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Institutions are shaped by history. Hence, in order to understand why local 
government institutions in Estonia were designed the way they were at the 
beginning of the 1990s after the collapse of communism, we should take into 
account both the history and the context of that time. To this end, the current 
thesis aims to analyse the re-establishment of local government in Estonia in 
the 1990s in the light of the past. For this purpose, a historical institutionalist 
approach is applied, with a particular focus on a path dependence and legacies 
framework.  
The interwar local government in Estonia was based on the structure 
created during the Russian era. Despite numerous legislative proposals, the 
special laws on local government were only enacted in 1937/38 under 
authoritarianism. During the communist period, the system used in the other 
Soviet republics was introduced in Estonia and local government became a 
state authority. The rebuilding of democratic local government in Estonia 
started at the end of the 1980s, not so much based on the interwar legislation 
on local government, but rather on the idea of interwar democratic local 
government. For some of the facets of local government institutions, the path 
had already been paved a century ago or earlier, making some choices in the 
post-communist period more likely while simultaneously reducing other 
available alternatives. The communist legacy of incomplete nation-building 
was a focal point for many parliamentary debates at the beginning of the 
1990s, with the result that in some cases less attention was paid to other details 
in the legislative process.  
The thesis concludes that both interwar and communist legacies can help 
in explaining some of the institutional choices made at the beginning of the 
1990s in Estonia. It proposes that the legacies explanation can prove useful in 
the historical institutionalist approach. Furthermore, when it comes to path 
dependence, it demonstrates that interdependent institutions can be more 
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1.1 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE FOR THE TOPIC 
After the collapse of communism, different countries have followed different 
paths in the transition to democracy. One possible explanation for this is that 
history matters and past legacies influence the path of democratisation (e.g. 
Ekiert & Hanson, 2003a; Stanger, 2002; Nunberg, 1999; Zweynert & 
Goldschmidt, 2005). This conclusion is nothing new in the research on the 
post-communist transformation in Central and Eastern Europe as the 
historical institutional approach has been used in democratisation studies in 
general since the 1970s, but ‘much work remains to be done to build firmer 
theoretical foundations linking the two fields’ (Barrenechea, Gibson, & Terrie, 
2016). The processes and outcomes of democratisation in different Central 
and Eastern European countries have diverged and therefore it is not possible 
to generalise, especially since out of all the Soviet republics, Estonia and Latvia 
had the most substantial prior experience of democratic politics (Linz & 
Stepan, 1996, pp. 402–403).  
Democratisation did not only take place at the state level – although the 
majority of the research into democratisation has focused on this area – but 
the transformation also occurred at the local government level in that there 
was a need to rebuild the local self-government that the Soviet powers had 
destroyed. Confining studies to national democracy alone would be 
inadequate because ‘subnational democracy cannot be simply deducted from 
the patterns of national democracy’ (Hendriks, Loughlin, & Lidström, 2011, p. 
728). Clark noted in 2002 that local government is, in fact, an underdeveloped 
research area in post-communist studies and democratic consolidation, due in 
part to the ‘rather negative view of the role of local government in democracy’ 
(Clark, 2002, p. 56). Since then, there has been some research into the topic 
(see King, Vanags, Vilka, & McNabb, 2004; Soós & Zentai, 2005), but fewer 
attempts to connect the developments of the 1990s with the past (e.g. with the 
interwar period).  
It has been argued that ‘history should be read “forward” and not 
“backward”’ in democratisation studies (Capoccia & Ziblatt, 2010, p. 939), 
because it allows us to identify more variables in action during the 
foundational moments of specific democratic institutions. Ekiert and Ziblatt 
argue that the post-1989 developments reflect both pre-communist and 
communist legacies in institutional choices – ‘not a single country in the 
region, for example, departed from the form of government and electoral 
institutions it established during the first episode of democratization in the 
post-World War I period’ (2013, p. 102).  
When it comes to Estonia’s case, local government played a remarkable role 
in establishing Estonia’s independence in 1918, and restoring it in 1991. In 
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addition, efforts to build government at the local level got underway on both 
occasions even before official independence was gained. We cannot talk about 
local self-government as such in Estonia during the Soviet period, but this does 
not preclude the possibility that certain elements of local government have 
survived for a century. This issue warrants further study. On the one hand, 
there is currently a lack of comprehensive analysis on the revival of democratic 
institutions in Estonia at the local level and on the legacies of the interwar (or 
the first republic) and Soviet periods. On the other hand, endeavouring to 
connect the developments of the 1990s at the local level with the Soviet period 
and the pre-communist period could help to explain the developments that 
took place during that decade, and contribute at the same time to research into 
Estonian local government and its history.1 Hence the original contribution of 
this thesis to the body of knowledge on this subject is twofold. First, it 
approaches certain elements of Estonian local government during the 
interwar and current period from a new angle; second, it enriches the 
research on the post-communist transformation at the local level by means 
of a case in which there was prior experience of democratic local self-
government during the interwar period. The latter is also relevant in the 
context of comparative institutional analysis, a central issue of which concerns 
‘why institutions are set up as they are’ (Stoker, 2008, p. 501), especially 
because opinions on the explanatory power of path dependence vary when it 
comes to the divergence of local government systems.  
Although the title of the dissertation is From Destruction to Democratic 
Revival, it delves further back in time than the title indicates. In order to 
reflect on revival, we also have to study what was destroyed and what, if 
anything, has been resurrected.  
1.2 RESEARCH AIM AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The aim of the thesis is to examine the developments in the local government 
system in Estonia since 1918, with an emphasis on the 1990s, and 
consequently to identify among the limited number of institutions those which 
appear to conform to the expectations of path dependence and those which do 
not; and to propose explanations for the presence of path dependence or for 
the lack thereof. As such, the thesis is a comparative historical analysis of these 
institutions and the way in which they have changed. The case explored is 
limited in time and also in the topics covered. The periods covered are from 
1918 to the 1950s, and from the 1980s to today. The English term local 
government conveys concepts both of local democracy (elections, councils, 
mayors, status) and of local administration (running public services) 
                                                 
1 In 2009, Sulev Mäeltsemees (2009) claimed that the restoration of local self-government and its 
position in the re-establishment of the independence of Estonia has remained under-researched to date, 
and that its role has even been underestimated in that process and stage of history.  
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(Coulson, 1995, p. 1). Of the two concepts, local democracy will be dealt with 
in more depth than local administration since there is a need to limit the scope. 
In the case of Estonia, the period from 1934 to 1940 can be classified in 
different ways. On the one hand, authoritarianism began in 1934 and hence 
these years could be associated with communism under the ‘authoritarianism’ 
label, as Wittenberg (2013, p. 10) has proposed. On the other hand, this was 
the period when Estonia finally adopted its own local government legislation, 
which was therefore referred to during the post-communist period. The latter 
is the main reason why this dissertation uses the terms pre-communist or 
interwar period, communist, and post-communist period. 
The main research question addresses the issue of whether we can talk 
about continuity in the case of Estonian local government (or the rebirth of the 
interwar local government system), or whether we should talk about a totally 
new local government system in Estonia after 1989. The three subsidiary 
questions that the thesis attempts to answer are consequently: 
 
1) Which aspects of local government institutions in Estonia have 
exhibited the strongest path dependence, and in which institutions has 
this been weak or missing, and why? 
2) What was the role of interwar legacies in the critical junctures and 
institutional choices of the post-communist period?  
3) What are the similarities and differences between the development of 
central-local relations in the two periods of independence? 
 
As the thesis is motivated by the puzzle related to the (re-)establishment of 
local government in the 1990s, and hence decentralisation and 
democratisation, the main formal institutions that will be dealt with are county 
government, local election rules, and the institution of the city/rural 
municipality mayor. In addition, in order to contextualise the issue more 
clearly and to answer the why part of the research question, the analysis will 
also cover the development of legislation and administrative units as well as 
territorial division.  
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. The second chapter discusses the 
main concepts and theories related to local government, local democracy, 
democratisation, and legacies. It also demonstrates why the Estonian case is 
unique. The third chapter deals with historical institutionalism as an analytical 
framework, and the methods employed. Chapters four to six focus on the three 
periods in the history of local government in Estonia – the era of the first 
republic or interwar period (1918–1940, years of local self-government), the 
Soviet period (selected years from 1940–1989, the destruction of local 
government), and Estonian re-independence (since 1989,2 the revival of local 
government). Chapters four and six adopt a similar structure, covering the 
                                                 
2 Although Estonia regained its independence in 1991, the relevant processes for local government 
started in 1989 or even in 1988. 
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general context, county level, local autonomy, local democracy and local 
government bodies, followed by a discussion. Chapter five covers only the first 
and last years of the Soviet period. Although the communist period can also be 
divided into sub-periods and contained critical junctures and various legacies, 
this period in Estonia will be dealt with only in part, for at least two reasons. 
First, it will be assumed that the communist legacies influenced only the initial 
years of re-independence and that these effects evaporated after some years. 
Second, the focus of the thesis is on those periods when local self-government 
actually existed. Chapter seven discusses the selected institutions with an 




2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND 
DECENTRALISATION 
The theoretical framework of the thesis is based on local government theory, 
democratisation, decentralisation, and post-communist development, on the 
one hand, and on historical institutionalism on the other. To this end, this 
chapter reviews how previous research has approached decentralisation and 
post-communist democratisation. The first section (2.1) focuses on two of the 
main values of local government – autonomy and democracy. The subsequent 
section (2.2) deals with democratisation and decentralisation and, together 
with section 2.1, creates the framework for analysing local government in 
Estonia in Chapters 4 and 6. Section 2.3 then demonstrates why Estonia’s case 
is an interesting one to explore within the analytical framework of historical 
institutionalism. Historical institutionalism itself is covered in more detail in 
Chapter 3. 
2.1 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ITS VALUES – 
DEMOCRACY AND AUTONOMY 
Local government is important in the context of transitioning from 
authoritarianism since local governments ‘restrain the excesses of national 
governments and the anti-democratic tendencies of centralized power’ (Smith, 
1998, p. 86). On the other hand, ‘the remnants of authoritarianism can equally 
be left over in local government’ (Smith, 1998, p. 86). Local government can 
contribute to the overall goals of the transformation processes in several ways. 
Local government has the potential to actively involve citizens in making 
choices for a locality (Stewart, 1996), to enable more people to participate in 
governing (Baldersheim & Illner, 1996; Sharpe, 1970), and is a source of 
political education (Kjellberg, 1995). Teune claims (1995, p. 18) that the 
‘incentives for participation are stronger locally than nationally in that the 
consequences are more visible and immediate on the local level’. Political 
education was also put forward as an argument as early as the 19th century by 
John Stuart Mill (1862, p. 269):  
But in the case of local bodies, besides the function of electing, many 
citizens in turn have the chance of being elected, and many, either by 
selection or by rotation, fill one or other of the numerous local 
executive offices. In these positions they have to act for public interests, 
as well as to think and to speak, and the thinking cannot all be done by 
proxy. It may be added that these local functions, not being in general 
sought by the higher ranks, carry down the important political 
education which they are the means of conferring to a much lower 
grade in society. 
Local government and decentralisation 
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Political education is closely related to the development of (new) political 
elites at the local level who might gradually participate in national political life 
(Baldersheim & Illner, 1996). In a similar vein, Stoker (1994, p. 194) concludes 
that ‘local government should not be defined by its task of service delivery; 
rather it should be valued as a site for political activity’.  
The aforementioned demonstrates that there are several arguments to 
support the claim that local democracy is crucial to the process of democratic 
transition and consolidation at the national level. Although it has been argued 
that there is a lack of hard evidence to support the conviction that local 
democracy is a necessary condition for a viable democratic polity (see 
Pratchett, 2004; Smith, 1998), there is even less evidence to substantiate 
claims to the contrary.  
Next we should attempt to define local government and present the criteria 
that have to be met in order to talk about local government as local self-
government. Local government is an institutional realisation of local 
democracy and a relevant building block of a democratic state. It ‘divides 
power and provides an alternative source of authority to the central state’ 
(Leigh, 2000, p. 7). Based on the European Charter of Local Self-Government, 
the concept ‘denotes the right and the ability of local authorities, within the 
limits of the law, to regulate and manage a substantial share of public affairs 
under their own responsibility and in the interests of the local population’ 
(1985; emphasis added); in addition, the Charter foresees that council 
members should be elected. This definition reflects the values of local 
government, namely democracy or participation, efficiency, and autonomy. 
Kjellberg admits that these values are ideals, but without these three ideals the 
‘purpose and very legitimacy of the institution of local government will have to 
be questioned’ (1995, p. 44).  
Similarly, Baldersheim and Illner (1996, pp. 1–2) have used democracy 
(popular participation and relations between citizens and elites), efficiency 
(capacities for problem solving and service delivery), and autonomy 
(‘relationships between local and central government and the scope of 
discretion left for the local authority’) to evaluate local government reforms in 
post-communist countries. According to the efficiency argument, the elected 
and politically responsible bodies at the local level have better knowledge of 
local issues and can transform these into actions more effectively than the 
central administrative agencies can (Kjellberg, 1995, p. 44). 
In relation to these three values, the focus of the thesis will be on democracy 
and autonomy. Efficiency, involving the capacity of service delivery, would 
require analysing several policy areas in order to draw any conclusions, and 
hence it has been omitted from the scope of the thesis. 
Democracy is an ambiguous term. There are any number of different 
definitions, but there is a consensus that the presence of competitive elections 
is one of its key elements. Schumpeter (1994, p. 250) offers the following 
minimalist definition: ‘the democratic method is that institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common 
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good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of 
individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will’. This applies to 
both the national and local levels. ‘If democracy is to take root in the long run, 
then democratic political developments will have to occur at the local level’ 
(Teune, 1995, p. 23). Among ‘the factors that support democracy at the sub-
national level’ are representative government, administrative capacity, 
legitimacy of local structures, ethos of democracy, and involvement of civil 
society (Smith, 1998, pp. 88–91).  
Gábor Soós (2006, pp. 8–9) argues that while a democratic audit involves 
criteria such as a guaranteed framework of equal rights, institutions of 
representative government, institutions of open and accountable government, 
and a civil or democratic society, the ‘assessment of local democracy requires 
two other dimensions’. These are (legal, political, and financial) autonomy and 
effectiveness. ‘In sum, local democracy is conceptualised as autonomous, 
effective, open, and representative local government surrounded by a civil 
society in the framework of guaranteed political rights’ (Soós, 2006, p. 9). 
Pratchett (2004, p. 361) concludes that ‘without some form of local democracy, 
the opportunities for developing democratic values and skills that can be used 
at broader institutional levels would be severely limited’. This brings us back 
to the aforementioned relevance of the local level for the political education 
that Mill (1862) emphasised. 
Local autonomy is ‘linked to both the theory and practice of democracy’ and 
is ‘rarely distinguished from local democracy’, although the two terms should 
be distinguished (Pratchett, 2004, p. 358). Democratic local governments 
must have autonomy (Teune, 1995, p. 14). Local autonomy is ‘primarily a 
question of responsibilities, resources and discretion’ (Davey, 1971, p. 45). If 
local administrative units have no legal, political, and financial autonomy, the 
term local (self-)government loses its meaning (Soós, 2006, p. 9). Irrespective 
of how autonomous local government is, ‘it presumes one or several 
institutional levels to which it is subordinated’ (Kjellberg, 1995, p. 45). This 
indicates that both the powers and structure of local government are inevitably 
subject to legislation set by a higher level. Goldsmith and Page argued in 1987 
that ‘the position of local governments in a country’s system of government 
was a reflection of the functions they performed, the discretion they had in 
performing these functions, and the access or influence that they had in policy 
debates at national level’ (Goldsmith & Page, 2010, p. 5).3 In order to measure 
the first, they used ‘local governments’ share of public expenditure and its 
share of public employment to reflect their functional importance’ (2010, p. 
5). In the case of discretion, it is important to ‘understand the legal framework 
within which they operate’, but also the ‘process of administrative regulation’ 
and the financial regime (Goldsmith & Page, 2010, pp. 5–6). Based on this, it 
                                                 
3 Page and Goldsmith have proposed a classification of local government systems into Northern and 
Southern ones, according to the vertical power relations, based on the same elements – functions, 
discretion, and access. This typology is introduced in Section 2.2.3 below. 
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seems advisable to explore the legal framework and compare it over time, 
particularly since ‘reforming the system of the local government will not be 
feasible without reforming the municipal law’ (Olle, 2000, p. 49). 
2.2 DEMOCRATISATION 
Since really existing democracy is a perpetually unfinished product, 
democratization will always be on the research agenda of political 
scientists. And since nothing seems to work well everywhere, they 
will have plenty of explaining to do. 
Schmitter (2010, p. 28) 
2.2.1 THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AT THE STATE LEVEL  
Developments at the local government level are part of the wider process of 
democratisation. Democratisation has often been divided into the phases of 
liberalisation, transition and consolidation. For its part, transition can be 
defined as ‘the interval between one political regime and another’ or, more 
specifically, ‘[t]ransitions are delimited, on the one side, by the launching of 
the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by the 
installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of 
authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative’ (O’Donnell 
& Schmitter, 1986, p. 6). According to Richard Rose, the transition implies 
‘predictability: we not only knew where a country was coming from but also 
knew where it was going’ (2009, p. 1). On the other hand, ‘[i]n the midst of 
transformation, it was clear what was being left behind, but it was not clear 
what lay ahead’ (Rose, 2009, p. 1). Rose has found that ‘[w]hile every society 
is in transition, few have experienced transformation as abruptly and 
pervasively as nations once in the Communist bloc [...]. There was the treble 
transformation of the economy, society and the political regime – and often of 
the boundaries of the state as well’ (2009, p. 1).  
The post-communist transition was part of the so-called third wave of 
democratisation (Huntington, 1991), which also covers certain countries in 
Southern Europe and Latin America. The democratisation process in Central 
and Eastern European countries was different from that in Southern Europe 
and Latin America.4 For example, it also included the need for economic 
reform and affected the levels of nationhood, constitution-making or the 
institutional framework, and ‘decisions on who gets what, when, and how – in 
terms of both political power and economic resources’ (Offe, 2004, p. 505). 
Schmitter (2010, p. 22) has argued that ‘having to make so many changes at 
                                                 
4 Although when it comes to democratic survival and failure among third-wave democracies, Carter, 
Bernhard, and Nordstrom (2016) find that ‘in terms of democratic survival there is very little reason to 
treat post-communist democracies as a special case’ (p. 849). 
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once was an advantage’, since in Central and Eastern Europe the transition 
and consolidation of democracy has been easier and faster than in either Latin 
America or Southern Europe. Due to the differences, the theoretical literature 
derived principally from Southern Europe and Latin America (model of 
transitology/consolidology) has been found to have ‘only limited usefulness’ 
at best for Central and Eastern Europe (Wiarda, 2001). Ekiert and Ziblatt 
(2013, p. 91) describe comparing the ‘post-communist experience to 
democratic experiments in other temporally proximate third-wave cases in 
other world regions’ as ‘the mistake of a drunkard whose search for his keys 
leads him to the spot he can most easily see – under the lamppost’. Hence it is 
reasonable to analyse Estonia’s case only in the context of Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
In 2002, Thomas Carothers published an article entitled ‘The End of the 
Transition Paradigm’, which sparked a debate in the Journal of Democracy 
about the transition paradigm.5 The article did ‘not target the scholarly 
literature on democratization; it [was] about a set of ideas that many 
democracy-aid practitioners arrived at and began to apply in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s’ (Carothers, 2002b, p. 33). Carothers’ main claim was that 
there is a contradiction between reality and the model, and that the transition 
paradigm has ‘outlived its usefulness’ (2002a, p. 6). He also argued that, based 
on the paradigm, underlying conditions, including legacies, are not major 
factors ‘in either the onset or the outcome of the transition process’, while 
cases of democratisation in Central Europe and elsewhere show that ‘past 
experience with political pluralism contributes to the chances for democratic 
success’ (Carothers, 2002a, pp. 8, 16). Hence, as the basic assumptions of 
transition theory have been proved wrong, it is not the most suitable 
framework for analysing democratisation in Eastern and Central Europe. 
Jürgen Habermas has described the changes in Eastern and Central Europe 
in 1989 as ‘rectifying revolutions’, where there was a ‘total lack of ideas that 
are either innovative or orientated towards the future’ (1990, p. 5). In addition, 
Illner (1996, p. 160) considered the claim that the majority of ideas and 
institutions were either ‘the cornerstones of western democracy and of the 
market economy’ or ‘anchored in the pre-war life of the East-Central European 
countries’ to be mostly correct. ‘Mostly’ refers to the goals and ideologies of 
transformation here. The case might be different for the ‘policies used to 
implement such goals and the changes themselves’, since the transformation 
was ‘producing its own social systems’ (Illner, 1996, p. 160). 
In a similar vein, different metaphors have been used to describe 
democracy-building. Elster, Offe, and Preuss (1998) have used a ‘rebuilding 
the ship at sea’ metaphor to describe the transformation process in the post-
communist countries, conjuring up an image of a damaged boat that the 
passengers have to rebuild in the ‘open sea’. Alternatively, Guillermo 
O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (1986, p. 66) have used a ‘multilayered 
                                                 
5 Journal of Democracy, Vol 13, no 3, July 2002, pp. 5–38. 
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chess game’ metaphor to describe some types of transition from authoritarian 
rule, since actors experience systems of constraints. Both metaphors suggest 
that there is no reason to look for linear or sequential models to explain the 
process of transitioning to democracy. A variety of transition pathways can be 
identified across nations and each national case has its peculiarities (Pridham, 
1994, p. 17). 
2.2.2 THE IMPACT OF LEGACIES  
Within the last decade or so, certain authors (e.g. Bozóki, 2008; Ekiert, 2003; 
Pop-Eleches, 2007; Pridham, 2009) have brought history back into 
democratisation studies and used the past, and especially legacies, to explain 
the success or outcomes of democratisation. The use of legacies as an 
explanation for the diverging paths of various countries after the fall of 
communism is multifaceted. First, the temporal focus ranges from communist 
legacies to interwar legacies (e.g. Ekiert and Ziblatt, 2013) and even thousands 
of years back (e.g. Young, 1997). Second, the level of analysis is mainly focused 
on individuals’ political behaviour (e.g. Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2017) or 
post-communist institutions and their design (e.g. Sarapuu, 2017). Third, 
legacies are mainly treated as a correlation, but sometimes also as a 
relationship (e.g. Kotkin and Beissinger, 2014). Due to all of these variations, 
the meaning of ‘legacy’ varies from one study to another and the concept is 
often left undefined.  
Regarding the post-communist economic and political transformation, 
Ekiert suggests that ‘in order to understand East European experiences we 
should pay more attention to legacies of the old regime and path-dependent 
dynamics, even despite the fact that these cases are characterized by a sharp 
break in institutional continuity’ (2003, p. 114). Various countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe ‘have been able to reassert links to pre-communist identities 
and, in [the] view of many observers, ‘return’ to their specific historical 
trajectories interrupted by communist rule’ (Ekiert & Hanson, 2003a, p. 2). This 
does not mean that the historical past predetermines the trajectory per se, but 
to some extent it makes some paths more probable. Painter and Peters, 
analysing administrative traditions,6 argue that ‘even if the structures have 
changed, many of the underlying values may not have’ (2010, p. 3).  
Researchers into the post-communist period have paid more attention to 
communist legacies than to pre-communist ones (Wittenberg, 2013, pp. 4–5) 
and this trend continues.7 Wittenberg notes that we do not necessarily have to 
                                                 
6 Peters (2008, p. 118) defines an administrative tradition as ‘an historically based set of values, 
structures and relationships with other institutions that defines the nature of appropriate public 
administration within society’. Therefore, ‘administrative traditions refer to a lower level of abstraction 
than historical legacies. Administrative traditions are a part of the administrative legacy of a country’ 
(Meyer-Sahling & Yesilkagit, 2011, p. 315). 
7 For example, Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017) and Beissinger and Kotkin (2014).   
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distinguish between the pre-communist, communist, and post-communist 
period. ‘Another possibility would be to divide things into an authoritarian 
period (encompassing interwar dictatorships as well as communism) and a 
post-authoritarian period after 1989. Depending on which demarcation is 
used, the temporal identity of the legacies would change’ (Wittenberg, 2013, 
p. 10).  
Ekiert concludes that ‘[i]n the existing literature on democratization 
authors usually point to at least four groups of factors that need to be included 
in any effort to explain patterns of the ongoing transformations: legacies of the 
past and initial conditions, institutional choices, policies of new governments, 
and the extent of external support’ (2003, p. 92). For Estonia’s local 
government, the first point would involve firstly analysing the local 
government during the so-called First Republic or interwar period (1918–
1940) because we need to understand the local government structure and 
reasons for this structure in order to identify the legacies in the post-1989 
period. For initial conditions, we have to turn to the local administration that 
was in place in the 1980s. 
Based on the debates on public administration in East Central Europe, 
Meyer-Sahling also claims that ‘there is no agreement with regard to the status 
of the legacy for the explanation of post-communist reform pathways and 
outcomes’ (2009, p. 510). In their analysis of the democratic transition and 
consolidation in post-communist Europe, Linz and Stepan argue that ‘History 
and the specific legacy of the previous non-democratic regime are important 
for all analyses of democratization. There is possibly no area where history is 
more important than in the Baltics’ (1996, p. 402). They also emphasise the 
fact that on the one hand, the USSR ‘brutally transformed these polities 
demographically, culturally, economically, and even ecologically’, but on the 
other hand, ‘Estonia and Latvia had the most substantial prior experience of 
democratic politics of any of the Soviet republics’ (Linz & Stepan, 1996, pp. 
402–403). 
Legacies can be positive or negative. Linz and Stepan use the term ‘usable 
democratic legacy’ to refer to the pre-communist democratic experience of the 
Baltic countries (1996, p. 452), which is mainly a positive legacy. The 
communist regime also had positive (e.g. eliminated illiteracy8) and negative 
legacies (e.g. double standards) (Bozóki, 2008). ‘The discrepancy between the 
formal rules and administrative practices is commonly argued to remain a 
hallmark of post-communist administrations’ (Meyer-Sahling, 2009, p. 511), 
                                                 
8 In the case of Estonia, this legacy is not applicable because, according to the census of 1897, the 
literacy rate in the Governorate of Estonia was 79.9%, while in Moscow it was only 56.3% – these figures 
include the whole population, including infants. When considered only from age 10 and above, then the 
rate on Estonian territory (Governorates of Estonia and Livonia) was 95%. In 1934, the literacy rate in 
Estonia was 96.1% (Tiit, 2011, p. 124). Education played a prominent role in interwar Estonia and the 
nation ‘developed into one of the most highly educated in the world’ (Bennich-Björkman, 2007, p. 89). 
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one reason being that attitudinal legacies9 are usually more difficult to handle 
than institutional ones (Pridham, 2000, p. 49). 
The continuities in the post-1989 developments are ‘both structural and 
cultural and reach to the more recent as well as to the distant past’ (Illner, 
1996, p. 162). Ekiert finds that ‘legacies can only be actualized though events’ 
and ‘the interaction of legacies and events should be at the center of 
macrohistorical analysis’ (2003, pp. 93–94). Kopstein, in analysing some of 
the literature on the post-communist democracy and legacies, concluded that: 
If the weight of the past affects the present, at a minimum it is 
necessary to specify which past. In the case of East-Central Europe, for 
example, the relevant past has been identified as the policy choices in 
the initial postcommunist years that have been influenced by the path 
of extrication from Communism, whether roundtables or revolutions, 
that have in turn been determined by the types of Communist regime 
that are themselves the product of the types of precommunist state and 
society, which ultimately reflect the level of modernization at the time 
of national independence after World War I. (2003, p. 233)  
Opinions vary on the stage at which the impact of different legacies is the 
strongest, but based on previous research there is some reason to believe that 
during the initial years of transition the communist legacies had a stronger 
effect than the legacies of the pre-communist period. Ekiert (2003) argues that 
the legacies of the communist period had the most significant impact on 
specific paths of reform and types of transformation in Central and Eastern 
Europe during the first decade of post-communism. Further, Meyer-Sahling 
concludes, based on his analysis of government effectiveness, that the ‘legacy 
of the communist past had a short-term effect on administrative reform 
outcomes after the change of regime’ (2009, p. 517), but also suggests that this 
potentially short-term impact of the legacy of the past should be subject to 
empirical investigation. Pop-Eleches found, by using a cross-sectional 
regression method,10 that there is no evidence that the effect of legacies fades 
away as the transition takes its course, but rather that ‘interwar statehood was 
a much stronger predictor of civil and political rights in 2004 ... than during 
the early transition years, when its effect was statistically insignificant’ (2007, 
p. 917). The weakness of Pop-Eleches’ study is that interwar statehood is only 
marked as absent or present, without taking into consideration its duration or 
content. All three examples (Ekiert, 2003; Meyer-Sahling, 2009; Pop-Eleches, 
2007) describe the situation at the state level and not at the local level.  
                                                 
9 According to LaPorte and Lussier (2011, p. 646) the attitudinal legacies are microlevel legacies and 
‘describe the attitudes and expectations of individuals or aggregates of individuals (for example, voters, 
mothers, ethnic minorities)’. 
10  It is not clear from his article exactly which countries are included under the interwar statehood 
variable, although the study covered 28 countries (12 East European countries and all 15 former Soviet 
republics and Mongolia). 
 
25 
At the same time, there is no ‘consensus on what constitutes a “legacy” or 
how to define it’ (LaPorte & Lussier, 2011, p. 638) and ‘through what 
mechanisms legacies shape current outcomes’11 (Ekiert & Hanson, 2003a, p. 
4). The simplest definition provided in the Merriam-Webster dictionary is that 
a legacy is ‘something transmitted by or received from an ancestor or 
predecessor or from the past’. To arrive at a legacy definition that befits 
historical institutionalism and comparative historical analysis, then legacies 
can be defined largely following Collier and Munck (2017) as ‘durable, stable 
institutions’ emerging from a critical juncture. This renders a legacy a crucial 
concept in determining the occurrence of a critical juncture. For the scholars 
of post-communist politics, oftentimes ‘a legacy is a causal factor that endures 
through a critical juncture’ (Lussier & LaPorte, 2017, p. 12; emphasis in the 
original), and this is a difference worth bearing in mind when perusing the 
literature.  
Although Meyer-Sahling questions the impact of the interwar period on the 
post-communist administrative reforms, he does not deny that this period was 
a source of inspiration (2009, p. 521): ‘the discrepancy between 
Czechoslovakia’s status as the country with the most professional bureaucracy 
during the inter-war period and the status of the Czech Republic as the reform 
laggard under post-communism does not lend support to the argument that 
the inter-war period could have much of an impact on post-communist 
reforms’. The conclusion regarding the weak link between the interwar period 
and post-communist reforms is questionable considering research conducted 
by Ekiert and Ziblatt (2013), Nunberg (1999), and Pop-Eleches (2007). 
Moreover, Meyer-Sahling himself calls for ‘further development of legacy 
explanations of administrative reform in East Central Europe’ (2009, p. 524). 
In conclusion, the legacies approach holds appeal because previous 
research about post-communist democratisation has found that: 
• ‘Subregional differences and country-specific trajectories from the pre-
communist period persisted during the communist period and remain 
visible today’ (Ekiert & Ziblatt, 2013, p. 96). The specific relations 
require further research according to Ekiert and Ziblatt (2013), 
especially with regard to the interwar period’s impact on post-
communist reforms, as questioned by Meyer-Sahling (2009), for 
example.  
• ‘[H]istorical legacies seem to matter more rather than less as the post-
communist transformation takes its course’ (Pop-Eleches, 2007, p. 
924).  
When it comes to the analytical framework for examining post-communist 
transformations and legacies, Ekiert and Hanson (2003b, pp. 18–20) 
                                                 
11 Wittenberg (2015, p. 369) has emphasised that a legacy ‘is the outcome to be explained, not the 
antecedent or the mechanism linking antecedent and outcome’. Furthermore, that ‘outcome qualifies as 
a legacy only if it cannot be fully explained except by reference to an antecedent cause or correlate’ 
(Wittenberg, 2015, p. 369). 
Local government and decentralisation 
26 
distinguish three levels of ‘analysis for investigation of the temporal and 
spatial contexts within which social and political change takes place’. These 
levels, which represent ‘three types of temporal “path dependence”’ (Ekiert & 
Hanson, 2003b, pp. 19–20), are: structural (‘historical patterns of economic 
and cultural reproduction’; longue durée), institutional (institutions and 
practices, i.e. institutional legacies; intermediate period of time), and 
interactional (‘contingent events, choices, and decisions engendering 
processes of increasing returns’; immediate context). Related to the latter, 
Crawford and Lijphart suggest, based on various research, that ‘the immediate 
context provides the conditions under which past legacies will or will not play 
a role in shaping the direction of regime change’ (1995, p. 196). 
2.2.3 DECENTRALISATION AND DEMOCRATISATION AT THE LOCAL 
LEVEL  
In the process of theorising about democratisation, political institutions are 
sometimes seen as outcomes of strategic interaction and also as ‘stable 
platforms from which contending groups can predict policy outcomes into the 
future’ (Alexander, 2001, pp. 249–250). Capoccia and Ziblatt (2010, p. 940) 
emphasise that: 
the complex institutional configuration of democracies rarely emerges 
all at once. On the contrary, different institutions often emerge at 
different times, often for different reasons. Thus, it is important to 
narrow our analytic look from the whole regime to a more detailed 
analysis of the emergence of the discrete democratic institutions that 
together define the content of political regimes.  
Local government is one such democratic institution. During the Soviet period 
there was no local self-government in Estonia and hence we cannot talk about 
democratisation without paying attention to democratic decentralisation. 
Decentralisation is a vital element of transformation in post-communist 
countries (Baldersheim & Illner, 1996, p. 7) and can contribute to the 
democratisation process (e.g. development of new elites, subnational 
governments’ ability to act ‘as a check or countervailing force to national 
governments’) (Illner, 2000, p. 391). Although decentralisation is also used in 
established democracies as a tool for intergovernmental relations, in the post-
Soviet countries, decentralisation was needed in order for local self-
government to materialise. 
There are at least three sources of, or motivators for, decentralisation – 
local-level, national-level, and international-level actors. Devas and Delay 
have indicated that one possible driver for decentralisation is ‘a real demand 
from the local level for local democratic control and autonomy, such as 
occurred in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s as a reaction against 
the failures of the centralised state over the previous four decades’ (2006, p. 
678). Yet the national level may also ‘perceive the potential economic, 
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administrative and political advantages of decentralisation’ (Devas & Delay, 
2006, p. 678), or the pressure for decentralisation might come from 
international organisations and bodies (e.g. OECD, European Union). 
Decentralisation has at least three facets – administrative, political 
(including democratic), and fiscal. Administrative decentralisation involves 
deconcentration, devolution, and delegation. Deconcentration is a process 
whereby ‘governmental functions are shifted downward within the 
hierarchical system of state bureaucracy, yet without weakening the vertical 
hierarchy of the system – deconcentrated units remain vertically subordinated 
to central authorities’ (Illner, 1998, p. 8). Devolution is ‘the transfer of 
authority to relatively autonomous bodies outside the direct control of central 
authorities’ (Yoder, 2003, p. 264) (e.g. to elected local governments) and is a 
way to increase local autonomy. To this end, deconcentration, delegation, and 
devolution can be seen as ‘points along a continuum of administrative 
autonomy’, where devolution involves the most autonomy (Schneider, 2003, 
p. 38).  
Political decentralisation ‘includes the constitutional or electoral reforms 
designed to devolve political authority to subnational actors and to create or 
activate spaces for the political representation of subnational polities’ (Falleti, 
2010, p. 17). Fiscal decentralisation policies should ‘increase the revenues or 
fiscal authority of subnational governments’ (Falleti, 2010, p. 17). Falleti 
(2010, p. 37) also notes that ‘a significant time lag between unfunded 
administrative decentralisation and fiscal decentralisation most likely 
indicates that the national government has the upper hand’.12 
Democratisation and decentralisation do not always go hand in hand. 
Pursuing only administrative decentralisation, without democratic 
decentralisation, can undermine democratisation (Manor, 2006). In addition, 
decentralisation can, under certain circumstances, lead to increased 
corruption or growing regional inequalities (Dowley, 2006; Loewen, 2018).  
The processes that took place in Central and Eastern Europe were not only 
those related to democratisation and decentralisation. For example, Coulson 
and Campbell have argued that ‘it was the rediscovery and reinvention of the 
purpose and rationale of local government, seen as playing a central role in the 
political and social life of the country, bridging the state and civil society’ 
(2006, p. 539). Illner (1998) has claimed that the reforms aimed at 
decentralisation in Central and Eastern Europe were halted halfway through 
the process, and more centralist policies have been introduced in the region. 
Estonia seems to be no exception, since in the mid-1990s the administrative 
system started to become state-focused again (Olle, 1996). 
                                                 
12 O’Dwyer and Ziblatt (2006) found, based on a sample of around 33 countries, that the correlation 
between the three types of decentralisation (political, fiscal, and administrative) is very weak. The same 
study also tentatively concludes that various types of decentralisation have had a different impact both 
on efficiency and effectiveness.  
Local government and decentralisation 
28 
Some of the key issues of decentralisation are (Devas & Delay, 2006, pp. 
679–680, 682): 
1) The size of decentralised local government units and the number of 
levels 
2) The structure of local government and local democratic control 
3) The financing of local government 
4) Central-local relations 
The size of local government units and the number of levels  
It is believed that the size of the basic units of local government influences 
their effectiveness and democracy. Smaller units offer greater opportunities to 
citizens for direct participation in governance (Horváth, 2000, p. 36), while 
bigger ones make it possible to provide services that have economies of scale 
(Devas & Delay, 2006, p. 680). The number, functions and relationships 
between the tiers of a local government system was one of the most broadly 
discussed issues in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s (Horváth, 2000; 
Regulski, 2003). 
In many countries, there is a regional or county level between the state and 
local government. The governmental purpose and capacity of the regional or 
county authorities varies, reflecting differences in national state structures 
(Herrschel & Tallberg, 2011, p. 11). Keating (1997, p. 17) suggests that: 
in most states, the region is a contested area, both territorially and 
functionally. Spatially, it exists somewhere between the national and 
the local and is the scene of intervention by actors from all levels, 
national, local, regional and now supranational. Functionally, it is a 
space in which different types of agency interact and, since it is often 
weakly institutionalized itself, a terrain for competition among them. 
 
Ultimately, due to the regional or county level being an arena of conflicting 
interests, the question arises as to ‘whether such an intermediate or regional 
tier of government should be part of the central government apparatus (i.e. a 
deconcentrated tier) or a democratically elected tier of devolved government’ 
(Devas & Delay, 2006, p. 681). In this thesis, the regional level has been 
understood as the level between the state and cities/rural municipalities, even 
if there is no political self-government at this level.13  
                                                 
13 For example, the Assembly of European Regions (1996) has defined a region as ‘the territorial 




The structure of local government 
Under the structure of local government, Devas and Delay (2006) refer to two 
main executive models, namely the single executive (directly elected executive 
mayor) and the plural executive (mayor plus executive committee elected 
indirectly from the council, or leader plus functional committees of the 
council). ‘The advantages claimed for the single executive model [...] are about 
effective decision-making and clear lines of accountability’, while the plural 
executive model ‘offers greater opportunities for council members to have a 
voice on behalf of their constituents in the council’s decisions. The loss of this 
voice in the single executive model can lead to frustration on the part of 
councillors and attempts to sabotage the work of the executive’ (Devas & 
Delay, 2006, pp. 682–683). ‘In East-Central Europe, the problem of balance 
between the representative and executive functions was particularly acute 
during the first years of post-communist reforms, both at national and local 
levels’ (Baldersheim, Bodnarova, Horvath, & Vajadova, 1996, p. 198). 
Baldersheim et al. (1996, p. 199) argue that the executives largely had the role 
of building the capacity of the system14 ‘to act in accordance with the demands 
with which they were faced’. 
According to constitutional institutionalism, mayoral norms ‘vary along 
with different government forms’, because ‘different countries structure their 
political organisation in different ways, including the division of labour 
between the mayor, the elected officials and the appointed officials’ (Berg, 
2006, pp. 320–321). Kübler and Michel (2006, p. 222) consider that in the 
case of vertical power relations, the ‘cultural traditions, legacies of the past, as 
well as routines established through daily practice can be at least as important 
in shaping central-local relations’ as legal rules. The same can be assumed to 
be valid for horizontal power relations. 
The council has both an internal and an external role. ‘Internally, the 
council should exert its influence in its relations with other agents to make 
local government responsive to “the voice of the people”’ (Denters, 2006, p. 
271). While the council exerts its control over the mayor, the ‘control over the 
city council is to a large degree a function of the electoral system’ (Mouritzen 
& Svara, 2002, p. 53). 
Mouritzen and Svara (2002, p. 5) propose, on the basis of 14 countries,15 a 
local government typology based on horizontal power relations. They duly 
distinguish four forms of local government: the strong mayor form, the 
committee-leader form, the collective form, and the council-manager form. 
These are ideal forms; the ‘mayor has the most influence in the strong-mayor 
                                                 
14 ‘System capacity’ includes financial and legal resources, as well as the political and managerial 
skills for using them. The three main elements of system capacity are power, leadership, and 
management (Baldersheim, Bodnarova, Horvath, & Vajadova, 1996, p. 199). 
15 Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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form of government and the least influence in the council-manager form’ 
(Mouritzen & Svara, 2002, pp. 55, 212).  
The financing of local government 
The two main issues concerning the financing of local government are the 
extent and nature of local taxation and the grant system (Stewart, 2000). The 
financing system reflects the degree of decentralisation and local autonomy. 
Traditional measures for decentralisation include, for example, local 
government expenditure as a share of GDP and local expenditures as a share 
of total government expenditure (Dowley, 2006, p. 568). According to 
Schneider (2003, p. 37), ‘viewing subnational expenditures as a percentage of 
total expenditures is the most appropriate way to gauge fiscal 
decentralization’; however, this ‘does not evaluate the autonomy possessed by 
local units’.  
Fiscal autonomy refers to ‘resources distributed and collected by local 
governments without the control of central or regional governments’ and can 
be regarded as high if local governments rely on their local revenue and 
allocate them at will (Soós, 2006, p. 11). ‘The percentage of local revenues from 
taxes provides an indicator of the degree of subnational control over resources’ 
(Schneider, 2003, p. 38). Vertical fiscal imbalance exists where sub-national 
governments depend on transfers from higher levels of government for their 
expenditure needs (Caulfield, 2002, p. 154). Financial autonomy has a direct 
impact on the real power of a local authority. This might go some way towards 
explaining why fiscal decentralisation is one of the aspects of transition that 
has attracted the most attention from academics to date. 
Central-local relations 
Central-local relations involve the inherent tension between local autonomy 
and central control. Pratchett has identified three approaches for defining and 
analysing local autonomy, namely ‘freedom from higher authorities ... 
freedom to achieve particular outcomes ... and ... as the reflection of local 
identity’ (Pratchett, 2004, p. 363). The ‘freedom from’ approach is ‘based on 
constitutional and legal understandings of central-local relations’ (Pratchett, 
2004, p. 363) and in principle refers to local autonomy.  
Furthermore, we can distinguish three categories of central-local 
relationships: dual, fused, and split-hierarchy (sometimes referred to as the 
“mixed system”). In a dual structure ‘at the local level central government 
agencies and the municipalities exist side by side but with different 
competencies’, while in fused systems ‘local authorities and their 
competencies are determined by local as well as by upper-level government’ 
(Heinelt & Hlepas, 2006, p. 22). This typology has been deemed too simplistic 
to capture differences, especially as most European countries are under a 
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fused system, or one approaching that (Heinelt & Hlepas, 2006). In addition, 
John (2001) warns about designating any state as dual as this proposition has 
not been sufficiently tested. As the current study focuses on just one country, 
which has experienced both a dual and a fused system, the typology allows for 
describing the general tendency over time. 
Another way to view central-local relations in Europe is via the North and 
South division proposed by Page and Goldsmith, which was based on the 
situation in the 1980s, that is, before the collapse of communism, as 
summarised in Figure 2.1. The North primarily comprised Northern European 
countries (Britain, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway), where ‘local government 
had a wide range of functions with some discretion ..., but had largely formal 
access via local government associations to central government’ (Goldsmith & 
Page, 2010, p. 1). The South was predominantly composed of Southern 
European countries (Italy, France, and part of Spain), where local 
governments had few functions and limited discretion, ‘but had more direct 
and informal access to the central government over many matters of local 
interest’ (Goldsmith & Page, 2010, p. 1). Furthermore, this divide is also in line 
with the religious divide – the Protestant north and the Catholic south, which 
has had an impact on the political culture and decentralisation of the countries 
(John, 2001, pp. 28–29). The differences between the North and the South are 
due to their historical background and hence the typology is grounded in 
history, which is one of the advantages compared to the dual/fused typology, 
especially when using it in a historical-institutionalist analysis. Its weakness 
lies in the fact that Goldsmith and Page covered only a limited number of 
unitary states and omitted federal Germany in their typology-building, for 
example.  
 
 Functions Discretion Access 
North High High Low 
South Low  Low High 
Figure 2.1  Functional allocation, discretion and access in the local government systems of 
Western Europe (Source: John, 2001, p. 28) 
2.3 LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN POST-COMMUNIST 
COUNTRIES 
Despite the possible legacies explanation elaborated in the previous section, a 
continuing puzzle is how to explain why some post-communist countries are 
democratic, while others are semi-democratic or autocratic (Ekiert, Kubik, & 
Vachudova, 2007). This, in turn, gives rise to an analogous question: Why have 
different post-communist countries developed their local government systems 
in divergent ways after decades of communist rule (i.e. what were the 
determinants)? 
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Ekiert and Ziblatt claim that:  
post-communist political transformations (outside of the former 
Soviet Union but including the Baltic states) should be conceptualized 
as a part of an ongoing and long-term historical democratization 
process across the gradient of Europe’s continent, from which the 
communist rule was but almost a temporary diversion. (2013, p. 91) 
Turning to the establishment of local government, Horváth identifies three 
main routes for the development of institutional transition at the local level in 
Central and Eastern Europe. According to the first scenario, the first free 
parliamentary and local elections were held at the same time ‘in order to 
establish new legitimate representative bodies’ (Horváth, 2000, p. 38). Under 
the second scenario, the parliamentary elections were held first and the new 
parliament adopted the basic legislation on local government, based on which 
the local elections were held. The third, or ‘gradual model’, which was the most 
typical in Central and Eastern Europe, was based on graduated legislation and 
foresaw that ‘only the most necessary elements for the future regime were 
introduced under the former circumstances’ (Horváth, 2000, p. 38). Estonia 
falls mostly under the third scenario because the local elections took place 
before the parliamentary ones, although it could also represent an additional 
scenario whereby democratic power was established first at the local level, 
after which new parliamentary elections took place. 
New legislative foundations were also needed to establish the institutional 
framework for local government. Horváth (2000) indicates two common 
legislative packages which are critical in (re-)establishing democratic local 
governance. The first consists of: (a) ‘constitutional changes (either a new 
constitution or crucial modification of the previous one); [(b)] acts on local 
government coherently codifying the basic rules of the new system, including 
... structure and operational rules; [(c)] acts on free local elections, defining 
the electoral system and process’ (p. 27). The second package, which 
establishes the scope of local government, includes: (a) ‘civil servant and 
public employee acts; [(b)] acts on the scope and duties of public 
administration at each level; [(c)] acts on property administration’ (Horváth, 
2000, p. 28). In addition, basic legislation is required on the status of the 
capital city and financial regulation of local governments (Horváth, 2000, p. 
28). The first package seems to be more crucial for local democracy because it 
can provide constitutional guarantees to the local government, determine 
horizontal and vertical power balances, and set the rules for representative 
democracy. In terms of the second package, point (b) specifies the vertical or 
central-local relations.  
Elster, Offe, and Preuss (1998, p. 18) claim that ‘transformation and 
systemic change is something that is only to a limited extent a matter of law 
making’ because there are other determinants of change that cannot easily be 
legislated, including cultural patterns and legacies, for example. In addition, 
Falleti has shown, based on her study of decentralisation in Latin America, 
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that although the institutional designs are shaped by ‘historical legacies and 
contextual conditions’, they are also ‘dependent on the types of territorial 
interests16 that dominate in the first round of negotiations over 
decentralization reforms and the order in which these [decentralization] 
policies unfold’ (2010, p. 39).  
Swianiewicz (2014) attempted to create an empirical typology17 of local 
government systems in Eastern Europe, as the well-established typologies 
often exclude this region. He proposed five types/clusters, based on which the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, and Latvia were grouped under type II. He refers to 
these three countries as ‘relatively decentralised’, pointing to the ‘negligible 
role of locally controlled taxes’, ‘a high level of territorial fragmentation ... and 
collective leadership’ (p. 305). This typology only takes into account the 
selected indicators in the 2000s, however, and hence may no longer be 
applicable in the next few years. 
Local government development in the post-communist countries is varied. 
New local government acts were introduced in the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovakia in 1990, and free local elections were held some months 
later (Baldersheim, Blaas, Horvath, Illner, & Swianiewicz, 1996, p. 24). In all 
the Baltic countries, the first competitive local elections were held in 
December 1989, whereas in Estonia the local government act was adopted in 
November 1989, and in Latvia and Lithuania one year later. While Hungary 
started to introduce a new local government financial system step by step as 
early as 1986, the Czech Republic and Slovakia didn’t follow suit until January 
1993. In many countries (e.g. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and 
Slovakia), the number of municipalities had increased by 1991 compared to 
1988. In 2012, the mayor was elected directly in Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia, and indirectly (by council) in the Baltic states and the 
Czech Republic. Lithuania introduced direct mayoral elections in 2015. 
The uniqueness of the Estonian case 
Comparative studies on local government in post-communist countries have 
generally been limited either temporally or geographically (with a focus on 
Central Europe), and there is a lack of comparative analyses involving pre-
communist or interwar legacies at the local level. The current comparative 
historical analysis aims to address this lacuna. 
Schöpflin analysed eight countries under communist regimes and 
concluded that for ‘every generalisation about Eastern Europe there is at least 
one exception, if not actually eight’ (1993, p. 2). Given that it was difficult to 
                                                 
16 According Falleti, territorial interests ‘are defined by the level of government that the actors 
represent’ and ‘by the characteristics of the geopolitical territorial unit’ they represent (Falleti, 2010, p. 
41).  
17 Swianiewicz used the following indicators as the basis: (1) territorial organisation; (2) functional 
decentralisation; (3) financial discretion of local governments; and (4) horizontal power relations. 
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make generalisations even during communist eras, the post-communist 
period is even more varied.  
During the interwar period, Estonia probably bore the most similarities to 
Finland. De Meur and Berg-Schlosser (1994) analysed 18 countries in the 
context of the survival and breakdown of democracy during the interwar 
period. Of the countries covered,18 the most pronounced similarities were 
found between Estonia and Finland, but while there was a democratic 
breakdown in the former, democracy survived in the latter. Findings indicated 
that one of the main reasons for the different outcomes was the different 
political culture in the respective countries (De Meur & Berg-Schlosser, 1994; 
Siaroff, 1999). 
Estonia is probably unique among post-communist countries during the 
interwar period. For example, Hungary and Poland had a different level of 
interwar statehood. While Hungary had an independent statehood in the 
interwar period (Pop-Eleches, 2007, p. 915), it was under dictatorship from 
1919 (Davies, 1997, p. 1320) and ‘did not have a single free and fair election in 
the interwar period’ (Kopstein, 2003, p. 232). Poland was, as a result of a coup, 
an authoritarian state from 1926. ‘Bulgaria had never truly experienced 
democracy in its history before the breakdown of the communist regime and 
was culturally separated from its Western neighbours’, hence the country 
‘could not refer to a “golden” pre-communist period’ (Elster, Offe, & Preuss, 
1998, p. 47). 
Czechoslovakia deserves a fuller explanation. Olson (1997, p. 151) claims 
that the Czechoslovakian Republic, created at the end of World War I, ‘was the 
only Eastern European nation to experience a continuous democracy until the 
beginning of World War II’. He also points out that the proportional 
representation electoral law of the 1990s in the Czech Republic was ‘a revival 
of the First Republic election system’ (Olson, 1997, p. 151). Regrettably, Olson 
highlights similarities between the interwar and post-communist periods, 
without focusing on causal mechanisms much. 
Czechoslovakia did not belong to the Soviet Union, and hence the 
communist regime was different from that in Estonia. Czechoslovakia, just like 
Yugoslavia, was a multinational state. Therefore, ‘because most Slovaks saw 
the interwar government as an instrument of Czech hegemony, this experience 
did not provide the same grounding for the effort to recreate democratic 
political life in Slovakia as it did in the Czech Lands’ (Wolchik, 1997, p. 200). 
In Slovakia, the ‘legacy of the interwar nationalist movement has also been 
evident in patterns of support for political parties in the postcommunist 
period’ (Wolchik, 1997, p. 201).  
In the interwar Czechoslovakia, the real local self-government existed only 
at the municipal level (the lowest level) according to Taborsky (1951). Taborsky 
                                                 
18 The countries covered were: Switzerland, Finland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Great Britain, 




(1951, p. 203) claimed in his article back in 1951 that ‘what happened in the 
field of local government in Czechoslovakia [during the interwar years] cannot 
be fully understood unless viewed against the Austro-Hungarian background’. 
The basic element of Austro-Hungarian heritage19 was ‘the Czech-German 
feud in the west and the similar ... feud, between the Slovaks and the 
Hungarians in the east’ (Taborsky, 1951, p. 203). The feud concerned the wish 
for increased state rights and centralisation as a response to this. There was at 
least one ‘element which might have worked in favour of more local self-
government – the discontent with the German-controlled (non-elective) local 
administration in the Czech lands’ (Taborsky, 1951, p. 205). But there was a 
general lack of interest and the new elite did not trust the Slovak people with 
local government, therefore local government in the new Republic became 
centralised (Taborsky, 1951, p. 206). 
Unfortunately, no detailed (comparative) historical analysis of local 
government in the Czech Republic seems to be available in English, and hence 
it is not possible to draw parallels or highlight differences between the 
Estonian case and the Czech Republic’s case. At the general level, it seems that 
compared to the interwar local government in Czechoslovakia at the 
lowest/primary level, the Estonian local government was more autonomous 
during the first decade of the interwar period at least. 
Two decades ago, Young (1997) analysed state-building in post-Soviet 
Russia, focusing on the ‘organisation of power among different levels of 
government’, especially local self-government. His analysis delves back as far 
as the 13th century and demonstrates how the legacy of a unitary system of 
power has hindered the development of local government in Russia – the 
‘greatest obstacle to local self-government in Russia has been the fact that 
motivation for reform has always emerged from above’ (Young, 1997, p. 269). 
According to Young, the local government reforms, including those during the 
Gorbachev era, failed for two main reasons. First, ‘the dominant interests 
involved in reforms had too much to lose and not enough to gain in the 
development of local power’, and second, ‘Russia lacked a meaningful legacy 
of local government’ (Young, 1997, p. 172).  
As mentioned previously, of the Soviet republics, Estonia and Latvia had 
the most substantial prior experience of democratic politics. A coup occurred 
in both countries in 1934, giving way to authoritarian rule. In Lithuania, a coup 
took place as early as 1926. In each case, ‘the coup was to a certain extent a 
pre-emptive one’ (Rothschild, 1992, p. 372). Latvia was the only Baltic country 
that reintroduced its interwar constitution in the 1990s. While Lithuania and 
Estonia had several interwar constitutions, including during the authoritarian 
years, Latvia had only one, adopted in 1922, namely before the authoritarian 
regime. This makes Latvia unique in its own way among Eastern European 
countries. 
                                                 
19 Taborsky uses the term ‘heritage’ similarly to the way in which many authors use the term ‘legacy’ 
half a century later. 
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When it comes to the usable past and local government, it seems safe to 
claim that Estonia is one of the few (if not the only) post-communist countries 
that had a ‘usable (democratic) past’ during the interwar period coupled with 
the experience of a strong local government. This makes identifying interwar 
legacies in the Estonian case challenging, as there is no other country with the 
same interwar legacy, which would allow for testing the validity of the legacy 
argument.20 
To conclude, studying democratisation and institutional developments at 
the local level, in addition to the national level, is relevant because local 
government is traditionally valued as a locale for political education and can 
contribute to the sustainability of democracy. Experience has shown that 
democratisation does not follow a set path but, despite the common 
communist past, developments in various countries diverge, and different 
countries have set up their institutions in different ways. Thus, it leads to the 
assumption – which will be studied below – that one explanation for 
divergence is the (distant) historical past of the specific country and context, 
which served to impact the institutional choices in the post-communist period.    
                                                 




3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
METHODOLOGY 
For an economic historian, time has always been something that is 
fundamentally disturbing, because there is no time in neoclassical 
theory ... I will be blunt: Without a deep understanding of time, you 
will be lousy political scientists, because time is the dimension in which 
ideas and institutions and beliefs evolve.  
(North, 1999, p. 316) 
The main purpose of this research is to explain the institutional similarities in 
local government in Estonia during two periods of independence. As the 
literature review revealed that transition theory is outdated, and that it may be 
feasible to explain the divergence between post-communist countries by 
looking to the past and considering legacies, the chosen analytical framework 
is historical institutionalism. In order to identify the legacy effects, it is 
insufficient to merely pinpoint ‘broad similarities and correlations between 
past configurations and present administrative reform outcomes ... because 
some kind of mechanism of reproduction must be present for the legacy to 
have a long-term effect’ (Meyer-Sahling, 2009, pp. 522–523). Bearing this in 
mind, this chapter provides an overview of the analytical framework and main 
methods used in the study. 
3.1 HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM 
Historical institutionalism is a sub-field of new institutionalism,21 and would 
appear to be an appropriate conceptual approach to the study considering that 
historical institutionalism ‘grew out of an interest in explaining variations’ 
(Steinmo, 2016, p. 107). New institutionalists agree that institutions are 
shaped by history (Putnam, 1993, pp. 7–8), seeing them ‘as the product of 
concrete temporal processes’ and ‘as enduring legacies of political struggles’ 
(Thelen, 1999, pp. 384, 388). In addition, Ekiert (2003, p. 89) proposes that 
‘a historical institutionalist approach provides a uniquely useful set of 
analytical and methodological tools for understanding’ post-communist 
transformations. Historical institutionalists ‘tend to have a view of 
institutional development that emphasizes path dependence and unintended 
consequences’ (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 938) and most historical institutionalist 
‘analysis is founded on dense, empirical description and inductive reasoning’ 
(Sanders, 2006, pp. 42–43). Steinmo (2016) believes that ‘to understand the 
                                                 
21 The three main types of new institutionalism are historical, rational choice, and sociological 
institutionalism. 
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actual policy choices made in different countries, we must examine the 
interaction between history, political institutions, public policies, and citizens’ 
preferences’ (p. 107, emphasis in the original). Further, as ‘the various 
institutional arrangements that make up a polity emerge at different times’, 
historical institutionalists ‘are likely to be concerned with the origins rather 
than the functions of the various pieces’ (Thelen, 1999, p. 382). The origins can 
reflect different logics of political order. ‘Historical institutionalists address 
big, substantive questions ..., take time seriously, ... analyze macro contexts 
and hypothesize about the combined effects of institutions and processes’ 
(Pierson & Skocpol, 2002, pp. 695–696).  
In order to understand institutional evolution, we have to specify ‘the 
reproduction and feedback mechanisms on which particular institutions rest’ 
(Thelen, 1999, p. 400). Moreover, as shown by Falletti (2010), the sequence or 
order of the reforms and events matters; as when cooking, the result depends 
on the order in which the ingredients are added (Pierson, 2004, p. 1). 
One advantage of using historical institutionalism when studying Estonian 
local government is that the concept ‘stresses what is, rather than what should 
have been’ (Norgaard, 2001, p. 31). ‘What the HI scholar wants to know is why 
a certain choice was made and/or why a certain outcome occurred’ (Steinmo, 
2008, p. 126). The fundamental logic and central concepts of historical 
institutionalism are path dependence and persistence, combined with critical 
junctures, and therefore the ability of historical institutionalism to explain 
smaller changes is sometimes questioned. Yet ways have increasingly been 
sought to discover how historical institutionalism could be used to explain an 
incremental change (see Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). 
Further, a recent trend has been to differentiate between exogenous and 
endogenous institutional change; while the former is more abrupt, the latter is 
gradual.  
The potential of historical institutionalism in democratisation studies has 
not been fully explored as yet because only ‘in recent years have 
democratization scholars begun to formally adopt the theoretical tools of 
historical institutionalism to study institutional continuity and change in 
authoritarian and democratic regimes’ (Barrenechea, Gibson, & Terrie, 2016, 
p. 195). 
3.1.1 THE MAIN CONCEPTS – PATH DEPENDENCE AND CRITICAL 
JUNCTURES 
As referred to above, two main concepts of historical institutionalism are path 
dependence and critical juncture. Path dependence can be seen as an 
‘explanation that unfolds through a series of logically sequential stages’ 
(Mahoney, 2001, p. 6) as shown in Figure 3.1. When scholars refer to the 
critical juncture framework (see Table 3.1 below), the logic is broadly the same, 
but the emphasis is on the critical juncture rather than on the persistence of 




Figure 3.1 Path-dependence explanation  
Source: Adapted from The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political 
Regimes in Central America (p. 5), by J. Mahoney, 2001, Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press and The Legacies of Law: Long-Run Consequences of 
Legal Development in South Africa, 1652–2000 (p. 49), by J. Meierhenrich, 2008, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Path dependence 
There are various ways of contemplating and defining path dependence. The 
first ‘comes out of the work of economists seeking to understand technological 
trajectories’ (Thelen, 1999, p. 384). Political scientists have taken this to mean 
that, once taken, a path can become ‘locked in’, ‘as all the relevant actors adjust 
their strategies to accommodate the prevailing pattern’ (Thelen, 1999, p. 385). 
This is also related to positive feedback and increasing returns, but tends to be 
too deterministic for political science according to Thelen, while Pierson 
(2004) has adapted a positive feedback framework for political science. The 
other view derives from the work of new institutional sociologists. 
‘Institutions, in this view, are collective outcomes’ and ‘socially constructed in 
the sense that they embody shared cultural understandings (‘shared 
cognitions’, ‘interpretive frames’) of the way the world works’ (Thelen, 1999, 
p. 386). These cultural constraints limit policymakers in redesigning 
institutions (Thelen, 1999).  
According to Nielson, Jessop, and Hausner, several studies of transitions 
to democracy use path dependence in the following way: ‘Path-dependency 
suggests that the institutional legacies of the past limit the range of current 
possibilities and/or options in institutional innovations’ (cited in Thelen, 
2004, p. 28). This is applicable both ‘at the policy level and at the level of 
institutions’ (Gains, John, & Stoker, 2005, p. 27). Regardless of whether the 
focus is on administrative reforms in Western Europe or in Central and 
Eastern Europe, the legacy explanations ‘tend to come to the same conclusion, 
namely that the legacy of the past is a hindrance to administrative innovation’ 
(Meyer-Sahling & Yesilkagit, 2011, pp. 311–312). One explanation for how a 
break occurs ‘from a path dependent line [...] is that policies or institutions are 
knocked out of their path dependencies by external and largely unpredictable 
shocks to the system’ (Gains, John, & Stoker, 2005, p. 28). This explanation is 
not ‘entirely satisfactory’, however, and there are several other explanations 
for deviations from path dependence (e.g. political actors searching for a 
strategic advantage) (Gains, John, & Stoker, 2005, pp. 28–29). Introducing 
changes is easiest during critical junctures, but before moving to this phase, it 
is worth emphasising several other features of path dependence. To this end, 
scholars of economics, political science, and sociology ‘assert that particular 
events in the past can have crucial effects in the future’ and these events may 
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Positive feedback / 
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be ‘“temporally lagged” – i.e. not initially felt but clearly visible at a later point 
in time’ (Mahoney & Schensul, 2006, p. 457).  
The path dependency framework explains persistence in institutions in 
general and is usually used to support certain key claims, which have been well 
summarised by Pierson: 
Specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; starting from similar 
conditions, a wide range of social outcomes may be possible; large 
consequences may result from relatively “small” or contingent events; 
particular courses of action, once introduced, can be virtually 
impossible to reverse; and consequently, political development is often 
punctuated by critical moments or junctures that shape the basic 
contours of social life. (2000, p. 251)  
Many have warned about concept stretching in the case of path dependence 
(e.g. Pierson, 2004; Rixen & Viola, 2015). As a result, Rixen and Viola propose 
a taxonomy of institutional change, but advocate a narrow definition of path 
dependence, pointing out that ‘the two defining attributes of path dependence, 
... are that it is endogenous and exhibits increasing returns’ (2015, p. 303). 
This definition is not suitable for analysing local government because the final 
decisions on local government institutions and change are made mainly at the 
state level and therefore they are not strictly endogenous. Hence, we have to 
apply a broad definition22 which also includes exogenous causal factors.  
Critical junctures 
Historical institutionalists often divide the flow of historical events ‘into 
periods of continuity punctuated by ‘critical junctures’, i.e., moments when 
substantial institutional change takes place thereby creating a ‘branching 
point’ from which historical development moves onto a new path’ (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996, p. 942). Collier and Collier define a critical juncture as ‘a period 
of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different 
countries (or in other units of analysis) and which is hypothesized to produce 
distinct legacies’ (1991, p. 29). They have noted that a critical juncture can be 
a quick transition, but also an extended period that might correspond to a 
prolonged ‘regime period’, for example. This means that a critical juncture can 
be a change point, but also a period of transition. It is worth emphasising that 
the importance of a critical juncture can be established ‘only with reference to 
a specific historical legacy’ (Collier & Collier, 1991, p. 33). Collier and Munck 
(2017) have recently developed and proposed a framework for studying critical 
                                                 
22 The determination of the broad and narrow/restricted definition is subjective. For example, 
Pierson (2004, p. 21) claims that he uses path dependence in his book in a ‘relatively restricted sense’, 
according to which path dependence refers to ‘social processes that exhibit positive feedback and thus 
generate branching patterns of historical development’.  
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junctures (see Table 3.1). Table 3.1 also demonstrates that there are still many 
open issues related to critical junctures. 
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Source: Collier and Munck, 2017, p. 3. 
 
Soifer (2012) has taken this a step further by adding a causal logic element, 
and distinguishing two types of conditions during critical junctures – 
permissive and productive. Permissive conditions ‘represent the easing of the 
constraints of structure and make change possible’, while productive 
conditions, ‘in the presence of the permissive conditions, produce the outcome 
or range of outcomes that are then reproduced after the permissive conditions 
disappear and the juncture comes to a close’ (Soifer, 2012, p. 1573). Hence, 




Analytical framework and methodology 
42 




Absent Status quo Crisis without change or 
missed opportunity 
Present Incremental change Critical juncture 
Figure 3.2 Permissive and productive conditions and outcomes 
Source: Soifer, 2012, p. 1580. 
More precisely, permissive conditions are ‘those factors or conditions that 
change the underlying context to increase the causal power of agency or 
contingency and thus the prospects for divergence’ (Soifer, 2012, p. 1574). 
Soifer proposes that the duration of a critical juncture ‘is marked by the 
emergence and disappearance of a set of permissive conditions’ because these 
conditions ‘mark a window of opportunity in which divergence may occur’ 
(2012, pp. 1574–1575). ‘Productive conditions can be defined as the aspects of 
a critical juncture that shape the initial outcomes that diverge across cases’ 
and these ‘alone are insufficient to produce divergence in the absence of the 
permissive conditions that loosen the constraints of structure and make 
divergence possible’ (Soifer, 2012; emphasis in the original).  
In comparative-historical analysis, ‘the concept of critical juncture applies 
only to the analysis of path-dependent institutions and not to all forms of 
institutional development’ (Capoccia, 2015, p. 147; emphasis in the original). 
The critical juncture framework also includes mechanisms of (re)production, 
which are ‘the factors that are sufficient to keep an outcome in place after the 
factors that produce it have disappeared’ (Soifer, 2012, pp. 1576–1577), as 
shown in Table 3.1 above.  
3.1.2 GRADUAL CHANGE AND RESURRECTION OF THE PAST 
Explaining gradual change 
One of the main critiques of institutionalism, and historical institutionalism in 
particular, is that it is incapable of coping with change or explaining change 
(e.g. Peters, Pierre, & King, 2005; Greener, 2005; Schmidt, 2008). For Peters 
et al. (2005), a fundamental theoretical question is ‘whether historical 
institutionalism can stand alone as an approach to understanding change and 
continuity in politics and policy’ (2005, p. 1277). Since the majority of the 
research conducted in the framework of historical institutionalism is 
qualitative, the determination of change is more a matter of judgement than 
of measurement (Peters, Pierre, & King, 2005, p. 1286). 
Vivien A. Schmidt highlights two problems of historical institutionalism 
when it comes to explaining change: ‘the institutions it defines have a tendency 
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to be overly ‘sticky’ and it lacks agents of change’ (2008, p. 4).23 Strictly 
speaking, substantial change takes place only at critical junctures. The 
‘punctuated equilibrium’ model suggests ‘that institutions either persist or 
they break down as a result of some exogenous shock or environmental shift’, 
but empirical findings are often different (Thelen, 2002, pp. 99, 101). The 
critical juncture is not always present and the change is not always remarkable. 
Sometimes it is incremental or gradual. In order to take such adjustments into 
account, Streeck and Thelen (2005, p. 8) suggest that one should ‘distinguish 
between processes of change’ (incremental vs. abrupt) and ‘results of change’ 
(which ‘amount to either continuity or discontinuity’): 
 




Incremental Reproduction by 
adaptation 
Gradual transformation 
Abrupt Survival and return Breakdown and 
replacement 
Figure 3.3  Types of institutional change: processes and results 
Source: Streeck & Thelen, 2005, p. 9. 
Furthermore, Streeck and Thelen (2005) have identified four modes of 
gradual institutional change:  
• Displacement – occurs ‘as new models emerge and diffuse which call 
into question existing, previously taken-for-granted organizational 
forms and practices’ (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, p. 19). Therefore, the 
replacement of existing rules with new ones can be expected to take 
place in ‘transformative, system-wide change’, and the possibilities 
of political veto are weak (Carey, Kay, & Nevile, 2017). 
• Layering – new rules are introduced to modify existing ones, via 
amendments, revisions, or additions. The concept combines some 
elements of increasing returns and even ‘lock-in’ with elements of 
institutional innovation. ‘Schickler argues that institutional 
innovators often have to work around some institutional features 
that are locked in, but they can add on other elements in ways that 
do not just reproduce or extend the old institutions, but actually 
alter the overall trajectory’ (Thelen, 2002, p. 102). In some cases, 
layering is a tool that policymakers actively seek and use, and the 
possibilities of political veto are strong (Carey, Kay, & Nevile, 2017). 
                                                 
23 Along the same lines, Peters et al. (2005) emphasise the importance of incorporating a dynamic 
conception of agency and also political conflict into the historical institutionalist approach to provide an 
adequate explanation for change. The political conflicts take place not only in the periods of critical 
juncture or at formative moments, but equally during path dependent or stable periods.  
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• Drift – the failure ‘to update formal rules when shifting 
circumstances change the social effects of those rules in ways that 
are recognized by at least some political actors’ (Hacker, Pierson, & 
Thelen, 2015, p. 184). This can occur when a gap manifests itself 
between rules and enforcement (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). 
• Conversion – ‘the transformation of an already-existing institution 
or policy through its authoritative redirection, reinterpretation, or 
reappropriation’ (Hacker, Pierson, & Thelen, 2015, p. 185). 
Conversion follows ‘the idea that institutions that were forged at one 
historical juncture, and thus as the product of one particular set of 
conflicts and interests, can in fact undergo a kind of transformation 
as they get redirected to new ends’ (Thelen, 2002, p. 103). One way 
this can happen is through the inclusion of new groups. In the event 
of conversion, we may identify institutional continuity, without 
noticing that the institutional functioning has changed considerably 
(Pierson, 2004, p. 138). 
‘Yet processes of drift and conversion can be observed only in analyses that 
are at once configurational and attentive to changes unfolding over significant 
periods of time’, therefore, ‘methodologically, it encourages a shift toward 
case-based analyses of configurations and historical process’ (Hacker, Pierson, 
& Thelen, 2015, p. 182). Mahoney and Thelen emphasise that the tools are 
especially relevant for explaining gradual change when the institutions have 
already been established; in addition ‘gradually unfolding changes may be 
hugely consequential as causes of other outcomes’ (2010, pp. 2–3). In the case 
of incremental or gradual change, the basic elements or basic structure remain 
intact. The probability of a specific change depends upon whether the veto 
possibilities of the actors are either high or low (political context), and whether 
the level of discretion of the institution in question is high or low. 
Revival of institutions 
Due to the fact that central to the analysis is the way in which interwar 
institutions have impacted the design of post-communist institutions, it can 
be proposed that legacies form a crucial part of this phenomenon. That said, 
even if according to LaPorte and Lussier (2011, pp. 651–652) ‘conceptual and 
empirical analyses display meaningful differences between work in the 
historical institutionalist tradition and that developed within the legacies 
paradigm’, they recognise that both sides can gain ‘by rigorously integrating 
the study of communist legacies with historical institutionalism’. The basic 
question is how to define the terms because only some authors include the 
term legacy in the definition of path dependence.  
We can identify at least three types of repetitions in history: replication, 
recurrence, and reproduction (Collier & Mazzuca, 2006). While replication 
refers to ‘repetition across different places’, recurrence refers to ‘repetition 
over time within the same place’ (Collier & Mazzuca, 2006, p. 476). 
 
45 
Reproduction, on the other hand, is for Collier and Mazzuca a temporally 
continuous form of repetition and therefore it is about temporally enduring 
institutions and structures. All three can appear as a causal pattern, but may 
also be a coincidence. Hence, as we are more interested in causality than 
coincidence, we should focus on the next aspect – legacy.  
There are at least two types of potential pre-communist legacies. The first 
concerns the features ‘that are present in both the pre-communist and post-
communist periods but not during the communist period itself’ (Wittenberg, 
2015, p. 373). The second type concerns the features that are present in all 
three periods, namely also in the communist period. Metaphysically speaking, 
the first ‘is the most controversial path because it is not clear what it means for 
a phenomenon to disappear and then come back’ (Wittenberg, 2015, p. 373). 
Wittenberg has provided a possible answer in his earlier paper for the 
sameness of the phenomenon in different periods. His suggestion is in the 
same vein as Collier and Mazzuca’s above. In other words, according to 
Wittenberg (2013), it is not enough that the phenomenon is the same in two 
different time periods, we should also make sure that ‘the phenomenon is not 
caused by any underlying conditions in the latter period’. One way to explain 
the reappearance of a pre-communist legacy is that during the communist 
period the legacy was temporarily frozen and was reactivated during the post-
communist period (Illner, 1996). 
Legacies involve processes of ‘reproduction, recombination, resurrection, 
and redeployment through which practices and beliefs embedded by an earlier 
regime find new or renewed meaning over the long term, within a different 
macrohistorical context’ (Kotkin & Beissinger, 2014, p. 19). An example of the 
resurrection of a Soviet-era practice in contemporary Russia is the 
reintroduction of cadre reserve lists by Putin after more than a decade-long 
hiatus (Huskey, 2014, p. 117). Although Huskey recognises the difference 
between the post-communist cadre reserve lists and those in Soviet times, he 
emphasises that the model is the same. Furthermore, he proposes that the 
cadre system was revived in Russia mainly because the same factors were 
present in both periods.24 Despite the fact that it might be a strategic choice by 
the elites and hence a challenge to the legacy argument, the past has influenced 
the likelihood of certain practices re-occurring in the country compared to 
other countries.25 Although Huskey focuses on practices, the lists exemplify a 
                                                 
24 These factors were lack of confidence in ‘the ability of a free market in labor to produce the 
necessary personnel for leading posts in state and society; a general preference for technocratic solutions 
to problems – in this case the conceit that one can advance state interests by employing a scientific 
approach to elite recruitment; and the desire of those in power to control who rises to political 
prominence in the next generation, and thereby assure their own longevity in office’ (Huskey, 2014, p. 
118). 
25 Huskey (2014, p. 118) emphasises that ‘the point here is that the past has framed the alternatives, 
and elites with similar interests and even similar values in other parts of the world would be unlikely to 
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practice that had disappeared but which has been revived despite available 
functional alternatives.  
Based on the assumption that historical legacies influence institutional 
choices, and considering the work of Collier and Mazzuca (2006), Wittenberg 
(2015), and Huskey (2014), it can be concluded that while in a tabula rasa 
situation all alternatives could presumably be equally possible, in reality past 
experiences and decisions either eliminate or make certain options less 
probable while increasing the probability of others.  
3.1.3 HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND CASE STUDIES 
An issue that arises from time to time in relation to historical institutionalism 
and relevant in the context of the current research is the question: ‘Can 
historical institutionalists really develop valid arguments from case studies 
and small-n comparisons?’ (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002, p. 696). Critics 
sometimes claim that case studies cannot generate valid knowledge because 
cases are not randomly selected (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002, p. 17). Pierson and 
Skocpol (2002) suggest that case studies can be relevant due to the 
accumulation of knowledge. Similarly, Thelen states that ‘most historical 
institutionalists would strongly contest the idea that middle range theories 
developed for particular historically or regionally bounded phenomena do not 
‘add up’ to anything’ (2002, p. 95).  
A ‘case study’s unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of 
evidence – documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations’ (Yin, 2009, p. 
11). Yet case studies are criticised for their lack of rigour in that ‘they provide 
little basis for scientific generalization’, and ‘they take too long, and they result 
in massive, unreadable documents’ (Yin, 2009, pp. 14–15). This is not always 
the case, however, since case studies can also be short and ‘are generalizable 
to theoretical propositions’ according to Yin (2009, p. 15). Theory-building 
from case studies can also be seen as one of the best ‘bridges from rich 
qualitative evidence to mainstream deductive research’ (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007, p. 25). ‘Case studies emphasize the rich, real-world context in 
which the phenomena occur’ (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 25), and hence 
a case study is an appropriate research approach for analysing local 
government and its institutions, allowing the development of the institutions 
in question to be placed into a context. Context here does not mean that we 
have to know everything about the particular situation, but rather that 
relationships should be taken into account (Pierson, 2004, pp. 169–171).  
                                                 
introduce cadre reserve lists because the choice would not present itself. Reviving an institution is far 
easier than constructing one ab ovo’. 
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3.1.4 SOME REMARKS ON RATIONAL CHOICE INSTITUTIONALISM 
Rational choice institutionalism (RCI) is another form of new institutionalism. 
It ‘developed at the same time as historical institutionalism but in relative 
isolation from it’ (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 942). Within RCI, there are two main 
ways to think about institutions. First, they are seen as ‘exogenous constraints, 
or as an exogenously given game form’, which constrain behaviour (Shepsle, 
2008, pp. 24–26; emphasis in original). The second concerns the way in which 
‘the rules of the game [...] are provided by the players themselves’ (Shepsle, 
2008, p. 25) and therefore it focuses (only) on rational behaviour. Similarly to 
historical institutionalism, the RCI approach has dealt with both structured 
and unstructured institutions. 
Application 
Human agency is central to RCI. Given that human beings ‘are only 
approximately rational’ (Shepsle, 2008, p. 33), the notion of bounded 
rationality also comes into the picture. For Pierson (2004, p. 9), the critique is 
not so much about ‘rational choice theory’s assumptions about human 
behaviour, but about its restricted range of application’ due its blind spots. RCI 
focuses on the ‘moves’ of ‘actors’ and has been ‘far less attentive to slow-
moving, long-term processes that clearly must play an important role in our 
understanding of the social world’ (Pierson, 2004, p. 177). Added to this, game 
theory tools are not well-suited to ‘exploring slow-moving macroprocesses’ 
because by increasing the actors involved, the results of game theory can 
become unmanageably complex (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002, p. 705). 
Comparison with historical institutionalism 
HI and RCI ‘are premised on different assumptions that in fact reflect quite 
different approaches to the study of politics’ (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992, p. 7), 
despite the fact that in both schools institutions structure political behaviour 
(Steinmo, 2001, p. 571). 
First, some of the biggest differences between HI and RCI can be found in 
the concepts of preferences and institutions (Katznelson & Weingast, 2005). 
Contrary to the historical view (institutions as a result of historical processes), 
RCI often ‘embraces a functional view of institutions’ (Thelen, 1999, p. 378) 
but, according to Thelen (1999, p. 400), ‘[f]unctionalist perspectives will not 
take us far, since they skirt the issue of the origins of institutions and the all-
important matter of the material and ideological coalitions on which 
institutions are founded’. 
Second, the RCI definition of the environment is more simplistic than that 
of HI and, for the most part, the time period covered is considerably shorter 
than in HI analysis (Katznelson & Weingast, 2005, pp. 5, 11). Contrary to HI, 
which mainly employs macroanalysis, RCI focuses on microanalysis. HI is 
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interested, above all, in explaining an outcome and ‘in developing a deep and 
contextualised understanding of the politics’ (Steinmo, 2001, p. 571), while 
RCI often focuses ‘on one set of rules at a time’ (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002, p. 
706). For RCI, ‘the central goal is to uncover the laws of political behaviour 
and action’ and to create, elaborate and refine a theory of politics (Steinmo, 
2001, p. 572). Rational choice institutionalists are theorists. ‘Historical 
institutionalists apply [an] inductive scientific method. Rational choice 
institutionalists, in contrast, apply a deductive model of science’ (Steinmo, 
2001, p. 572). 
Third, when it comes to RCI, the change occurs in two situations. ‘First, if 
the institution ceases to produce a satisfactory outcome for those actors who 
are powerful enough to change the institution, or second, if the power 
distribution between actors is fundamentally changed’ (Norgaard, 2001, pp. 
25–26).  
Overall, this is not to say that historical and rational choice institutionalism 
cannot complement each other. On the contrary, there is convergence between 
the two and in some cases they can effectively complement each other 
(Katznelson & Weingast, 2005; Thelen, 1999). 
3.2 RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA 
The main materials that have been used to answer the research questions are 
legislation from different periods, analytical and descriptive studies, articles 
written mainly by Estonian researchers and authors, interviews, and official 
documents (e.g. the meeting minutes of the local councils between 1989 and 
1993, bills and accompanying explanatory memorandums, and parliament 
stenographs). Based on this, the principal research method used is 
documentary analysis, supported by interviews. Different types of sources 
were available for different periods. While for the interwar period a valuable 
source comprised local government associations’ journals, in the post-
communist period the material consisted of the stenographic records of 
parliamentary proceedings. This was appropriate considering the aim of the 
research. For the interwar period it was essential to understand the 
institutions and institutional aspects of the time, while for the post-communist 
period it was important to understand why certain decisions were or were not 
taken. 
A semi-structured interview format was used because it allows for a flexible 
interview process (Bryman, 2004, p. 321). Interviews comprised general 
questions, questions specific to the type of municipality, and questions based 
on the responses of the interviewee or on markers. The main weakness of the 
oral history interview ‘is the possibility of bias introduced by memory lapses 
and distortions’ (Grele, 1998, cited in Bryman, 2004, p. 323). To mitigate this 
problem, the minutes of council meetings were also examined. Five audio-
recorded interviews were conducted altogether, which is a relatively small 
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number for qualitative research, but they were only one source of data among 
many, and not the principal one. In respect of the number of interviews that 
need to be conducted, Weiss, for one, claims that ‘when further inquiry will 
add little to the story, stop inquiring’ (1994, p. 21).  
A purposive sampling technique was used for the interviews, sometimes 
referred to as ‘a sample chosen to maximize range’ (Weiss, 1994, p. 23). 
Maximizing range ensures that the ‘sample contains instances displaying 
significant variation’ (Weiss, 1994, p. 23). The main criterion for the selection 
of interviewees was that each person would have some experience of the local 
soviet, as well as the local council or government. The advantage of this was 
that the interviewees themselves were able to compare the two different 
systems and the transition. In addition, some interviews were conducted with 
people who had direct experience of only one system. Criteria such as the 
geographical location and size/type of the municipality were also considered.  
The anonymity of the respondents was respected due to the possibly 
sensitive nature of issues during the Soviet period. This was arguably 
beneficial for the research since there were occasions when an interviewee 
preferred to pause the recording for a few minutes to talk about certain 
aspects.  
The most challenging part concerned conducting research into the Soviet 
period due to the lack of sources. Estonian historian David Vseviov (1999) has 
concluded that although much historical literature on the socialism era was 
published during the Stalin years, it has almost no factual or theoretical value. 
In addition, the ‘1950s thus became the first decade to experience the 
production of a Soviet view of Estonian history’ (Rebas, 2005, p. 425). These 
publications only demonstrate the efforts that were made to preserve and 
present Soviet Estonia’s history for the present and future (Vseviov, 1999). At 
the same time, Vseviov (2003) claims that it is possible for historians to write 
‘true scientific history about Estonia in 1940–1991’; historians just need 
special ‘glasses’ to accomplish the task. 
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4 LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN 1918–1940: THE 
PERIODS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY 
REPUBLIC AND THE ERA OF SILENCE 
There is no legal principle that could compete in Estonia with the idea 
of self-government by age, continuity, and development.  
Uluots (1933, p. 159)  
In 1933, Estonian prime minister and law professor Jüri Uluots compared 
Estonian self-government to a juniper tree, which, although it is not beautiful,  
is strong and tough; it has stayed from century to century despite 
different winds, whether they come from the west or the east, whether 
from the north or from the south. A lightning that comes with a storm 
does not destroy it, because juniper has the quality to keep itself 
attached to the land; if you break one branch, the others will not go to 
rack and ruin. (1933, pp. 159–160)  
Local self-government in general, and rural municipalities in particular, play 
an important role in Estonia’s history, which will be described in this chapter. 
Indeed, during the time of the establishment of the Republic, the local self-
governments were the only organised authorities to whom national tasks were 
also entrusted, in addition to local self-government tasks (Saar, 1927, p. 178).  
The period from 1918 to 1940 in Estonian history can be divided into at 
least two sub-periods or even four (e.g. Sootla & Laanes, 2015). Estonia gained 
independence in February 1918. ‘The Republic emerged as one of the most 
liberal democracies anywhere in the world. It was a state whose political 
foundations were sculptured by the democratic left’ (Parming, 1975, p. 7). 
However, a military coup was staged in March 1934, and the second half of the 
1930s has henceforth been described as the ‘Era of Silence’. In 1934, county 
self-government as a democratic local government unit was abolished and, 
with an amendment to the City Act, the local autonomy weakened. When we 
take a look at the rest of Europe during the same period, we find quite a long 
list of countries where liberal democracies were replaced by dictatorships. 
Parming (1975, p. 5) has claimed that the Estonian case is interesting because 
the authoritarianism in the country was ‘a pre-emptive authoritarianism’.  
This chapter will describe the main characteristics and developments of 
Estonian local government between 1918 and 1940 (i.e. the interwar period). 
The focus is on local government legislation, local autonomy and local 
democracy. As developing an electoral system can be seen as part of 
developing a democracy (Taagepera, 2002, p. 284), local elections are also 
covered. Finally, the last section of the chapter provides a summary analysis 
of the main points of the development of selected institutions during the 
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interwar period. The main aim of the chapter is to provide, in conjunction with 
Chapter 5, the context for the analysis of local government at the beginning of 
the 1990s.  
4.1 GENERAL CONTEXT 
The period of the First Republic (i.e. the interwar period) was characterised by 
political instability at the state level. At the beginning of the 1920s there were 
‘three large blocs of parties: the socialists on the left, the agrarians on the right, 
and a variety of smaller parties in the centre’ (Kasekamp, 2010, p. 106). There 
was no single, strong party which could represent several different groups in 
society. From February 1918 until June 1940, Estonia had 27 cabinets. ‘The 
problem was that parties would continually desert the cabinet in the hopes of 
striking a better bargain with other groups’ (Siaroff, 1999, p. 111). In the first 
four parliaments (Riigikogu), that is, from 1920 to 1932, 10–14 parties were 
represented. In the fifth parliament, there were six parties (Parming, 1975, p. 
17). This demonstrates the claim by Reeve and Ware (1992, p. 9) that there is 
a connection between the adoption of proportional representation soon after 
the ‘vote was extended to most of the population’ and a highly fragmented 
party system. The post of Minister of the Interior (or Minister of the Court and 
the Interior)26 was held by no less than 18 different men during the period in 
question. 
Frequent cabinet turnover (including Interior Ministers), and the ensuing 
low political stability, is one factor which can be blamed for the poor and 
fragmented legislation governing local government in that period. This also 
serves to complicate the identification of general tendencies during the period.  
Olle (2001, p. 44) has claimed in his research on the interwar local 
government in Estonia that identifying the responsibilities of local 
government before the adoption of the acts on local government at the end of 
the 1930s would require ‘an extremely labour-intensive and time-consuming 
legal analysis’, and hence he focused mainly on the Rural Municipality Act of 
1937 and the City Act of 1938. Moreover, Eugen Maddison (1927a), who was 
Secretary General at the Ministry of the Interior, has said that most of the 
Estonian legislation of that time did not contain references to the legislation it 
amended or repealed: ‘[t]hat weakness does not get much attention, because a 
new act amends the previous act despite whether it has been mentioned in the 
new act or not’ (p. 37).  
                                                 
26 The Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of the Court were merged in 1929, but in 1934 the 
two Ministries were separated again. 
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The main local government units – cities and rural municipalities 
Local government units in 1917 comprised cities, towns (alevid), rural 
municipalities, and counties. Cities were mostly subordinated to the Ministry 
of the Interior, while for rural municipalities there was an additional link in 
the form of a county between the rural municipality and the state. The 
legislation also clearly distinguished between cities and rural municipalities 
when it came to their tasks, revenue base, supervision, and so on. 
In 1920, there were twelve cities27 and eight towns28 altogether. By 1938, 
the number of cities had increased to 33 (Dolf, 1938, p. 5)29 because in that 
year all towns were renamed as cities.30 Towns (alev), as separate 
administrative units, were created in 1917 (Reino, 1998, p. 124) and have 
existed at different periods in Estonia, but as they have been a temporary 
phenomenon or their number has remained small, the following chapters and 
sections do not address them in detail, if at all. 
Rural municipalities were created in 1816–1818 based on the ‘territorial 
distribution of manorial estates’ (Krepp, 1938, p. 57). A solid legal basis for the 
rural municipalities was created in 1866 with the Act on the Parish 
Administration in Baltic Provinces (Baltimaa vallakogukondade valitsemise 
seadus), which was in force with amendments until 1937 (Schneider, 1992, p. 
7). During 1923–1938 there were few amalgamations and little establishment 
of new rural municipalities (Uuet, 2002, p. 54), the last major amalgamation 
taking place in 1890–1892 (Krepp, 1938, p. 17). Discussions about the optimal 
size of the rural municipalities were held throughout the 1920s and 1930s, 
while an extensive administrative-territorial reform was implemented in 
1938–1939. This was not only due to the size of the rural municipalities, but 
also to the fact that in 1936 there were still around 40 municipalities, whose 
territory was divided, with different parts of one municipality being situated 
in the territory of another municipality (lappvallad) (Velner, 1936b). After the 
administrative-territorial reform,31 the number of rural municipalities was 
decreased from 365 to 248 as of 1 April 1939. The reform was prepared in 
cooperation with geographers from the University of Tartu (the leading figures 
                                                 
27 Haapsalu, Kuressaare, Narva, Paide, Paldiski, Petseri, Pärnu, Tallinn, Tartu, Valga, Viljandi, and 
Võru. 
28 Jõgeva, Jõhvi, Kilingi-Nõmme, Narva-Jõesuu, Nõmme, Otepää, Tapa, and Türi. 
29 From 1921 to 1926, town rights were granted to Antsla, Kunda, Kärdla, Mõisaküla, Põltsamaa, 
Võõpsu, Kallaste, Mustvee, Sindi, Tõrva, Elva, Suure-Jaani, Keila, and Mustla. In 1926, five towns were 
granted city rights at the request of their citizens – Nõmme, Põltsamaa, Tapa, Tõrva and Türi. Otepää 
was granted city rights in 1936 (Uuet, 2002, pp. 34–37, 53). 
30 In 1938 the cities were divided into groups – capital city, first-level cities (more than 50,000 
inhabitants), second-level cities (10,000–50,000 inhabitants), and third-level cities (less than 10,000 
inhabitants). 
31 The reform concerned mainly the rural municipalities. 
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being Edgar Kant and Endel Krepp32) (Kurs & Tammiksaar, 2001, p. 59), and 
the local conditions were taken into account. The borders of only 20 rural 
municipalities remained unchanged (Olle, 2001, p. 13). 
Table 4.1.  Rural municipalities by size (number of inhabitants) 
Number of 
inhabitants 
1922 1930 1934 1939 
- 1000    66 (17.5%)   50 (13.3%)   60 (16.3%)    4 (1.6%) 
1001-1500 
 138 (36.5%) 
  77 (20.5%)   73 (19.8%)    2 (0.8%) 
1501-2000   64 (17.1%)   70 (19%)  13 (5.2%) 
2000 -  174 (46%) 184 (49.1%) 166 (45%) 229 (92.3%) 
Total 378 375 369 248 
Sources: 1922 – Kohver, 1929, pp. 5–6; 1930 – Maaomavalitsus, 1930, pp. 179–180; 1934 – 
Feldman, 1938a, p. 35; 1939 – Loorits, 1938, pp. 167–168. 
 
The parish (kihelkond) has been a historical administrative unit in Estonia 
since the 13th century, but its relevance had decreased by the beginning of the 
20th century. Although the idea of establishing parishes was considered on 
several occasions when drafting local government acts (e.g. in 1920, and in the 
1990s), it usually lacked strong support and was dropped. Parishes were too 
big to replace rural municipalities and too small to replace counties.  
4.1.1 DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
It took almost two decades to establish Estonia’s own special laws on local 
government. It is questionable whether the delay can be better explained by 
path dependence or by the frequent change of cabinets. As will be 
demonstrated below, several of the drafted bills did not aim to introduce 
fundamental changes to the system inherited from the time of the Russian 
empire, but only to anchor into the legislation the system that already existed, 
with limited modifications. Before broaching the subject of the special laws, 
an overview of local government in the constitutions will be provided. 
Pre-constitutional acts and constitutions 
According to Kliimann (1935), the three main steps towards the establishment 
of national independence were: 
                                                 
32 According to one analysis (Krepp, 1938, pp. 46, 61–62), the optimal size of a rural municipality 
would have been 2,000–3,000 inhabitants because in the case of bigger municipalities a visit to the 
centre of the commune (communal house, school, post office, doctors, church, etc) would be burdensome 
and more expensive.  
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• Decision of the Provincial Assembly of 15/28 November 191733 
• Manifesto of 24 February 1918   
• Temporary Regime of the Governance of the Republic of Estonia, 
adopted by the Constituent Assembly (Asutav Kogu) on 4 June 1919  
The decision of 1917 is considered to be the first pre-Constitution 
(Kliimann, 1935, p. 54), declaring that the supreme power belongs to the 
Provincial Assembly.  
The manifesto of 1918 was more of a declaratory act than a constitutive one 
(Kliimann, 1935, p. 60). It defined the counties of the Republic of Estonia. The 
final determination of the state borders in those counties bordering Russia and 
Latvia was to be decided by the referendums after World War I. With the 
manifesto, the city self-government, county self-government, and rural 
municipality self-government authorities were called to immediately resume 
their operations, which had been violently interrupted earlier. The county 
governments restored their operations for the most part in November 1918 
(e.g. Viljandi, Pärnu, Tartu); activities prior to that were mostly performed in 
secret (Ant, Kessel, & Pajur, 1999, pp. 245–246, 250, 257).  
The Temporary Regime of the Governance of the Republic of Estonia of 
1919 was – as its name indicates – a temporary constitution. It declared that 
Estonia is an independent democratic republic, where the supreme power of 
state is vested in the people and the Constituent Assembly exercises supreme 
power on behalf of the people. However, it did not contain any reference to 
local government. 
Constitutions were adopted in 1920, 1933, and 1937.34 While the 
Constitution of 1920 was adopted by the Constituent Assembly, the 
Constitution of 1934 was adopted through a referendum, and the Constitution 
of 1938 by the National Assembly (Rahvuskogu).  
Chapter VII of the Constitution of 1920 regulated the local government 
institutions. Specifically, it stipulated the directly elected local councils and the 
local governments’ right to impose local taxes. As Section 75 stipulated that 
‘Through the self-government bodies the State Power exercises the local 
governing insofar as there is no special institution created by law’, there was 
an inherent risk that, if the central government wished, it could create special 
institutions and, in so doing, transfer the power away from the local 
government authorities. The Constitution as a whole has even been considered 
to be ‘ahead of its time’ in comparison with several other countries (Truuväli, 
2008, p. 34). It also had its flaws, however, insomuch as the parliament had 
too much power compared to the government (Truuväli, 2008, p. 133) and ‘it 
lacked a system of checks and balances’ (Merusk, 2007). The Constitution’s 
main creators – the Social Democrats and the Labour Party – managed with 
                                                 
33 Provincial Assembly decision on supreme power of 1917 (Maanõukogu otsus kõrgemast 
wõimust). 
34 As these Constitutions entered into force in 1920, 1934, and 1938 respectively, these are referred 
to as the Constitutions of 1920, 1934, and 1938. 
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their allies to oppose the amendment of the Constitution until 1932, when the 
political powers favouring the amendment gained the majority in parliament 
(Truuväli, 2008, p. 133).  
People rejected the Constitution amendments in the referendums of March 
1932 and June 1933. The amendment proposed by the Veterans (or veterans 
of the War of Independence, vapsid) was adopted in the referendum on 14–16 
October, 1933. The modifications to the Constitution were significant enough 
to talk about the Second Constitution (e.g. Truuväli, 2008, p. 136). At the state 
level, the power was now vested in the State Elder and the power balance was 
again not achieved. The main implication for local governments was that the 
second level of local government was abolished, that is, counties were no 
longer considered to be local government units, but a level of state 
administration. One reason behind the change was that the ‘counties, contrary 
to relatively weak rural municipalities and cities ... represented potential 
opposition to the central government and this was the case throughout the so-
called “Era of Silence”’ (Mäeltsemees, 2006). Laaman (1937, p. 364) has also 
indicated that one possible motive for the abolishment of the counties was that 
they were the local strongholds of certain political parties due to their 
formation structure. Hence, the purpose was to eliminate the political rivalry 
(Schneider, 1992, p. 10).  
Moreover, nor did the Constitution of 1938 leave local government 
untouched because the two-tier local government system was established 
again, albeit differently from the one that existed before 1934. The second-
level local government was composed of delegated representatives of city 
governments and rural municipality governments (Mäeltsemees, 2001, p. 45), 
and for that reason counties could not be regarded as a level of local self-
government. The Constitution no longer listed the types of local government 
units, but allowed the organisation of local government to be determined in 
the legislation. 
‘According to the Constitution adopted in 1920 and the amendments 
adopted in 1933, local self-government in Estonia was state managed, 
although communal local self-government had historically been characteristic 
of Estonia’ (Mäeltsemees, 2006). The turning point from one theory to another 
was the period of Russian Provisional Government, as the 1917 regulations 
reflected the state-centred local government theory (Olle, 2001, p. 9). 
Steps towards the special laws on local government 
In the 1920s and for most of the 1930s, local government was still regulated by 
the Act on the Parish Administration in Baltic Provinces of 1866 and the City 
Act of 1892, which had both been amended several times, including major 
amendments in 1917. The new acts were not adopted until the late 1930s: the 
Rural Municipality Act was adopted in 1937, and the City Act and County Act 
in 1938. The special acts were comprehensive in nature, as the City Act of 1938, 
for example, also repealed, in addition to the City Act of 1892 (the 1915 version 
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with later amendments), those acts regulating city revenues, expenditures, 
supervision, and elections. Olle claims that it was natural to apply the previous 
legislation for a certain period during independence, to the extent that it did 
not contradict the Constitution and later acts (lex posterior derogate prior) 
(2001, p. 21). In addition, the lack of new special acts can partly be explained 
by the frequently changing cabinet composition at the state level. 
The fact that the special laws on local government were not adopted until 
1937/38 does not imply that the adoption of these acts would have been 
considered irrelevant. Drafts were developed, but for one reason or another 
they never became legislation. 
Work on the special laws on local government started as early as 1917. The 
Local Government Committee of the Constituent Assembly approved a draft 
of the Estonian Local Government Act (hereinafter “ELGA”) on 18 May 1920 
(Asutava Kogu Omavalitsuse komisjon, 1920, May 18). It was on the agenda of 
the Constituent Assembly session of 7 September 1920, where the majority 
were in favour of deferring discussion, as it was an important issue and there 
was insufficient time to adopt the act before the end of the term (Asutav Kogu, 
1920, September 7). In the explanatory memorandum (see Riigikantselei, 
1921, p. 2), it was dubbed ‘a practical constitution’. The draft act was based on 
the system that had already been established; the traditional local government 
units were functioning and they would have ‘risked losing the existing 
foothold’ by creating a new system (Riigikantselei, 1921, p. 2). If parishes had 
been established as the main local government units, the legislation from the 
Russian time would have had to be substantially amended, and this would 
have been time-consuming (Riigikantselei, 1921, p. 4). Therefore, at least in 
the short run, the costs of departing from the set path would have been too 
high compared to keeping those institutions that had already been created, 
pointing to the existence of a self-reinforcing process or positive feedback, 
which generates path dependence. The explanatory memorandum also reveals 
that in defining the competences of local government units, it was not possible 
to take Prussia’s draft City Act as an example because Estonia still had to 
consider the legal framework from the Russian time. While separate legislative 
acts for rural municipalities, cities, and counties had existed until the 1920s, 
ELGA tried to combine all three acts into one as the majority of provisions on 
city, county and rural municipalities would have been identical (Jans, 1921, p. 
138).35 One of the most challenging issues was how to divide or determine the 
scope of powers in general, and between a rural municipality and a county in 
particular (Jans, 1921). The Local Government Committee chose the Anglo-
American system over the continental system (Jans, 1921, pp. 138–139). It was 
decided that the scope of activities of the local authorities would be framed as 
broadly as possible to avoid any distancing from the power (Jans, 1921, p. 139). 
The two local government bodies, namely the council and the government, had 
representative and executive functions respectively. The latter functioned in 
                                                 
35 Cities preferred to have a separate act of their own (Jans, 1921, p. 138). 
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accordance with the powers conferred on it by the council. ELGA was not 
adopted because the Constituent Assembly ended its activities in December 
1920.  
In February 1921, the Local Government Committee of the parliament 
decided to table the same draft of ELGA for the government to peruse in order 
to ascertain their position on the issue. The new government did not deem it 
appropriate to establish one common act for different types of local 
government units, nor did it support the idea of listing the functions of the 
local government in the act. It was duly decided that new, separate draft acts 
for different types of local government units would be prepared (Kiiver, 2010, 
pp. 47–48).  
In November 1922, the government submitted drafts of the City Act, the 
Rural Municipality Act and the County Act to parliament, none of which 
became legislation (Jans, 2008, p. 640). The draft City Act was partly based 
on the respective acts in Germany (Siseministeerium, 1922). It was felt that 
these draft acts took too centralized an approach, and hence the local 
government representatives continued to support the ELGA draft of 1920 
(Avikson, 1924a; Kiiver, 2010, p. 70). A new government was formed on 2 
August 1923, after which parliament returned all the bills, and the Ministry of 
the Interior started to develop new acts, which in practice were just 
amendments to the proposals (Kiiver, 2010, p. 70). After that, attention shifted 
to the Rural Municipality Act and several bills/principles were prepared.  
The Ministry of the Court and the Interior submitted the principles of rural 
municipality organisation in January 1930. This was followed by the draft 
Rural Municipality Act in August of the same year. The bill (see Kohtu- ja 
Siseministeerium, 1930) foresaw the amalgamation of rural municipalities 
with less than 1,000 inhabitants with neighbouring ones, providing that their 
natural location allowed it (Section 3 of the bill). The decision on 
amalgamation would have been made by the Minister of the Court and the 
Interior after allowing county governments and rural municipality councils to 
present their views (Section 4), but in the absence of agreement among the 
lower tiers, the Government of the Republic could also take the decision 
(Section 5). The Association of Estonian Municipalities proposed 83 
specifications or amendments to the bill (Eesti Maaomavalitsuste Liit, 1930). 
Their proposals mainly aimed to increase the rights of counties and rural 
municipalities to be consulted. 
Local government associations wanted to actively participate in the process 
of developing local government legislation. They stressed that taking their 
opinions into consideration when ministries were drafting the acts would help 
the bill to gain support in parliament, and consequently facilitate its 
implementation (Avikson, 1928a). One of the conclusions of the second 
congress of local government associations in 1928 was that ‘while developing 
new acts and regulations, the views of the local government associations 
should be considered’ (Eesti Linnade Liit, 1928, p. 115). 
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The ELGA bill of 1920 was the most democratic of the bills. In the later 
bills, which constituted separate acts for cities and rural municipalities, the 
approach was more centralised. In 1934, the amendments to the City Act of 
1892 and the Act of 1926 on rural municipality36 increased the powers of the 
Minister of the Interior and county governments, but also those of the local 
executive. The first special acts on local governments as institutions that were 
adopted and enforced were the Rural Municipality Act of 1937, the City Act of 
1938, and the County Act of 1938. Elements of these three acts will be 
introduced in the following sections. The acts served to increase the power of 
the rural municipality and city government, especially that of the mayor, and 
decreased the council’s power. 
Lundver has claimed that a local government crisis had developed by 1926, 
mainly because the central government had established special entities or 
appointed special officials to exercise state authority at the local level, instead 
of allocating the tasks to local governments. In essence, this reduced the 
powers of the latter (Lundver, 1991, p. 334), the likelihood of which had 
increased with the Constitution of 1920. Although Lundver comes to the same 
conclusion as Csekey (2008) in attributing the crisis to weaknesses in the 
system in 1930, several attendees of the Legal Scholars’ Days of 1931 found 
that it was not appropriate to talk about a crisis per se (see Eesti Juristide Liit, 
2008).  
Considering the lack of a single comprehensive legal framework for local 
government until 1937/1938, it is a challenging task to map its different 
aspects (e.g. functions and powers) up to that time. From the perspective of 
the municipal law discipline, Olle (2001, p. 21) also regarded the prevailing 
legal circumstances as just too complicated to provide an exhaustive analysis 
of the powers of local government (e.g. territorial, organizational, and 
financial power) until 1937/38. In addition, he emphasises that local 
governments themselves did not always have a proper overview of the 
legislation regulating their activities. This is illustrated by the fact that in 1927 
the Cities Association translated and published a codification of the City Act of 
1892, which was specifically needed by cities that acquired city rights in 1926 
(Eesti Linnadeliit, 1927, p. 16). 
                                                 
36 The Act on the Election of Rural Municipality Councils and the Organisation of Rural Municipality 
Councils and Governments (Vallavolikogude valimise ja vallavolikogude ning vallavalitsuste 
korraldamise seadus) of 1926 included some provisions on the government and the council of a rural 
municipality (in addition to provisions on the elections, which formed the main part). In general, it is 
not regarded as a special act for rural municipalities (e.g. Loorits, 1939; Kiiver, 2010). 
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4.1.2 THE RISE AND FALL OF COUNTY GOVERNMENT  
In search of a role for county government  
In the modern sense, the history of counties as democratic local government 
units in Estonia dates back to the Russian Revolution of 1917, although from 
the territorial point of view the counties started to develop as far back as the 
Middle Iron Age (Olle, 2001, p. 19). The governing bodies of the counties were 
established with the legislation37 adopted in March 1917. County council 
elections took place on 24 and 25 June, 1917 and the county councils 
commenced their activities from 1 July, 1917. The executive bodies (county 
governments) were established later (Avikson, 1927b, pp. 188–189). In some 
places, the county councils were elected on a local initiative even earlier (e.g. 
in Võru in March 1917) (Kohver, 1927, p. 195). In December 1917, the county 
governments were abolished by the Bolsheviks. After the Bolsheviks fled from 
occupying German forces in February 1918, the county governments became 
active again, but this state of affairs only lasted a month (Avikson, 1927b, p. 
191) because of the German invasion. The county governments subsequently 
convened again in November 1918, after the occupation had ended. 
Rural self-government38 was established during the Russian period based 
on the Russian three-tier model (rural municipality, county (or 
kreisiomavalitsus), and provinces (kubermang)). Estonia became an 
independent state, and the third tier of rural self-government – the Provincial 
Assembly – took over governing the state; the first and second tiers – rural 
municipalities and counties – remained (Maddison, 1927b). There was only 
one tier for cities as they were subordinated to the state level. 
The conclusion of a meeting held in April 1919 between the Minister of the 
Interior and local government representatives was that the local government 
institutions needed to be reorganised and also that the number of counties 
should be increased from 9 to 20–25 (Asutav Kogu, 1919, col. 204). During the 
period from 1888 until 1920 there were 9 counties altogether.39 Two new 
counties – Valgamaa and Petserimaa – were established in 1920. These 11 
counties remained until the end of the interwar period.  
Although the county governments played a crucial role in establishing the 
independence of the state, there were calls for county reform in the 1920s, at 
both the state and the local level. In 1928, the chairman of Võru county 
                                                 
37 Regulation on Temporary Arrangement of Administrative Governance and Local Government of 
Governorate of Estonia of 1917 (Eestimaa kubermangu administratiivse valitsemise ja kohaliku 
omavalitsuse ajutise korraldamise määrus) and Internal Rules of County Council (Maakonnanõukogu 
kodukord) of 1917 – both were supposed to be temporary measures, but they were partially in force even 
in 1937. 
38 ‘Rural self-government’ includes the rural municipalities and the county municipalities. 
39 Harjumaa, Järvamaa, Läänemaa, Pärnumaa, Saaremaa, Tartumaa, Viljandimaa, Võrumaa, and 
Virumaa. 
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summarized the main reasons for the dissatisfaction with the counties as 
follows: ‘the country is small; the number of posts for officials should be 
decreased; small rural municipalities are unviable; county councils have 
become political parliaments, hence these should be abolished; people change 
due to party considerations too frequently; local governments have too much 
independence’ (Kohver, 1928, p. 250). Other reasons that were cited included 
inadequate regulation of county powers in the legislation and the 
contradiction between large responsibilities and small financial resources 
(Jans, 1928, p. 251). 
One of the obstacles to abolishing the county governments concerned the 
issue of who should take over their tasks and responsibilities. The rural 
municipalities could not handle everything, and nor could the Ministry of the 
Court and the Interior perform the supervisory tasks (over the legality of 
decisions) in as many as 375 rural municipalities for that matter. Hence, the 
municipalities considered the reform to be a better option than the 
abolishment of the county level.  
One of the reasons for the establishment of the Estonian Counties 
Association (later the Association of Municipalities of Estonia40) in 1921 was 
the increasing centralisation (Raud, 1931, p. 286). Raud (1931), a founding 
member of the Counties Association, was very critical of politicians’ changing 
views on the relevance of the county governments, depending on whether they 
themselves were in power in the counties or not. 
In 1929, the Association drafted the main principles for the county and 
rural municipalities acts (see Eesti Maaomavalitsuste Liit, 1929), largely 
describing the system that was already in place at the time. In 1931, the 
Association presented a new set of basic principles (see Eesti 
Maaomavalitsuste Liit, 1931), but this time for the reorganisation of county 
self-government. Their proposals for the composition of the county council 
and government were as follows: (1) the county council would be elected 
directly by the citizens or would be composed of representatives of the rural 
municipalities. The latter would have required an amendment to the 
Constitution; (2) under the legislation in force, the county government had to 
have at least four members; the principles proposed three members (or in 
small counties on the approval of the Minister of the Interior only one member 
– county governor) and a reduction in the minimum required number of 
meetings. As a result, the Association’s proposal would have probably helped 
to cut the administrative expenditure. 
Cooperation between different types of local government units was 
enhanced in 1925 in at least two ways. First, the Counties Association 
presented a proposal for the Association’s new statute to the central 
government, which would also allow rural municipality membership of the 
                                                 
40 Rural municipality representatives started to participate in the council of the Counties’ 




Association. Second, in 1925 the Counties Association and Cities Association 
established a common committee to discuss questions of general interest 
(Avikson, 1926, p. 164). The first meeting of the committee took place in 
January 1927 (Maaomavalitsus, 1927). As of 1925, all counties were members 
of the Counties Association. 
The Association, which was initially established as an association of 
counties, did not limit its activities vis-à-vis the central government to 
commenting and proposing legislation. It also sought to represent the interests 
of the rural municipalities. One example concerns the nationalisation of 
certain lands and buildings in the rural municipalities. For instance, some 
school buildings that were constructed with rural municipality resources were 
nationalised along with the manorial estates. The problem stemmed from the 
fact that property owners had given lands to rural municipalities for the 
building of schools, for example, well before the Land Act came into force, but 
this transaction was seldom registered in the land register, and was based on 
a verbal agreement. In 1923 the Counties Association sent a proposal to the 
central government to add a note to Section 4 of the Land Act of 1919, whereby 
the lands and buildings that were used by the rural municipalities for schools 
would be given to the rural municipalities for free, and registered in the land 
register accordingly (Avikson, 1924b). Despite that, the property remained in 
the possession of the Ministry of Agriculture and the rural municipalities had 
to pay rent. The Association sent another draft act to the Ministry of the 
Interior in 1927 (Avikson, 1928b, p. 4), but the issue remained unresolved into 
the 1930s. 
Temporary county governments 
The county self-governments were replaced in 1934 with temporary county 
governments. This process involved contingency, but also demonstrated the 
hardships related to changing the established institutional structure. In 1932, 
the Ministry of the Court and the Interior developed the principles for the 
reorganisation (Vellner, 1933, p. 5) and a bill for the County Act. In September 
1933, the new Minister of the Court and the Interior, Wiktor Rooberg, 
submitted the bill on the abolishment of county government to the 
Government of the Republic, which submitted it to the parliament within the 
same month. The bill (see Kohtu- ja Siseministeerium, 1933, September 21) 
set the date of abolishment as 1 April, 1934. The reasons presented in the 
explanatory memorandum were the ones listed above by Kohver. Additional 
reasons were that (i) counties were too big in terms of territory to comply with 
the requirements set for local governments, (ii) the tasks of the county 
governments were more the tasks of the central government than local ones, 
and (iii) the county governments did not take the interests of the rural 
municipalities sufficiently into account. The most noteworthy reason was that 
the ‘county governments are deemed to hinder, like other local governments, 
the implementation of the state’s straightforward financial policy with the 
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activity that comes from the rights given to them’ (Kohtu- ja Siseministeerium, 
1933, September 21, p. 4). This argument was not elaborated, but in 1930, in a 
similar vein, the Head of the Tax Department of the Ministry of Economics 
blamed local governments for spending while the state was attempting to cut 
its expenditure (Linnad ja Alevid, 1931). Under the bill, the county 
governments were to be replaced with local state authorities and the county 
governor would have become a member of staff of the Ministry of the Court 
and the Interior. The bill contained the main principles and entrusted the 
Government of the Republic with adopting specific regulations or decisions. 
The bill did not become law, however. 
The crucial point, or contingency, in the development of the county 
governments was the adoption of the Constitution in 1933 instead. Section 75 
of the Constitution did not mention the counties as local government units: 
‘the State exercises the governing at the local level through city, town and rural 
municipality self-governments, if no special authorities have been established 
in legislation’. Although the provision could be interpreted in several ways, the 
prevailing interpretation was that the types of local government units were 
limited to the ones listed in Section 75. An alternative interpretation would 
have implied a constitutional guarantee for city, town and rural municipality 
self-government, but still have allowed county self-government to exist. 
The county self-governments were abolished as of 24 January 193441 and 
replaced with temporary county governments. The Act on Temporary 
Governance of the Counties was, according to the explanatory memorandum, 
an act to implement the Constitution of 1934. The county governments had 
had a wide range of functions – according to the Government of the Republic, 
the abolishment implied amendments to more than 70 legal acts. The 
responsibilities of the council were transferred to the temporary county 
government and any decisions that required council approval were to be 
approved by the Minister of the Court and the Interior, or by another minister 
if it was foreseen in the law (Section 6 of the Act on Temporary Governance of 
the Counties). Under the Constitution, only the local government units had the 
right to collect local taxes and therefore the counties could no longer retain 
this right. However, the Act stipulated that counties could still collect the taxes 
that they had established prior to January 1934, to cover operational expenses.  
After the establishment of the temporary county governments, one possible 
way forward would have been to grant rural municipalities the same powers 
as the cities. For example, Melesk claimed that it was unjust that ‘the same 
task in a city that is entrusted to city government belongs to the representative 
of the central government in a rural area’ (1934, p. 43). Similarly, an unnamed 
villager or group of villagers was quoted as saying that ‘Rural municipality 
residents are currently awaiting a new local government act as if they were 
waiting for the sun to rise, whereupon all citizens and self-governments would 
                                                 
41 Act on Temporary Governance of the Counties of 1934 (Maakondade ajutise valitsemise seadus). 
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be placed at the same level’ (Ühe küla hääl, 1934, p. 43). Needless to say, this 
did not happen.  
The most pertinent question during the changes in 1934 was who should 
take over the tasks of the county government. Should it be the national 
authorities or the rural municipalities? In his speech (see Postimees, 1935) 
delivered in January 1935, Päts, in his capacity as the State Elder, indicated 
that the question of how to organise those tasks that the county governments 
had fulfilled for years had still not been resolved. 
The Act of September 1936, which amended the Act on Temporary 
Governance of the Counties, granted the Government of the Republic the right 
to reduce the number of staff of the temporary county government. It also 
stipulated that the Government of the Republic would appoint the members 
of the temporary county government, and remove them from office. This 
provision clearly made the county government a state authority. 
(Re-)establishment of the two-tier local government system 
The Constitution of 1938 did not determine the local government units as 
narrowly as the Constitution of 1934. By stipulating that ‘The organization of 
the second instance of the local self-governing institutions and the rules for 
the formation of their representative assemblies shall be determined by law’, 
Section 123 of the Constitution again created a two-tier local government 
system. Following that, the County Act was issued on 19 April 1938 as a decree 
of the Head of the State. According to the Explanatory Memorandum of the 
Act (Siseministeerium, 1938, April 7), the Act sought ‘on the one hand to 
strengthen the position and capacity of the county self-government’s bodies 
and, on the other, to intensify the contact between the county self-government 
and central government, to achieve a second tier self-government that is viable 
and acting in the interests of the state and people’. 
The county level was no longer the same local self-government that it was 
prior to 1934. This can be explained, among other reasons, by the fact that the 
President appointed the county governor, and the members of the county 
council were not elected directly by the people. The county governor was a 
state representative in the county and the leader of the county government. He 
had the right to report directly to the President of the Republic and the Prime 
Minister. The main differences compared to the pre-1934 arrangement were 
as follows: 
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Before 1934 Based on County Act of 1938 
• Cities subordinated to the state level 
and only rural municipalities and 
towns to the county level. 
• In addition to rural municipalities and 
towns, cities (except the capital and 
first-level cities) also subordinated to 
the county level. 
• Members of county council elected 
by the residents of the rural 
municipalities and towns. 
• Members of the county council 
elected from the rural municipality 
mayors and city elders of the third- 
level cities by the plenary of the rural 
municipality mayors and city elders. 
• County council appointed the chair of 
the county government. 
• President appointed the county 
governor, who was directly 
subordinated to the Minister of the 
Interior. 
• The bodies of the county self-
government comprised the county 
council (including the audit 
committee) and the county 
government. 
• The bodies of the county self-
government comprised the council, 
county governor, county government 
and plenary of the rural municipality 
mayors and city elders (advisory 
body). No audit committee because 
oversight of the county government’s 
reporting and activities was the task 
of the central government bodies. 
 
The County Act of 1938 contained several elements similar to those of the 
City Act of 1938 and the Rural Municipality Act of 1937. One of these was an 
increase in the power of the executive or the leader of the executive body, 
including the duration of his mandate being longer than that of the 
representative body. 
The new body – the plenary of the rural municipality mayors and city elders 
(valla- ja linnavanemate täiskogu) – was to increase the proximity of the 
county government and the rural municipalities and city governments 
(Maddisoo, 1938, p. 135). The new organisation has been compared to a 
pyramid, where the plenary is at the bottom and the county governor at the 
top (Reintalu, 1938). As the county governor was a state representative in the 
county, and there was also the plenary, all three levels were better connected, 
although the new county government was no longer as strong a balancing 
power vis-à-vis the central government as it was before 1934, because instead 
of being a local self-government body, it was now integrated into both the state 
and the local level.  
4.2 LOCAL AUTONOMY 
When it comes to the differences between cities and rural municipalities, the 
two main differences were related to supervision and financing. Furthermore, 
both of these aspects are related to central-local power relations. 
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4.2.1 SUPERVISION  
A prevailing question in central-local relations concerned the supervision of 
the legality of local government activities and decisions. At the end of 1918, the 
Temporary Government assigned a commissar to every county as a 
representative of the central government. This was only a minor adjustment 
compared to what was set out in the City Act of 1892. According to the 
Regulation on Commissars of Temporary Government of 1918, the 
commissar’s main responsibility was to ensure that the authorities were 
implementing the legislation appropriately and acting within the law – 
essentially supervising the legality of their work. For this purpose, the 
commissar had the right to suspend the implementation of local government 
decisions if they were not in compliance with the law, to conduct investigations 
if necessary, and so on. The commissar worked under the auspices of the 
Ministry of the Interior, and was obligated to report to the Minister of the 
Interior at least once a month. In August 1919,42 a decision was made to place 
all the supervisory powers under the jurisdiction of the Minister of the Interior 
because the commissars’ term had come to an end and there was no wish to 
appoint new ones. Henceforth, the local governments were asked to send all 
their decisions, or a copy of the minutes, to the Ministry of the Interior. It is 
not entirely clear why the post of commissar was abolished, although a circular 
letter of August 1919 stated that the Government of the Republic saw no 
benefit in appointing new commissars before the local government legislation 
was drafted and enacted. In addition, at the beginning of 1919, the Ministry of 
the Interior had informed all county governments that all local government 
authorities should deal directly with the Ministry of the Interior and not 
approach the Temporary Government directly.43 
The Temporary Act on Local Government Supervision was adopted on 11 
October 1919. It confirmed that the supervision of the legality of local 
government activities was under the jurisdiction of the Minister of the Interior. 
The supervision of cities and counties was implemented through the 
representatives of the Minister, while the supervision of rural municipalities 
and towns was performed through county governments.  
Maddison (1927a, p. 37) claimed that the wish to ensure the broad 
independence of local government was aptly inscribed in the Temporary Act 
on Local Government Supervision of 1919 because it implied that the 
supervision could only be exercised based on this Act. This is questionable, 
however. Even though the Temporary Act of 1919 covered only the legality 
aspect, the City Act of 1892 set out the supervision by the Minister of the 
Interior over the content of the bylaws (Section 110), and that provision was 
also in force after 1919 (Dolf, 1927, p. 60). 
                                                 
42 Circular letter (of 1919) to all city, county, town, and rural municipality governments (Kõigile 
linna-, maakonna-, alevi- ja vallavalitsustele). 
43 Circular letter (of 1919) to all county governments (Kõigile maakonnavalitsustele). 
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All the decisions of the city council, including any annexes, were sent by the 
mayor to the supervisory authorities. The list of decisions for which approval 
by the Ministry of the Interior was required before taking effect was presented 
in Section 79 of the City Act as of 1927. The list included, for example, decisions 
on the transfer of immovable property, borrowing and providing guarantees 
(above a certain limit), and signing contracts with private undertakings. In 
March 1934,44 the list of decisions requiring the Ministry’s approval was 
supplemented with a budget, a report on its execution, and bylaws.  
In order to suspend the execution of local decisions, the higher-level 
authorities had to refer the matter to the administrative court. In 1921, if not 
earlier, the Minister of the Interior realized that this was too burdensome. He 
also recognized that not all local municipalities had ‘books’ with legislation 
concerning local government, and therefore councils often took decisions that 
were not in line with the law (Siseministeerium, 1921, August 29, p. 1). To 
address this shortcoming, the Ministry proposed that the supervisors should 
suspend the local decisions and provide the local authorities with justification 
for doing so, allowing them to either amend a decision or refer it to the 
administrative court (Siseministeerium, 1921, August 29, p. 1). The bill 
concerning the amendment of the local government supervision act was sent 
to the parliament, but soon recalled. This principle was introduced in 
December 1934 in a decree instead,45 which also foresaw that the central 
government had the right to suspend the activities of the council of the local 
government that was experiencing serious solvency problems. In such a case, 
the tasks of the local council and local government would have been assigned 
to the city’s or rural municipality’s government, which was appointed by either 
the Government of the Republic or the Minister of the Interior. By 1937, this 
right had been exercised for one rural municipality and one city 
(Siseministeerium, 1937, January 25, p. 19). 
In May 1934 an additional clause46 was added to the Act of 1919, which 
enabled the Government of the Republic to remove from office mayors, 
members of local government, including members of the temporary county 
government, and secretaries of cities, towns, and rural municipalities if their 
activity was deemed detrimental to the state or local interests. In March that 
same year, the Government of the Republic’s powers in appointing mayors was 
increased, which heralded a new principle in local government organisation. 
With these two measures, the central government increased its control over 
local government, especially if we consider that the county level, which was 
one of the actors balancing the central government, was weakened with the 
establishment of the temporary county governments. 
                                                 
44 Decree Amending the City Act (1934) (Linnaseaduse muutmise dekreet). 
45 Act (of 1934) Amending and Specifying the Legislation related to Local Governments 
(Omavalitsustesse puutuvate seaduste muutmise ja täiendamise seadus). 
46 Decree (of 1934) Specifying the Temporary Act on Local Government Supervision (Omavalitsuse 
ajutise järelevalve seaduse täiendamise dekreet). 
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An indication that changes in the first half of 1934 increased the Ministry 
of the Interior’s workload vis-à-vis local governments was the amendment47 of 
the Government Organisation Act in November 1934, which created a separate 
self-government department within the Ministry. The department was 
responsible for the ‘organisation, management and supervision of self-
governments and minority culture self-governments’. The fact that the 
Ministry of the Interior sought to implement its new powers in practice too is 
reflected in the explanatory memorandum of the amendment 
(Siseministeerium, 1934, October 30), where it is clearly stated that the 
Ministry’s responsibilities in the ‘active management and organisation’ of self-
government authorities would increase significantly. 
All of these changes in 1934 increased the powers of the supervisory 
authorities as well as central government control over the local authorities. 
The speeches of the state leaders in January 1935 emphasised further changes 
– the decrease in the competence of the council and the increase in the 
competence of the mayor and central government (Vellner, 1935, p. 4). Vellner 
referred to these developments as ‘deconcentration’. 
The Rural Municipality Act of 1937 and the City Act of 1938 contained a 
chapter on supervision and repealed the Temporary Act on Local Government 
Supervision of 1919. The Ministry of the Interior was responsible for 
supervision of the cities (except for the third-level cities, which were the 
responsibility of the county governor48). The rural municipalities were under 
the supervision of three bodies – the Ministry of the Interior, the county 
government, and the chair of the county government. The supervision covered 
the legality and expediency of local government activities. The latter was 
limited to those cases specified in the legislation. For example, the approval of 
the supervisory authority was still needed for the budget adopted by local 
councils and for taxes and tax rates. The central government had to be able to 
trust those people responsible for governing at the local level, and one way to 
ensure this was by granting the Minister of the Interior greater powers in 
appointing the local officials, and removing them from office 
(Siseministeerium, 1937, January 25, pp. 18–19).  
4.2.2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES 
During the period under discussion, opinions were voiced to the effect that the 
central government had conferred tasks on the local governments, but not the 
appropriate measures or independence (see Postimees, 1930; Saar, 1927) and 
funding (Postimees, 1926; Lauri, 1923, p. 3; Loorits, 1936, p. 20). This leads to 
the assumption that there was administrative decentralisation without 
                                                 
47 Act (of 1934) Amending and Specifying the Government Organisation Act (Valitsemise 
korraldamise seaduse muutmise ja täiendamise seadus). 
48 According to a diary kept by Eduard Laaman (2004), the Ministry of the Interior was already 
considering subordinating cities to the county level in January 1937. 
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adequate fiscal decentralisation. Before going into detail, we have to 
acknowledge that the available financial data for the period is incomplete and 
not entirely comparable for at least two reasons. In the case of cities, the 
budgetary procedures were harmonised from the financial year 1922 
(Neuhaus, 1926, p. 1), which is also the reason why the budgetary data for the 
years prior to 1922 is not available in a consolidated format. In addition, data 
on the rural municipalities’ income and revenue is missing or not comparable 
during the first decade because the Statistical Office did not start to collect 
detailed data on taxation until 1927 (Pullerits, 1928, p. 68).  
In 1930, Neps (1930) claimed that ‘Estonia is the most centralized state in 
the whole educated world’ based on the expenditure of the state and local 
government in different countries, because the share for the state and local 
government was 80% and 20% respectively. The indicative change in sub-
national expenditure and state expenditure in relation to GDP is presented in 
Figure 4.1, which shows that during the 1930s local government expenditure 
compared to GDP remained unchanged for the most part. In the case of the 
cities, the average increase in expenditure in 1926 compared to 1925 was 
26.2% (Eesti Linnadeliit, 1928, p. 90). This partly reflects the increased state 
support for streets and roads (Neuhaus, 1928, p. 317). 
 
 
Figure 4.1  Local government and state expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 1923–1936/37 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on Feldman (1928, 1931, 1938b, 1938c, 
1939), Neuhaus (1927b, 1929), Riigi Statistika Keskbüroo (1937), Valge (2003, p. 
2712). 
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The first congress of local government representatives in October 1924 
adopted a resolution in the area of taxes, which included a claim that one of 
the measures needed for the local government authorities to survive and 
function effectively was ‘to develop and quickly enforce a new local 
government tax act whereby revenues appropriate for local government 
expenditures would be ensured’ (Eesti Maakondade Liit ja Eesti Linnade Liit, 
1925, p. 142). Four years later, there was still no new tax act. At the congress 
of 1924 and 1928, it was concluded that if local governments were entrusted 
with new tasks, then the relevant sources of revenue should also be indicated 
in the acts (Eesti Maakondade Liit ja Eesti Linnade Liit, 1925, p. 142; Eesti 
Linnade Liit, 1928, p. 115). 
In the first half of the 1930s, local government revenues decreased mainly 
due to the economic downturn, but also for cities due to legislative 
amendments49 (Velner, 1936c, pp. 146–147). The ordinary income of cities was 
19.55% smaller in 1935/36 compared to 1930/31, while for rural municipalities 
the decrease was 40.68%, and in the case of the state 16.76% (Loorits, 1936, p. 
19). The decrease was bigger for rural municipalities because their revenues 
depended mainly on tax income, while for cities it was a question of business 
activity (Loorits, 1936, p. 22). 
‘An important prerequisite for the exercise of local fiscal autonomy is ... 
the ability to choose tax rates’ (Oulasvirta & Turala, 2009, p. 314). While in 
1920 the state had determined the maximum rates for most of the local taxes 
(local government taxation powers were subject to capping), from 1921 
onwards the local municipality could determine the rates, with few 
exceptions (e.g. head tax, whose maximum rate was set by the state). The 
maximum rates set by the local councils were to be approved by the Minister 
of the Interior by consulting the Minister of Finance. In 1926, the parliament 
adopted an act50 amending two earlier acts and setting out the arrangement 
that the Minister of Finance had to approve the tax rates that the local 
municipalities had determined. The reason was purely practical – to decrease 
the administrative burden, as the Ministry of the Interior was only an 
intermediary (Siseministeerium, 1926, March 13, p. 2). Avikson (1927a) was 
of the opinion that the Amending Act of 1926 was not appropriate – under 
the Temporary Act of Local Government Supervision of 1919, county 
governments were responsible for the supervision of the legality of the rural 
municipalities, but as the Minister of Finance was duly required to approve 
the tax rates of the counties and rural municipalities, the ‘supervisory 
authority cannot supervise as foreseen in the act’ (p. 38).  
Discussions on tax reform started in the second half of the 1920s, but the 
question of possible new taxes only came onto the agenda in 1929/30 due to 
                                                 
49 For a list of the legislative amendments affecting the revenues and expenditure, see Loorits, 1936, 
pp. 19–20. 
50 Act (of 1926) Amending Local Government Tax Acts (Omavalitsuste maksuseaduste muudatuste 
seadus). 
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difficulties in balancing the state budget (Selter, 1931, p. 13). The head of the 
tax department at the Ministry of Economics noted in his report to the 
Minister of Economics in 1930 (Linnad ja Alevid, 1931, p. 137) that local 
government at that time was not dependent on the central government, but 
the other way around, largely because the local government tasks were not 
anchored in the legislation and the central government could only count on 
the accommodating approach of local governments in implementing state 
tasks. Therefore he concluded that the state tax reform could not be 
accomplished without local government tax reform. Moreover, he said that it 
was unfair that local governments themselves could determine the basis for 
taxation, as in that case citizens and enterprises in different municipalities 
would be treated differently. 
The revenues and taxation powers of cities were different from those of the 
rural municipalities. Hence, cities and rural municipalities will be dealt with 
separately in the next section.  
Cities 
At the beginning of the 1920s, cities were in a better financial situation than 
rural municipalities and counties (Lauri, 1923, p. 3). In 1922–1925, their 
budget was in surplus, which in turn was used to increase reserves or to pay 
off loans (Neuhaus, 1927b). During the early years of independence, the ceiling 
for several local tax rates set in 1917 was increased considerably (between five- 
and tenfold).51 
From 191752 and in the 1920s cities had the right to apply 29 different local 
taxes,53 plus the ones stipulated by special laws. Of those 29 taxes, however, 
23 could only be levied when the revenues from the city’s assets and 
enterprises54 were insufficient to cover the expenditures of the city. Over the 
years, the structure of the revenues changed. For example, while in Tallinn in 
1916 the tax revenue was 6.7% of all revenues, in 1928/29 it was 39.1% (N., 
1930, p. 29). Due to an amendment to the Income Tax Act, the share of income 
tax in the revenues decreased, while that of property tax increased in 1925 
(Neuhaus, 1927a, pp. 7–8). In 1936, for example, the state share of property 
tax was allocated to the cities to ease their financial situation (Velner, 1936a, 
p. 61). The City Act of 1938 listed 26 different taxes, some of which were fees. 
The Act mostly stipulated maximum rates and some taxes were subject to 
                                                 
51 See Regulation on Increase of Tax Rate Ceilings for Cities of 1918 (määrus linnade heaks 
võetavate maksude ülemmäärade kõrgendamise kohta) and Act Amending and Specifying the Tax Acts 
on Cities and Towns of 1920 (seadus linnade ja alevite maksuseaduste muutmise ja täiendamise kohta). 
52 Before 1917, the city taxation right was stipulated in the City Act and was limited/narrow (T., 1924, 
p. 34). 
53 Codification of City Tax Act of 1917 as of 1924 (Linnamaksu seadus (kodifitseeritud)), 1924. 
54 The revenues from assets and enterprises yielded about 10–20% of the total revenues. See Figure 
B2 in Appendix B. 
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approval by the Minister of the Interior. Throughout that period, the tax 
revenue remained broadly between 50–60% of all regular revenues. In 1936–
1938, for instance, local taxes yielded around 30% of total revenue. 
Rural municipalities 
The Provisional Act on the Revenues, Expenditure, Budgets, and Reports of 
Rural Municipalities and Counties of 1920 specified which taxes could be 
collected by rural municipalities and which by counties, including the 
maximum rates set by the state. In the same year only a few minor 
amendments were made to a similar act on cities and towns, which had been 
adopted in September 1917. According to the local government 
representatives, at the beginning of the 1920s the revenues of rural 
municipalities were about 30% lower than before World War I (Lauri, 1923, p. 
3). The cities and counties were in a better position (Olle, 2001, p. 24). Of the 
rural municipalities, those that had industrial enterprises on their territory 
and were able to levy taxes accordingly were in a better financial position. To 
ease the financial situation of municipalities, the Constituent Assembly 
adopted an act in 191955 which gave all local governments the right to collect 
additional taxes to cover their budgetary deficit in that year. Acts that gave 
local governments the right to collect additional taxes were also adopted in the 
years that followed. At the end of 1919, the act on local taxes of 1866 was still 
in force, but the Ministry of Finance considered that local governments should 
not collect taxes based upon it (Asutav Kogu, 1920, col. 2589–2591).  
In 1920, the Constituent Assembly planned to discuss the income tax bill, 
which foresaw that rural municipalities’ share of income tax would be only 
one-tenth. In April 1920, in regard to the issue, Tartu County Government sent 
a letter to the Constituent Assembly’s committee (Tartu Maakonnavalitsus, 
1920). The county government stressed that the situation whereby the 
majority of the municipalities’ income was determined by the Government of 
the Republic was not appropriate. The county government also referred to the 
Act of 1866, pointing out that it gave municipalities more freedom to 
determine their revenue and expenditure, and that the Estonian Republic 
should place more trust in municipalities accordingly. 
The different responsibilities placed on the rural municipalities (e.g. 
construction of new school houses) had put many of them in an economically 
difficult situation by 1934 (Kruberg, 1934, p. 110). They levied 12 different 
taxes and taxation’s share of the general revenue was duly 78%.56 Hence, there 
was a need to look for new sources of revenue besides taxation (Kruberg, 1934, 
pp. 110–111). The Rural Municipality Act of 1937 listed eight different taxes 
                                                 
55 Act on Additional Taxes that Local Governments Can Levy to Cover the Deficit of 1919 (seadus 
omavalitsuste heaks nende 1919. a. puudujääkide katmiseks võetavate täiendavate maksude kohta). 
56 This figure includes both the local taxes and the taxes collected by the state and transferred to the 
rural municipalities. 
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that the rural municipalities had a right to collect, along with the maximum 
rates or other guidelines. Some additional taxes were set in other legal acts. In 
the Explanatory Memorandum of the Rural Municipality Act of 1937, it was 
acknowledged that the revenue sources foreseen in the Act would not resolve 
the financial problems of the rural municipalities.  
In general, although the rural municipalities had a shorter list of possible 
local taxes than the cities, their revenue was more dependent upon them. 
The example of head tax 
In the domain of finances, head tax presents a good example of path 
dependence because, despite receiving much criticism, the tax was maintained 
mainly due to a lack of viable alternatives, and was subsequently extended to 
cities in addition to rural municipalities.  
Head tax was contradictory in many ways, and was found to be unfair as 
the amount remained the same despite one’s income. Such a tax was already 
in use during Russian times, albeit with some differences;57 during the period 
of independence, it was not possible to abolish it completely because there 
were no alternative sources of rural municipality revenue (Velner, 1935, p. 97). 
With the Provisional Act on the Revenues, Expenditure, Budgets, and Reports 
of Rural Municipalities and Counties of 1920, the rural municipalities were 
granted the right to collect head tax,58 and for more than a decade rural 
municipality residents had to pay it, while the residents of cities did not. The 
Independent Socialist Labour Party submitted a bill on abolishment of the 
head tax to parliament in October 1922 as they deemed it unfair (Tööliste 
Wõitlus, 1922), but even their interpellations were rejected (Riigikogu, 1922, 
col. 1362–1367). Trade unions also called for the abolishment of head tax 
(Ametiühisusline kuukiri, 1923, p. 65).  
At the 2nd congress of local government representatives of 1928 (Eesti 
Linnade Liit, 1928, pp. 114–115), the resolutions of the 1st congress were 
recalled and it was concluded that, due to financial difficulties, a high head tax 
was practically the only possibility for rural municipalities to fulfil their tasks. 
Their proposed solution was that the whole revenue from the income and 
property tax should go to local governments, which would allow head tax to be 
abolished, and some state subsidies to be withheld. In 1932, with the 
amendment of the Act of 1920, the maximum tax rate was set at the national 
level.  
While in 1923 head tax accounted for 21% of the rural municipalities’ 
revenue, by 1934/35 it was already 41% (see Figure B1 in Appendix B). 
                                                 
57 During Russian times, head tax was only collected from male residents, had no upper limit, and 
was increased when money was needed to build a public building. The capital reserves had increased as 
a result of the tax, but as these were put into Russian state securities, they were lost at the end of World 
War I (Loorits, 1936, p. 18). 
58 Counties and cities initially had the right to collect the tax only in certain years to cover the deficit. 
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Allegedly, in 1934, the mayors of the rural municipalities in Harju County were 
inclined to think that ‘head tax is not fulfilling its purpose anymore and should 
be abolished, because the tax is not collected in cities and collecting it from the 
rural residents would make the latter second-rate citizens’ (Kruberg, 1934, p. 
110). Head tax was also collected under the Rural Municipality Act of 1937, 
with a maximum rate of 20 kroons per year. 
As several towns became cities in 1926, at the end of that year the Ministry 
of Finance tabled a draft provisional act on an increase in revenue sources for 
new cities only. They justified their actions by saying that as new cities could 
no longer withdraw head tax and had also lost 40% of the subsidies for 
teachers’ salaries, they were facing financial difficulties and needed additional 
revenues (see Rahandusministeerium, 1926, December 28, p. 2). On becoming 
cities, under the applicable law they would have received 40% of the income 
tax instead of 20%, but that would have covered only about 5% of the lost 
revenue (Riigikogu, 1927, col. 31). The proposed solution was that the new 
cities would have the right to levy head tax for a period of five years under the 
same principles as the rural municipalities (see Rahandusministeerium, 1926, 
December 28, p. 2). At the first reading in parliament, the local government 
committee proposed that the bill should be rejected because head tax was an 
outdated form of taxation that ‘does not allow fair distribution of tax between 
citizens’ (Riigikogu, 1927, col. 31–32). As a result, parliament rejected the bill.  
Establishing head tax in all cities was discussed in 1924 and 1932, but did 
not garner enough support. In 1924, the subject was raised because the right 
to withhold head tax had been granted to towns, while in 1932, it was discussed 
in relation to the Community Act proposed by the Cities Association (Velner, 
1935, p. 98). The reasons behind the proposal to establish head or community 
tax in cities were: (a) the need to increase the cities’ revenue; (b) to harmonise 
the treatment of inhabitants in both urban and rural areas; and (c) to establish 
a closer relationship between local government and its residents (Velner, 1935, 
p. 99). The Ministry of the Interior supported the idea, but the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs was against it (Velner, 1935, p. 99).  
The city community tax, which in principle was similar to the head tax, was 
established in June 1936 and its revenues were to be used for welfare services 
(Velner, 1936a, pp. 62, 64). This could be seen as a step towards decreasing 
the differences between cities and rural municipalities because, prior to that, 
if a person was living in a city and had no property or businesses there, he did 
not have to pay any direct tax, while in the rural municipalities and towns 
residents had to pay head tax. The Ministry of the Interior used the same 
argument in the Explanatory Memorandum on the bill of the City Community 
Tax Act (Siseministeerium, 1936, June 2), highlighting the fact that people 
from rural areas were moving to the cities to avoid paying head tax. 
Furthermore, the Ministry deemed it only fair that if a person had the right to 
vote, he also should bear financial obligations towards the local government. 
The City Community Tax Act of 1936 was issued as a decree by the State Elder, 
due to its national urgency. The community tax was also stipulated in the City 
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Act of 1938, with a maximum rate of 20 kroons per year, in keeping with the 
rural municipalities. 
4.3 LOCAL DEMOCRACY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
BODIES 
Local government bodies in Estonia have traditionally been the council 
(representative body) and the city or rural municipality government (executive 
body), which is headed by a mayor. In addition, a secretary (of the city or rural 
municipality) and an audit committee have sometimes been specifically seen 
as local government bodies. Local residents elect the council members, who in 
turn elect or appoint the mayor.  
During the interwar period, the acts on local elections were among the most 
frequently amended legislation concerning local government. On the other 
hand, the main amendments to the rules governing the roles and powers of the 
local government bodies were introduced in 1934 and 1937/38 by increasing 
the powers of the executive. 
4.3.1 CONSTANTLY CHANGING ELECTORAL RULES  
All three Constitutions (1920, 193459, and 1938) included a provision on local 
elections: 
• Section 76 of the Constitution of 1920 stipulated that representative 
bodies of the municipalities ‘shall be elected on general, uniform, 
direct, and secret voting, based on the proportionality principle’;  
• In Section 76 of the Constitution of 1934, the same elements were 
promulgated, but it was specified that voters should have the 
possibility to elect individual persons;  
• In Section 123 of the Constitution of 1938, the provision regarding 
the election of individual persons was abolished, but a clause was 
added defining that ‘voters are the citizens with the right to vote, 
who belong to the area of the municipality, and who have a 
permanent residence or place of work in this area’. In addition, the 
direct reference to the proportionality principle was deleted and the 
method of allocation was left for the legislature to decide based on 
appropriateness.  
All three Constitutions also set forth which citizens had the right to vote 
and which were disenfranchised in general. 
Local elections were held in 1919, 1921, 1923, 1926/1927, 1929/1930, 1934, 
and 1939. The legislation concerning them was amended prior to almost every 
election. Previous to this and until 1917, the local government was based on 
                                                 
59 30 sections out of 89 were amended in the Constitution of 1920 and hence it is justified to talk 
about a new Constitution. 
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social class. The local council elections in 1917 were the first in which all 
citizens who were at least 20 years of age, and who lived in a city or rural 
municipality, could vote (Vihalem, 1963).  
The mandate of the councils elected in 1917 was set to end on 1 January 
1919.60 The elections of 1919 took place under the Russia-wide rules, adopted 
by the Provisional Government, and under implementing rules laid out by the 
Estonian government (Truuväli, 1986a, p. 146). The complete new act for rural 
municipality council elections was adopted in 1921, and for the city council 
elections in 1926. Until such times, the electoral rules of 1917 continued to 
govern, although they were subject to amendments while they were in force. 
The adoption of the new act concerning city council elections in 1926 was not 
initiated by the government, which submitted a proposal for an amendment, 
but by the Riigikogu’s committee on local government. The latter found that 
there were already four acts in force concerning city council elections, so rather 
than amend those and create five, they decided it would be better to draft the 
act in full (Riigikogu, 1926a, p. 155). The most relevant change in 1926 was to 
limit eligibility to run as a candidate only to those on the electoral roll of the 
respective municipality. The subsequent significant amendments to the 
electoral rules were the amending acts of 1933, the decrees of 1934, and the 
acts of 1939. 
Based on the election legislation of 1920–1921, the council mandate was for 
two years. In 192361 it was extended to three years and in 193262 to four years. 
Under the Rural Municipality Act of 1937 and the City Act of 1938, the council’s 
mandate was for 5 years. It is worth recalling that the Rural Municipality Act 
and the City Act were adopted as late as 1937 and 1938. Until then, the pre-
1900 acts with amendments were still in force. 
Suffrage and eligibility to vote 
A critical aspect of local democracy is the participation of voters. Participation 
can be undermined in at least three ways: ‘by restricting the suffrage, by 
restricting the impact of elections, and by ‘self-exclusion’ on the part of voters’ 
(Birch, 2003, p. 56). Suffrage rules or franchise requirements determine who 
can vote. Voting rights can be restricted to certain criteria – for example a voter 
must be at least a certain age or must meet certain residency requirements. 
These criteria were both in use in Estonia. 
                                                 
60 Provisional Regulations on the Election of Estonia’s Rural Municipality Councils of 1917 (Eesti 
wallanõukogude walimiste ajutised määrused). 
61 Act on Determining the Duration of the Mandate of City and Town Councils and Rural and County 
Councils of 1923 (Linna- ja alevivolikogude ning valla- ja maakonnanõukogude volituste aja 
kindlaksmääramise seadus). 
62 Act on Duration of the Mandate of Local Government Councils of 1932 (Omavalitsuste volikogude 
volituste kestuse seadus). 
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Age limit. The voting age was 20 years or older, although in 1939 the age 
limit was increased to 22. The latter was also stipulated in the Constitution of 
1938.63 Truuväli (1986a, p. 148) suggests that by raising the age limit to 20 
years, compared to 18 years under the Tsarist rules, the bourgeoisie excluded 
a considerable number of workers from the ballot boxes, as at that time young 
people started working at the age of 16 or 17.  
Place of residence. Based on the provisional regulations of 1917, in order to 
be eligible to vote, a person had to live in the municipality (or own real estate 
there) at the time of the composition of the electoral roll. In 1919, the eligibility 
to vote was extended to those working in the territory of the municipality. In 
1926, the requirements in cities and rural municipalities diverged, with the 
residence of the voter being the only factor in the cities, while in rural 
municipalities the situation remained unchanged. The acts of 193964 required 
a person to live or work permanently in the municipality for a minimum of two 
years. As a rule, the voter was registered on the electoral roll based on his place 
of residence. If he wished to vote in the municipality where he worked, he had 
to submit a request for that purpose.  
The situation whereby there was no minimum period of residence in a 
municipality in order to be eligible to vote was seen by some (e.g. Smetanin, 
1925, pp. 215–216) as a threat in certain small municipalities, where a group 
of temporary workers had congregated, and whose votes could dominate 
during the local elections.  
Groups deprived of voting rights. Under the provisional regulations of 
1917, the right to vote was denied to those who were declared feebleminded, as 
well as all those under guardianship. These rights were also taken away from 
anyone convicted of and punished for stealing, fraud, and several other acts, 
including those convicted by a court for violating voting laws (for certain years 
after serving their sentence), and those running brothels. The regulations of 
1919 expanded these exemptions and deprived defectors and those who had 
failed to show up in the event of mobilisation, of their voting rights, but in 1921, 
this amendment from 1919 was deleted. The categories of people deprived of 
voting rights were also modified later. For example, in 1939 citizens doing 
                                                 
63 During the drafting of the Constitution of 1938, the decision-makers considered both lowering the 
age limit and raising it, although the draft version of the Constitution set an age limit of 23 (Mägi, 1937, 
p. 182). Uluots, who acted as a general rapporteur in the first chamber of the National Assembly for the 
draft Constitution of 1938, stated in a speech (Uluots, 1937, p. 140) that it seemed to him that there were 
two main reasons why the voting age in the draft Constitution of 1938 was 23: first, because citizens were 
usually conscripted at the age of 20, and if those doing military service could not vote while those deemed 
unsuitable for military service could, it would be unjust towards the former; and second, because citizens 
were considered adults at 20 under civil law. However, there may have been a need to increase the age 
of majority to 21 in the future, so setting the voting age at 20 may have been inappropriate and setting it 
at 23 would have ensured that only adults could vote (the enacted Constitution set the voting age at 22). 
64 City Councils Election Act of 1939 (Linnavolikogude valimise seadus) and Rural Municipality 
Councils Election Act of 1939 (Vallavolikogude valimise seadus). 
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compulsory military service during the elections were prohibited from voting. 
This had already been considered earlier, but not implemented. Some 
members of the Riigikogu had proposed this in 1926, but when it was found 
not to be in line with the Constitution during discussions on military service 
legislation earlier that year, the idea was dropped (see Riigikogu, 1926b, p. 
194). The Constitution of 1938 included a provision which stated that citizens 
doing compulsory military service could not vote. The aim was to ensure that 
the army and politics did not mix. 
Eligibility for nomination and the nomination procedures 
The eligibility criteria for a person to run as a candidate in an election 
presumed that he/she had the right to vote, but there might have been 
additional softer or stricter requirements. The age limit for a candidate was 
the same as that imposed on suffrage until 1939, when it was increased to 25 
years of age. In the explanatory memorandum of the bill imposing this 
increase, the government reasoned that it wished to have ‘more experienced 
powers’ in the local councils. The same age limit was also set for candidates for 
parliamentary elections. In the initial years of the Republic, a candidate could 
have been from another municipality. In 1926, this was changed and the 
candidate had to be on the electoral roll of the municipality where he/she was 
running for office.  
There were also special requirements concerning the number of signatures 
and the deposit required for being listed. The requirement in relation to the 
number of supporting signatures was changed several times. While 3–10 
signatures were usually required for a list, in 1939 this was increased to 5–15 
signatures per candidate.65 The signatures allowed the authorities to see who 
was supporting certain candidates and to add them to their “black list” 
(Truuväli, 1986a, p. 152). A summary of the changes is presented in Appendix 
C. The acts of 1926 clearly set out three types of organisations/groups who 
could not submit a list of candidates for the elections, with the objective of 
banning groups whose aim was to subvert the Republic of Estonia.66  
The deposit requirement for a local election was introduced in 1933 
through local election legislation, which borrowed similar provisions from the 
Parliament Election Act. Under the act of 1933 amending the City Councils’ 
Election Act, the deposit in the cities was between 25 and 150 kroons per list 
depending on the size of the city. In rural municipalities the deposit was 5 
                                                 
65 5–50 signatures per candidate were set out in the draft act on the city council election of 1939, but 
it was reduced in the parliamentary committee. 
66 Organisations and groups whose activity is aimed at (1) overthrowing/changing the existing 
constitutional polity by violent means, (2) ending the independence of the Republic of Estonia or 
separation of a part of the territory of the republic, or (3) developing propaganda denying the 
independence of the Republic of Estonia. 
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kroons.67 Under the acts of 1939, the deposit was 10–30 kroons. The rationale 
for the introduction of the deposit was to ensure that only those with wide 
support could be fielded as candidates (Kohtu- ja Siseministeerium, 1933, 
September 27). 
Electoral rules 
The Constitutions of 1920 and 1934 determined that elections should take 
place based on the principle of proportionality. The Constitution of 1938 
changed this, since it was decided that elections under this principle are 
‘discredited and a purely majority system is difficult to implement. Thereby 
the method of electing the local government councils was left to the legislator 
to decide’ (Olle, 2001, pp. 7–8). One of the threats of a majority system was 
that smaller groups, which at the same time might be economically more 
important, might not be represented in the local councils (Mägi, 1937, p. 206). 
In addition, it may have had a negative impact on the representation of 
minorities. 
The ballot structure was changed several times. Although voters could only 
submit one ballot, the number of candidates they could vote for and whether 
they could add additional candidates changed frequently. The initial system (a 
party list system) left the least choice for voters.  
Under the rules of 1917, voters voted for a list and the system was based on 
a closed list proportional representation system. New elections were organised 
if elections or the whole list of a certain group were to be repealed, or 
additional elections were organised if there was an insufficient number of 
candidates on the list. Based on the City Council Elections Act of 1920, a voter 
had the possibility to vote for a list (by agreeing with the order of candidates 
on the list) or, if desired, to indicate a candidate within a list. The d’Hondt 
method was used for the allocation of mandates and divisors 1, 2, 3, 4, and so 
forth. The Rural Municipality Council Elections Act of 1921 maintained a 
closed list proportional representation system without the d’Hondt method 
and without the possibility to underline a name on the list. In 1926 the 
proportional system was retained, but the calculation method was modified 
slightly. The possibility to underline a name on the list, which was already 
allowed in city elections, was extended to the rural municipalities. While the 
parliament elections act was adopted just before the local elections act, the 
former was based on the d’Hondt method while the latter was based on the 
Hagenbach-Bischoff system (Jõgi & Avikson, 1927, p. 22). 
In 1933, the act amending the City Council Elections Act and the act 
amending the Rural Municipality Council Elections and Rural Municipality 
Council and Government Organisation Act emphasised the principle of the 
                                                 
67 Act Amending Rural Municipality Council Elections and Rural Municipality Councils and 
Governments Organisation Act of 1933 (Vallavolikogude valimise ja vallavolikogude ning 
vallavalitsuste korraldamise seaduse muutmise seadus). 
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election of individual candidates. The new system was developed based on the 
system introduced in Finland in 1906 (Klesment, 1933, p. 211; for Finland see 
Sundberg, 2002, p. 77) but only a few elements were included while the major 
parts were disregarded (Postimees, 1933). This involved combining the 
principle of proportionality with the principle of voting for individuals 
(Klesment, 1933, p. 211). Every list of candidates was composed of up to three 
names. The voters had several options for casting their vote and they could 
vote for up to three candidates. First, they could vote for the preferred ternary 
as it was listed, but they could also reorder the names according to preference 
by marking them 1, 2, and 3. There was also a so-called “white sheet” on which 
the voter could write up to three names; these could have been from different 
lists or even persons who had not been listed as candidates. It has been 
suggested that in several rural municipalities about 25–30% of the voters used 
white sheets (Päevaleht, 1934). In rural municipalities, a total of 17.3% of votes 
were given to persons not on the list of candidates (Truuväli, 1986a, p. 240). A 
vote for a candidate listed in the first position was counted as one vote, the 
second as half a vote, and the third as one-third of a vote. The explanatory 
memorandum to the act amending the Act on City Council Elections (Kohtu- 
ja Siseministeerium, 1933, September 27) mentioned that the possibility of 
voting for people who were not designated as candidates would be particularly 
beneficial in cases where certain people were not officially designated due to 
political intrigue. 
The acts of 1939 were based on the election of individuals. The names of all 
candidates were presented in alphabetical order and without any indication of 
which party the candidate belonged to. According to the new election acts, the 
voters in a rural municipality had the possibility to vote for as many candidates 
as there were councilmen to be elected from the respective electoral district. 
In cities, the maximum number of candidates a voter could vote for was the 
total number of councilmen to be elected from the electoral district, decreased 
by one-fourth. Candidates were to file for candidacy on an individual basis and 
at least five citizens had to sign the petition for candidacy, while one person 
could not sign more than one petition. This can be seen as an additional 
restriction because previously a list could contain the names of all or several 
party candidates and only five signatures were required for this list to be 
approved.  
One of the weaknesses of the rules in the 1920s was that in the proportional 
system with the (closed) list the emphasis was on the political parties, while 
persons’ abilities were secondary (Maaomavalitsus, 1924). Therefore the 
council of Estonia’s Counties Association proposed as early as December 1922 
that reforms should be made where persons, not lists, were voted upon 
(Maaomavalitsus, 1924, p. 100). The closed lists were considered the main 
weakness of the system as the voters’ ability to participate in choosing people 
who would represent them in the council was limited and the parties 
themselves determined who they would send to the council (Postimees, 1925).  
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It has been suggested that the proportional electoral system, which was in 
use from 1918 until 1933, could have been in use longer had there not been an 
economic crisis, failures to amend the Constitution, and the rise of the 
Veterans’ movement (Adams, 2009). The system introduced in 1933 was still 
proportional and the ternaries could be affiliated to larger groups. The change 
of 1939 should be viewed against the background of the state of martial law 
declared in March 1934, which was constantly prolonged. The government 
seemed to oppose the proportional system for local elections, presumably 
because such a system would have required citizens to become organised. 
Having candidates designated on an individual basis and presenting all the 
candidates in a single common list in alphabetical order was one of the few 
ways to prevent citizens from organising themselves into groups for the local 
elections.  
Extension of the mandate and ministerial decisions 
The mandate of the incumbent elected representative body was extended 
during the period under discussion at least five times: 
1) On 31 December 1920, the city councils’ mandate was extended by 
one year, until 1 January 1924.68 A possible reason for this was that 
the mandate of the councils of rural municipalities was due to end 
then (Vihalem, 1963, p. 57) based on the Rural Municipality Council 
Elections Act of 1921 (Section 74). After that, the elections for the 
city council and the council of rural municipality were organised 
mainly within the same month. 
2) By means of an act on the duration of the mandate of local 
government councils of 1932,69 the mandate of local councils was 
extended to four years, and the mandate of councils elected in 
1929/1930 until 31 October 1933. 
3) On 31 October 1933, the parliament adopted an act on the extension 
of the councils’ mandate, in accordance with which the mandate was 
extended until 15 February 1934. Under the explanatory 
memorandum (see Kohtu- ja Siseministeerium, 1933, July 14) on an 
earlier draft of the act, the possible reasoning behind the 
postponement of the elections was that the popular vote on the 
amendment of the Constitution was expected to take place at the 
beginning of October 1933, and hence the local elections during that 
month would have been technically impossible to organise. 
                                                 
68 Act of 1921 on Amending City Council Election Act (Seadus „Linnavolikogude valimise seaduse” 
muutmise kohta). 
69 Act on Duration of the Mandate of Local Government Councils of 1932 (Omavalitsuste volikogude 
volituste kestuse seadus). 
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4) On 5 November 1937 the president-regent issued an act (as a 
decree)70 by which the mandate of councils elected in 1934 was 
extended until 15 August 1939. One explanation for the extension 
was that the Constitution (which included a new basis for the local 
governments) was set to come into force in January 1938 
(Postimees, 1937). 
5) Due to the local elections legislation,71 the mandate of councils 
elected in 1934, which was set to expire in August 1939, was 
extended in May 1939 until 31 December that same year. In the 
explanatory memorandum (see Vabariigi Valitsus, 1939), the 
government justified the action by stating that as ‘elections shall be 
held at least 25 days before the end of the mandate of the council, 
the new elections would be in mid-July’. This was considered 
inappropriate as city residents were usually away from their 
permanent place of residence for the holidays. This extension was 
re-confirmed in November 1939,72 the reason being that it was set 
out in the City Act of 1938 and Rural Municipality Act of 1937 that 
the mandate of the local councils was five calendar years, meaning 
that those councils elected in 1939 started their work on 1 January 
1940. In addition, the old rural municipalities were abolished as of 
31 March 1939 and the new rural municipalities started to operate 
on 1 April 1939 due to the changes made with regard to their borders. 
As of this date, the old councils ceased to exist and their tasks were 
transferred to appointed rural municipality governments until the 
following elections (Velner, 1939, p. 53). 
Part of the initiative to extend the mandate also came from the local 
governments themselves. At the congress of the Rural Municipalities 
Association, held in October 1933, a decision was adopted whereby the 
mandates of the councils and governments of the rural municipalities would 
be extended until the new act on rural municipality and the new act on its 
elections had been adopted (Eesti Maaomavalitsuste Liit, 1933, p. 205). 
There were two main cases when the mandates of certain parties were 
voided. The first occurred in 1925 and the second in 1934. 
The results of the 1923 elections revealed an increase in the popularity of 
various communist parties (Truuväli, 1986a, p. 184). The Workers’ United 
Front (Töörahva Ühine Väerind), created on the initiative of the Estonian 
                                                 
70 Act Extending the Mandate of City, Town and Rural Municipality Councils and the Cultural 
Council of the German Minority’s Cultural Autonomy of 1937 (Linna-, alevi- ja vallaomavalitsuste 
volikogude ja saksa vähemusrahvuse kultuuromavalitsuse kultuurnõukogu volituste pikendamise 
seadus). 
71 City Councils Election Act of 1939 (Linnavolikogude valimise seadus) and Rural Municipality 
Councils Election Act of 1939 (Vallavolikogude valimise seadus). 
72 City and Rural Municipality Council Term Act of 1939 (Linna- ja vallavolikogude volituste tähtaja 
seadus). 
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Communist Party, gained about one-third of all votes in Tallinn, and they also 
received more votes in other big cities than any other party (Truuväli, 1986a, 
p. 182; Päevaleht, 1923). The bourgeoisie took action and several deputies of 
the Workers’ United Front were arrested (Truuväli, 1986a, p. 185). The State 
Order Protection Act was adopted on 12 February 1925. In accordance with 
this act, the Minister of the Interior was granted powers to terminate the 
mandate of council members who represented parties or groups which aimed 
to violently change the state order set by the Constitution, to end the 
independence of the Republic, or to develop propaganda denying the 
independence of the Republic of Estonia.73 Another basis for termination of 
the mandate was if an individual member of the council held such views. 
Representatives of the Workers’ United Front constituted about 19.3% of all 
members of city councils (Truuväli, 1986a, p. 185). In the case of rural 
municipalities and cities where the representatives of the Workers’ United 
Front had less than one-third of seats, their seats were filled with 
representatives from other groups. The bourgeoisie used a provision in the 
1920 amendment of the election act which stipulated that if there were no 
further candidates on a certain list to fill the vacant posts in the council, those 
posts should be filled with candidates from other lists (Vihalem, 1963, p. 69). 
After the representatives of the Workers’ United Front were deprived of the 
mandate, new elections were organised in about a dozen rural municipalities 
at the end of June 1925. Truuväli (1986a, p. 222) states that, despite 
everything, the Workers’ representatives were successful in several 
municipalities in the new elections as well.  
The decrees of the State Elder from 19 March 193474 gave the Minister of 
the Court and the Interior the power to annul the election results, to withdraw 
mandates, and to declare new elections in some municipalities. Three days 
later, the Minister75 duly annulled the mandates of the Veterans (or veterans 
of the War of Independence), which they had attained from the results of the 
elections in January 1934. In Tallinn, for example, the Veterans had gained 47 
seats out of 87 (Vihalem, 1963, p. 155). While in 1925 the seats of the deputies 
from the Workers’ United Front were filled by candidates from other parties 
and groups, or new elections were organised, in 1934 the Veterans’ seats were 
mainly left unfilled and new elections were allowed (albeit not mandatory) if 
the number of council members was below a certain level.76 Truuväli (1986a, 
                                                 
73 In parliament, several deputies of the Workers’ United Front had already been arrested before 
December 1924 (Vihalem, 1963, p. 66). 
74 Decree (of 1934) amending the City Councils Election Act (Linnavolikogude valimise seaduse 
muutmise dekreet) and Decree (of 1934) amending Rural Municipality Council Election and Rural 
Municipality Councils and Governments Organisation Act (Vallavolikogude valimise ja vallavolikogude 
ja vallavalitsuste korraldamise seaduse muutmise dekreet). 
75 Decision of the Minister of the Court and the Interior of 1934 no 2388. 
76 Decree (of 1934) Amending the City Councils Election Act (Linnavolikogude valimise seaduse 
muutmise dekreet) and Decree (of 1934) Amending Rural Municipality Council Election and Rural 
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p. 245) also draws attention to other differences, namely that the removal of 
the Veterans was not as rapid as in the case of the Workers’ United Front. In 
addition, some of the Veterans abjured their views, and members of the 
Farmers’ Party often supported their continuance in the councils nonetheless.  
The aforementioned reasons behind the electoral reforms were only the tip 
of the iceberg. The rationale indicated in the official documents goes only some 
way, if any, towards explaining the changes. There are still many grey areas in 
Estonian history when it comes to the ‘Era of Silence’, and several of these will 
probably remain unexplained. 
Based on Lijphart’s (1994, p. 13) definition of an electoral system as ‘a set 
of essentially unchanged election rules under which one or more successive 
elections are conducted in a particular democracy’, we cannot talk about an 
electoral system during that era.77 On the contrary, we can only talk about 
election rules. ‘Historically, ... elections have been an instrument of 
authoritarian control as well as a means of democratic governance’ (Schedler, 
2002, p. 36). One criterion for democratic elections is that they ‘must be 
“decisive” ex ante as well as “irreversible” ex post’ (Schedler, 2002, p. 41). To 
this end, several elections were undemocratic in Estonia. In 1921 the Trade 
Union list was very popular in several cities and in Tallinn they gained 28 seats 
out of 101, but even in April 1921, 26 out of the 28 deputies were arrested 
(Truuväli, 1986a, pp. 178, 180). In 1923, the Workers’ United Front was 
successful, receiving 23–33% of the votes in major cities (Truuväli, 1986a, p. 
182). The reaction to this has already been described. Moreover, when we 
factor in the measures against the Veterans in 1934, we have many reasons to 
claim that the elections were not irreversible ex post. 
Parming (1975, p. 57) has suggested that authoritarianism in Estonia 
‘emerged in the process of preventing authoritarianism’. The Veterans’ 
movement had the ‘appearance of a fascist-type organisation’ and by 1933 they 
were the largest political force in Estonia (Kasekamp, 2010, p. 109). During 
the city council elections on 14–15 January 1934, the Veterans gained about 
42% of the votes, which augured well for their success in the following 
parliamentary elections and those for the State Elder (Truuväli, 1986a, pp. 
190–191). These results were followed by the declaration of a state of 
emergency on 12 March 1934, and the annulment of the Veterans’ mandates, 
as described above, as well as the postponement of the already announced 
elections of the Parliament and State Elder78 on the grounds that due to the 
Veterans’ propaganda, free and fair elections could not be guaranteed. Despite 
the measures, the city council elections in 1939 confirmed the trend of the 
weakening position of the ruling clique and the noticeable strengthening of 
                                                 
Municipality Councils and Governments Organisation Act (Vallavolikogude valimise ja vallavolikogude 
ja vallavalitsuste korraldamise seaduse muutmise dekreet). 
77 The only subsequent elections under essentially the same rules were the ones of 1926 and 1929/30. 
78 Decree Postponing the Elections of the State Elder and Riigikogu of 1934 (Riigivanema ja 
Riigikogu valimiste edasilükkamise dekreet). 
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democratic powers (Truuväli, 1986a, p. 194). The Veterans’ success was due in 
part to the economic crisis (Arumäe, 2007, p. 23) coupled with their ability to 
win support from different classes of society, which other parties did not 
manage to do so effectively. 
As the Veterans did not gain power at the state level, we have no way of 
knowing what would have been the result if they had not been banned in 
1934.79 Päts had denounced the Veterans’ Constitution of 1934, stating that it 
‘could easily lead to dictatorial rule’, but at the same time he ‘adopted almost 
every one of the Veterans’ probable ruling methods’ (Parming, 1975, pp. 56–
57). Parming (1975) proposes that if the new Constitution had been confirmed 
in the 1932 referendum, the ‘pre-emptive authoritarianism would not have 
been a necessity’. The claim that the coup of 1934 and authoritarian regime 
were facilitated due to the Constitution of 1934 has been disproved by some 
lawyers and historians (Kenkmann, 2009).  
The analysis concludes that the national government was not the sole actor 
influencing the initiation of electoral reforms, and that the self-interest of the 
ruling parties was not the main determinant. Local government associations 
shared their views on the electoral rules as well. We can find references (see 
Eesti Maakondade Liit, 1925, p. 298) that attest to the fact that the council of 
the Association of Estonia’s Counties supported the increase in the minimum 
age of government members at the local level to 25 even at the beginning of 
the 1920s, and suggested considering it for candidates in the local councils as 
well. This might have been beneficial for certain political groups. If one were 
to take a look at the age of the candidates in Tallinn in 1921 and 1923 
(Smetanin, 1925, p. 217), one would see that those under the age of 25 
constituted 4.34% and 4.47% of all candidates, respectively. In 1923, 20% of 
the Workers’ United Front candidates in Tallinn were under 25 years of age. 
In the right-wing parties, the proportion of candidates under 25 in Tallinn was 
very low or non-existent. Implementing the change would have required a 
change in the Constitution because otherwise the special laws would have been 
constitutionally inconsistent. 
At the first congress of Estonia’s local government figures in 1924, it was 
stated in one adopted resolution that the opportunity to vote for individuals 
should be introduced as soon as possible in the local elections (Eesti 
Maakondade Liit ja Eesti Linnade Liit, 1925, p. 142). The main positions that 
the council of the Estonian Counties’ Association adopted in June 1926 as 
regards the local elections were that only permanent residents should have the 
right to vote, elections should be held every four years, only citizens residing 
in the respective rural municipality should have the right to be elected to the 
local council, and that the local elections should be based on the Finnish 
system (open lists) (Eesti Maakondade Liit, 1926, p. 183). The same principles 
were put forward in 1929 by the Rural Municipalities Association’s committee 
                                                 
79 The political goals of the Veterans are still rather unclear as far as historians are concerned 
(Velliste, 2007, p. 10). 
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(see Eesti Maaomavalitsuste Liit, 1929, p. 261). All of these demands were 
reflected in the electoral reforms of 1933 and 1939. The question remains as to 
why these proposals were not implemented earlier. This can only be partly 
explained by the Constitutional restrictions. Were the local governments’ 
proposals implemented only after the ruling parties found them to be 
beneficial for themselves? 
The two changes of 1939 – the increase in the voting age and the two-year 
residential requirement – reduced the size of the electorate. We can assume 
that it was the biggest reduction in the electorate during the interwar period.  
Voter turnout in the biggest cities was at its lowest in 1919 and 1939. In 1919 
the turnout was lower than in 1917 in several cities and rural municipalities.80 
One reason was that the Bolsheviks were not allowed to present their lists and 
they called on people to boycott the elections (Truuväli, 1986a, p. 174). Among 
cities, voter turnout in 1939 was lowest in Tallinn (33.3 or 35.4%) (Põltsamaa, 
with 88%, was the highest). Smetanin (1939) suggested that one possible 
explanation could have been the impact of the new system. The voters had to 
vote for individuals, but in the bigger cities it was often the case that they did 
not know the candidates even by name. In small cities, the candidates were 
familiar and it had a positive impact on voter turnout. This can be seen by 
comparing the turnout in 1934 with that in 1939. While the decrease was clear 
in the big cities, the turnout level in smaller cities was maintained.  
During the first elections, the political parties determined who were at the 
top of the list and citizens had no opportunity to show their support for certain 
candidates within a list. With every reform, the voters’ ability to determine 
who would gain a seat in the local council increased. 
We cannot look at the development of electoral laws without looking at the 
changes to the Constitution. While each Constitution stipulated who should 
have the right to vote, the criterion for the right to run for the council was not 
determined in detail and was left to the special laws to determine. On the one 
hand, the changes to the Constitution necessitated introducing certain 
changes to the special laws. On the other hand, the Constitution limited the 
possibilities for electoral reform (e.g. there was a wish to deprive citizens 
serving in the army of their voting rights by enacting special laws). 
Voters had to adapt to different electoral rules and ways of demonstrating 
their support for certain candidates or lists. As shown, the main changes to the 
electoral laws and rules were introduced in 1933 and 1939. In the case of voting 
rights and eligibility for nominations, the changes were often influenced by the 
changes to the legislation concerning parliamentary elections and the changes 
to the Constitution. Based on the conceptualisation of electoral reform offered 
by Jacobs and Leyenaar (2011), the reforms at the local government level in 
Estonia were predominantly minor or technical ones.  
                                                 
80 In Tallinn, 35.1% of those with the right to vote actually did so (in 1917, the figure was 68.1%); in 
Tartu – 58.3%; Narva – 48.4%; Pärnu – 60.6% (Truuväli, 1986a, pp. 174–176). 
Local government in 1918–1940: The periods of the Parliamentary Republic and the Era of 
Silence 
86 
To summarise, the special laws on local elections were generally not the 
main tool for influencing the election results. Frequently, the exclusion of 
competitors took place after the elections, mainly on the grounds of protecting 
the Republic, civil order, and national security. Banning certain political 
groups and extending the mandates of the incumbent elected local councils 
were also measures that were used. As the Constitution set out the basic 
principles on voting rights and electoral rules, it limited the scope of the 
reforms. Several potential changes discussed in parliament were impossible to 
implement as they may have contradicted the Constitution. 
4.3.2 THE APPOINTED MAYOR 
When it comes to the local government bodies, based at that time on Section 
21 of the City Act of 1892, city self-government was composed of the city 
council and city government (with the executive bodies – mayor, assistant 
mayor(s), if any, and members of the city government). In the Provisional 
Regulations on the Election of Estonian Rural Municipality Councils of 1917, 
the Provincial Assembly determined that the rural municipality government 
was to be composed of the mayor, at least one assistant, and a secretary. As 
already indicated, mayoral power was increased in the 1930s, both in the cities 
and in the rural municipalities. 
Appointment of the mayor 
The very first city mayor of Estonian nationality took office in 1902 in the city 
of Valga as a result of the local elections of 1901 (Mäesalu, et al., 2007, p. 161). 
Since 1917, the city mayor and the rural municipality mayor were appointed 
by the local council, with the exception of the capital city and first-level cities 
after 1934.81 Until 1934, no additional approval from the central government 
was required. To ensure the separation of powers, the mayor could not be a 
member of any legislative body. Moreover, he was not allowed to hold any 
other post in local government or in the service of the state, apart from 
honorary posts.  
The duration of the city mayor’s mandate was equal to that of the council, 
except under the City Act of 1938 when the mayor’s mandate was extended. 
Attempts to uncouple the mayor’s term from that of the council had been made 
previously. In the draft City Act of 1922, it was foreseen that the duration of 
the mayor’s mandate and of the members of government would not be directly 
                                                 
81 Under the City Act of 1938, cities at the first level had more than 50,000 inhabitants, those at the 
second level between 10,000 and 50,000, and those at the third level less than 10,000. 
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linked to the mandate of the council, but would continue for eight years.82 
While under the previous City Act the minimum age limit for a mayor was 20 
years, a proposal was made in 1922 to increase this to 25 (see 
Siseministeerium, 1922, March 6, p. 10). The minimum age limit was 
effectively increased with the City Act of 1938 to 30 years in all cities, apart 
from third-level cities where it was 25.  
For rural municipalities, the duration of the mayor’s mandate was equal to 
that of the council even after the Rural Municipality Act of 1937, with a 
minimum age limit of 25. While initially the mayor of a rural municipality was 
elected from among the council members, as a result of the Rural Municipality 
Council Elections Act of 1921, a person who was not a member of the council 
could also be appointed as mayor. This marked a step towards harmonising 
the rules governing city mayor and rural municipality mayor. 
The City Act of 1892 was amended in 1934 by increasing the power of the 
central government in appointing the mayor. Under the Decree of 19 March 
1934,83 the Government of the Republic had to appoint the mayors in four 
cities – Tallinn, Tartu, Narva, and Nõmme. In all of these cities the mandates 
of more than 30% of the councilmen had been annulled (Postimees, 1934b). 
In the two biggest cities – Tallinn and Tartu – Army Generals were appointed 
as the new mayors. The Minister of the Interior claimed that they were 
appointed not because they were Generals, but because they were ‘experienced 
persons’ (Postimees, 1934b). The new mayor of Tartu admitted to journalists 
that he was not familiar with the job he had accepted (Postimees, 1934a). 
Neither of the new mayors made major changes with regard to the personnel 
of the city government and the previous mayors continued as deputy mayors.84 
In Narva, the previous mayor continued, and in Nõmme the incumbent 
assistant mayor became the mayor (Postimees, 1934b). 
Under the City Act of 1938, the city government was composed of the mayor 
and city advisers. In the case of the capital city, the post of deputy mayor was 
also foreseen. In the smallest cities, the mayor could also be responsible for 
city government tasks. The mayor’s term of office was six years, while the 
council’s term was five years. The mayor of the capital city was appointed by 
the President of the Republic and was designated the supreme mayor. In first-
level cities, the mayor was appointed by the Government of the Republic based 
on a nomination by the Minister of Internal Affairs. In second- and third-level 
cities, the mayor was appointed by the council, but had to be approved by the 
Minister of Internal Affairs. The mayor had to be at least 30 years old and had 
to have completed higher education or to have long-term experience in the 
                                                 
82 Half of the city government members were to be reappointed every four years, to ensure 
continuity, and also because eight years was deemed to be more appealing for qualified persons than 
four years, according to the explanatory memorandum. 
83 Decree amending the City Act (1934) (Linnaseaduse muutmise dekreet). 
84 Karl Luik had been mayor of Tartu since 1920 and Anton Uesson had been mayor of Tallinn since 
1919. 
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field of governance. The requirements for third-level cities were lower: the age 
limit was 25 and the appointee had to have ‘sufficient education and skills to 
perform his duties’ (Section 81 of the City Act). The President or the 
Government of the Republic had the right to remove the mayor he had 
appointed from office if the mayor’s activity was deemed detrimental to the 
interests of the State or municipality (Section 389 of the City Act). The change 
of 1938 reflected the general tendency towards increasing control at the State 
level and the weakening role of the legislative/representative body. 
Statutory functions and powers of the mayor 
Cities. In the City Act of 1892, the mayor was a part of the city government85 
and the Act did not explicitly stipulate the duties of the mayor, but rather those 
of the city government as a whole. The explicitly stated duties of the mayor 
only entailed the general supervision of the activities of both the city 
government and the authorities subordinated to him/her. In addition, the 
mayor was responsible for issuing orders to collect notices, for preparing 
issues for reporting purposes, and other similar activities. The mayor also 
appointed the city secretary. Further, the mayor could not hold any other post 
in local government or in the service of the state, or be a member of the 
legislative bodies. A document adopted by the city council of Tallinn in 1929 
(Tallinna Linnaomavalitsus, 1929), which governed the functioning of the 
council, city government, and departments in Tallinn, was not significantly 
more detailed in respect of the mayor’s functions than the City Act of 1892 
itself.  
The City Act of 1938, however, provided a list of the specific duties that 
were to be undertaken by the mayor. The mayor remained responsible for the 
general management of the city government’s activities and for supervising the 
activities of both municipal agencies and enterprises, and officials and civil 
servants of the city government. He/she also had the power to appoint most of 
the city officials and to represent the city. In relation to the council, he/she was 
responsible for drafting the agenda of council meetings and, as a new task, was 
to preside over these meetings. In third-level cities, where a collegial city 
government was not foreseen, the mayor86 and deputy mayor were also 
obliged, in addition to the functions of mayor or deputy mayor, to fulfil those 
functions which, in other cities, came under the remit of the city government. 
Rural municipalities. In accordance with the Act of 1866 on Parish 
Administration in the Baltic Provinces, the mayor of the rural municipality 
played a central role in the municipality. The plenary of the rural municipality 
elected both the council and the mayor, and hence the latter was directly 
elected. The council met at least once a year and the mayor’s tasks were listed 
                                                 
85 City government refers to the executive body of the local municipality. 
86 In third-level cities – designated county cities – the mayor was referred to as linnapea, whereas 
in those cities which were not county cities, he was referred to as linnavanem. 
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in the law. The temporary regulations of 1917 foresaw that the council would 
elect the mayor from among its members. The list of tasks provided for in the 
Rural Municipality Act of 1937 was significantly longer than the one set for city 
mayors in the City Act of 1938. 
The Rural Municipality Act of 1937 replaced the collegial executive body 
with an individual-based one. In the Explanatory Memorandum on the Act 
(see Siseministeerium, 1937, January 25), it was emphasised that as the mayor 
of the rural municipality would be given significant powers, he would also bear 
full responsibility for the wellbeing of the rural municipality. A weakness of 
the collegial system was that no one really took responsibility. It was also noted 
that at the end of the 1930s the tendency in the whole public sector was to 
emphasise the individual. Therefore, general issues relevant for the whole 
rural municipality came under the competence of the council, and the mayor 
was responsible for governing effectively.  
Mayors in the main cities in Estonia tended to have either a military 
background or one connected with the law. In Pärnu, all the mayors from 1917 
to 1940 had studied law or/and worked as an attorney (Pärnu linnavalitsus, 
2018). Continuity can also be noted in this respect. For example, mayors 
serving in the cities of Tallinn, Tartu, Pärnu, and Haapsalu between 1917 and 
1940 had held their post for at least 10 years. Mouritzen and Svara claim that 
‘the longer the mayor remains in office, the more influential the mayor is likely 
to be’ as a public leader and that the ‘amount of influence in budget and 
economic development decisions’ is related to ‘the length of time the mayor 
has spent in office’ (Mouritzen & Svara, 2002, pp. 209, 211).  
Horizontal power relations  
Cities. Under the City Act of 1892, the mayor participated in council meetings 
with the same rights as council members, irrespective of whether he had been 
a councilman before taking up his duties as mayor. However, the mayor could 
not participate in decisions affecting issues related to his own activity, such as 
establishing remuneration and the revision of city government reports 
(Section 120 of the City Act). The council determined the mayor’s salary and 
other emoluments, and the salary had to be determined before the election 
(Section 123). From 1934, the mayor’s salary was determined by the President 
or Government of the Republic and the salary of the supreme mayor of the 
capital city was equal to that of a member of the Government of the Republic. 
The Tallinn city self-government guidelines of 1929 (Tallinna 
Linnaomavalitsus, 1929, p. 1) explicitly stated that the council was the highest 
echelon of city self-government.  
Under the rules of 1892, the council decided whether there was a need for 
an assistant mayor and also determined the division of duties between the 
mayor and his assistant. If the council did not appoint any assistants to the 
mayor, it had to select a member of the city government for the post of deputy 
mayor. The minimum number of city government members was two. The city 
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government was accountable to the council, and had to submit reports on its 
activities, financial transactions, assets, and the situation in the departments. 
The proposed City Act of 1922 made a clear distinction between those 
issues for which the mayor was directly accountable to the state level, and 
those for which he was accountable to the council.87 When the mayor acted as 
a representative of the state, he had to obtain the council’s approval only if the 
task included expenditure for the city or use of the city’s resources (Section 
62). Under the draft City Act of 1922, the city government had controlled the 
council and the mayor had controlled the city government (Kiiver, 2010, p. 61). 
In 1938 the horizontal power relations at the local level were shifted even 
more than in 1934, by increasing the power of the mayor (also see Table 4.2). 
The City Act of 1938 again stipulated that the mayor would participate in the 
council sessions with the same rights as the councillors, even if he was not a 
member of the council (Section 33). However, the mayor was also responsible 
for drafting the agenda of the council session, chairing the meetings of the 
council (Section 37), and for determining whether a specific issue fell within 
the competence of the council (Section 38). In addition, if the council wished 
to add an agenda item or change the order of the items, it required permission 
from the mayor (Section 41). The mayor could also suspend the council 
decisions, which did not require the approval of the supervisory authority, 
when such decisions were in breach of the law or detrimental to city interests, 
and send these decisions back to the city council to be reviewed (Section 36). 
While under previous legislation the council members could have had certain 
expenses reimbursed, with the City Act of 1938 and Rural Municipality Act of 
1937 this option was abolished. 
Rural municipalities. The rural municipality councils were regulated in 
quite a similar way to those of the cities. One relevant difference was that the 
rural municipality council had to share competence with the county council. If 
there was any uncertainty over whether a particular issue fell under the 
competence of one level or another, the county council was the one that 
decided under whose competence the issue belonged (Maanõukogu, 
1917/1999). The county reviewed the decisions of the rural municipality. In the 
county of Saare in 1919, for example, the Administrative Department of the 
county took nine decisions made by rural municipalities to the administrative 
court (Saare Maakonnavalitsus, 1920, January 14), and a further 13 in 1920 
(Saare Maakonnavalitsus, 1921, March 7). Objections raised by the county 
government to decisions taken by the rural municipality were usually 
discussed and resolved at the following council meeting, without the need to 
take the decision to the administrative court (Saare Maakonnavalitsus, 1921, 
March 7). 
                                                 
87 Sections 60–62 of the draft City Act of 1922 (see Siseministeerium, 1922, March 6). 
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Under the Act of 1926,88 the number of council members varied between 15 
and 25. The council meetings were chaired by the mayor or his assistant, 
except when the activities of the government of the rural municipality were 
under discussion, in which case the council selected a person to chair the 
meeting from among its members. All issues related to the rural municipality, 
the selection of executive bodies, and the supervision of the activities of the 
latter fell under the competence of the council. It was possible to annul the 
mandate of an individual member of the council with a two-thirds majority 
vote by all council members. 
Table 4.2  Selected indicators of horizontal power relations 
Whether ... City Act of 1892  
(version of 
1927) 
City Act of 1938 Temporary 
regulations on 








Act of 1937 





by the council) 
No (either (i) 
appointed by the 
President, or (ii) 
by the 
Government of 
the Republic, or 
(iii) elected by 
the council and 
approved by the 
Minister of the 
Interior)  
No (appointed 




by the council) 
No (appointed 
by the council) 
... the mayor’s 
term in office 
is equal to the 
council’s 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
... the mayor 
can be 
recalled by the 
council 
Not regulated Respectively, 
the President or 
the Minister of 











can, based on a 
proposal by the 
Minister of the 
Interior 
... the mayor 
presides over 
the council 
No Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
... the mayor 




Yes Yes Not regulated Yes Yes 





Yes The mayor 
makes a 
proposal and the 
Minister of the 
Interior appoints 







the Minister of 
the Interior 
appoints 
*According to the Rural Municipality Council Election Act of 1921, the mayor did not have to be a 
member of the council, and could be an outside candidate. 
Source: Adapted from elements in Egner & Heinelt, 2008, and Heinelt & Hlepas, 2006. 
 
                                                 
88 Act on the Elections of Rural Municipality Councils and the Organisation of Rural Municipality 
Councils and Governments of 1926 (Vallavolikogude valimise ja vallavolikogude ning vallavalitsuste 
korraldamise seadus). 
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On 18 August 1929, the Council of the Association of Municipalities of 
Estonia adopted the Rules of Procedure for the Councils of Rural 
Municipalities. The document was approved by the Minister of the Court and 
the Interior on 5 December 1929. The rules of procedure were based on the 
legislation and consisted of 95 Sections. 
Some rural municipality mayors voiced demands to increase their power. 
For example, in 1935 one such mayor of a rural municipality proposed at the 
Association of Municipalities board meeting that the mayor should be directly 
elected, otherwise he was subordinated to the council. They also claimed that 
they lacked prestige in the council (Kruustee, 1935). With the Rural 
Municipality Act of 1937, some of the less important decisions were duly 
transferred from the council competency to that of the mayor. Broadly 
speaking, the principles of the Act were similar to those stipulated for the cities 
a year later – the mayor’s right to suspend certain decisions by the council 
(Section 31 of the Act), the right to draft the agenda of the council session and 
chair the council meetings (Sections 32 and 33), and so on. 
 
4.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The Russian Revolution of 1917 marked a turning point with a long-lasting 
impact for the democratisation of local government in Estonia (Olle, 2014, p. 
56), because at the beginning of 1938 the majority of the legislation on city 
governments still comprised pre-1918 regulations and was in the Russian 
language.89  
Although a local government framework or special laws were drafted in 
1918–1934, there was not enough political stability, will or consensus to adopt 
them, with the exception of legislation concerning local elections. Such 
legislation was probably influenced by the parliamentary election rules and by 
political interests. Hence, the activities of local governments were governed in 
part by the pre-independence legislation, and due to continous amendments 
to this legislation it was difficult for local governments to follow the relevant 
applicable rules. The creation of a totally new local government system was 
excluded right from the start of independence due to the high costs of the 
potential change. Demonstrating the basic logic of path dependence, past 
decisions limit future choices, and taking another path can incur high 
switching costs. 
The changes in 1934, and those that came afterwards, were in the direction 
of deconcentration (Vellner, 1935, p. 4), although the path to deconcentration 
had already been paved with the Constitution of 1920. A resolution by the first 
congress of local government representatives in 1924 stated that there had 
                                                 
89 In the case of Latvia, for example, the Rural Municipality Act was adopted in 1922, the City Act in 
1930, and an Act Abolishing County Governments in 1934 (Angelus, 1938, p. 9). 
 
93 
been a tendency to govern at the local level through the special institutions and 
that the powers of local government had been cut as far as possible (Eesti 
Maakondade Liit and Eesti Linnade Liit, 1925). The special institutions’ 
governance remit remained in the legislation throughout the interwar period. 
The Constitution of 1938 stipulated that ‘The organization of local 
administration and the development of local life are assured by the law to local 
self-governing institutions’ and no longer contained the wording ‘insofar as 
there is no special institution created by law’. However, the special institutions 
clause was added to the City Act of 1938 and Rural Municipality Act of 1937.  
A positive development at the end of the 1930s was the enactment of 
conceptually consistent local government acts, which finally created a clear 
legal framework for local governments, covering all the relevant bodies, 
supervision, taxes, and so on, although these acts were issued as decrees of the 
State Elder or President-Regent due to their urgency, and were not discussed 
in parliament. This type of enactment makes it virtually impossible to identify 
the causes of the new elements introduced with the City Act, Rural 
Municipality Act, and County Act in 1937/38. A certain cause from 1934 until 
1940, however, was the authoritarian regime, which resulted in rules that 
ensured more extensive state control over local governments than the former 
fragmented legislation. This could provide a basis for dividing the analysis into 
authoritarian (interwar authoritarian and 50-year-long communism period) 
and post-authoritarian periods, as suggested by Wittenberg (2013), although 
as there are more differences between the interwar authoritarian and 
communist periods than there are between the 1920s and the second half of 
the 1930s, this approach will not be applied in the current study. In addition, 
in the post-communist period, references are predominantly made to the end 
of the 1930s when it comes to using the past as a source of ideas, and not the 
1920s. 
State Elder Konstantin Päts gave a speech (see Klesment, 1936, p. 2) in 
January 1936, a month before holding a referendum asking the people for the 
mandate to establish a National Committee and to grant it the power to draft 
and adopt a new Constitution. In his speech, he stated that despite the flaws 
in the Constitution of 1934, it granted supremacy to the State Elder, who was 
able to resolve issues during 1934–1936 that would have been impossible 
under the Constitution of 1920. In the same speech, Päts indicated his 
opposition to the proportional election system, at least when it came to the 
parliamentary elections. Setting aside the fact that there was an authoritarian 
regime in 1936 (i.e. ignoring the context), it cannot be denied that the 
legislation of 1937/38 on local government, and especially on county 
government, contained many principles and constructs that could have been 
appropriate under democracy. Despite the fact that the City Act and Rural 
Municipality Act contained some fairly undemocratic provisions,90 it was the 
first time that Estonia as an independent state had one legal act governing 
                                                 
90 Increased powers of the Minister of the Interior over the municipalities.  
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most aspects of city or rural municipality. This naturally came at a price, 
however, in the form of reduced local democracy and increased executive 
powers.  
During the interwar period, rural municipalities and cities were in different 
situations, mainly because the rural municipalities were seen as sub-units of a 
county even before 1918, but convergence increased over the years. For 
example, responsibility for the supervision of some cities fell to the county 
governor, and was no longer under the remit of the Minister of the Interior. 
Further, while rural municipalities had already collected head tax for years, 
the cities were granted the right to collect community tax in 1936, and the City 
Act of 1938 was based on the same principles as the Rural Municipality Act of 
1937. Head tax serves as a good example of path dependence. Although it was 
acknowledged that the tax was unfair in many respects, and should not be 
promoted, it provided crucial revenue for rural municipalities. Replacing it 
with other sources of revenue would have probably required an overhaul of the 
whole financing system. Despite a decade of resistance, it was easier to extend 
it to the cities than it was to abolish it.  
We can ‘differentiate between accounts of how institutions are created and 
those of how they are sustained’ (Bennett & Elman, 2006, pp. 260–261). The 
interwar period in Estonia was predominantly about sustaining inherited local 
government institutions, even though there was an interest in creating one’s 
‘own’ institutions. Gradual institutional change was dominated by layering 
and displacement. On the one hand, both policymakers and local government 
representatives were learning from the experiences of other countries. On the 
other hand, there was the realisation that the pre-1918 institutions were not 
the most appropriate and needed to be reformed.  
From the perspective of path dependence and the assumption that formal 
political institutions may be, but are often not path dependent (Alexander, 
2001), there are at least three institutions worth highlighting: county self-
government, election rules, and the legislation on local government.  
First, when it came to local self-government at the county level, the much-
debated county government reform was either partially or fully implemented 
only in connection with the adoption of the Constitutions of 1934 and 1938, 
despite the fact that county government was not enshrined in the Constitution 
of 1920. At the end of 1933, a bill on the abolishment of county self-
government was submitted to parliament but, contingent event or not, the 
adoption of the Constitution proved detrimental in this respect, as it provided 
an argument for formally abolishing county-level self-government. At the 
same time, as the lower-level local government had not been reformed, it was 
not possible to simply abolish the middle level. Path dependence was 
reinforced by the lack of large-scale amalgamation of rural municipalities. 
Another contingent event occurred in 1919 when the state decided not to 
appoint new commissars and granted the county governments supervision 
over the rural municipalities. Re-establishing local governance at the county 
level, albeit in a modified form, once again called for a new Constitution in 
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1937. Hence, in the case of county government, previous decisions and the lack 
of changes in the other institutions made county government somewhat sticky 
as an institution. As the County Act of 1938 was adopted during the 
authoritarian regime in the absence of a parliament, it is difficult to 
understand why county administration was designed in the way it was. The 
strong executive was used at both the city/rural municipality level and the 
county level, and can be explained by the authoritarian regime. It is clear that 
Päts supported a two-chamber parliament at the state level and even though 
he had started to have doubts about the idea, a visit by Finnish President Pehr 
Evind Svinhufvud in August 1934 breathed new life into this way of thinking 
because Svinhufvud had said that the weakness of new states could be 
attributed to the lack of a second chamber (Laaman, 2003, p. 2767). Whether 
the decision to establish a two-chamber parliament at the national level had 
any impact on the design of county governance is not known. 
Second, the electoral system is an example of constant change. As electoral 
laws are political institutions that ‘can be changed by simple legislative 
majority’ (Alexander, 2001, p. 259), they are not very path dependent. Indeed, 
the electoral system in Estonia had not become entrenched, but was also 
influenced by practices in neighbouring countries (e.g. Finland). It is 
questionable whether it represented a quest for a viable system or a battle for 
political power at the local level (i.e. to gain as many seats in local councils as 
possible). At the end of the 1930s, the changes were motivated by the need to 
avoid the existence and establishment of political parties under the 
authoritarian regime, and hence the available paths for change were 
determined by the aim of preventing political parties and groupings from 
gaining a foothold. 
Third, in the case of primary-level local government and special acts on 
local authorities, the lack of change could be seen most clearly in the formal 
institutions. The institutions were a legacy of the tsarist era. Many of the bills 
that were drafted, but not adopted, were mainly aimed at anchoring the 
existing institutions into a coherent legal text. One reason for this, as indicated 
above, was that the composition of the Cabinet changed frequently, and bills 
that had already been tabled were withdrawn and rewritten. There was little 
criticism of city and rural municipality governance after the mid-1920s, and 
hence there were no strong change proponents.   
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5 ABOLISHMENT OF LOCAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT 
The main aim of this chapter is, first, to examine which elements of the local 
government of the First Republic (i.e. the interwar republic) were abolished, 
especially during the first 10 years of occupation91 and, second, which 
administrative system was in place in the 1980s. Hence, the focus is only on 
the first and last years of the period, and therefore the structure of the chapter 
is different from that in Chapters 4 and 6. The present chapter still uses the 
term ‘local government’, but generally speaking this does not refer to local self-
government as such, but rather to those institutions which, in the Constitution 
of 1940 and of 1978, were ‘local bodies of state authority’. 
Zubkova (2007) states that the Sovietisation of the Baltic countries took 
place in two stages: during the first stage (until mid-1947) there was an 
attempt to avoid hard measures and to demonstrate that national specificities 
were being taken into consideration, whereas the end of 1947 marked a process 
which culminated in mass repression, collectivisation, and ‘purges’ within the 
union-republic’s leadership (pp. 200, 205). She also claims that the weakest 
link in the implementation of the Sovietisation policy were the local 
authorities, which she attributes to the fact that the administrative hierarchy 
did not function in practice and, at the republic level, did not have a good 
overview of what was happening in the county, let alone at the rural 
municipality level. The situation changed in 1947 when the establishment of 
the lowest-level administrative bodies was also completed de facto (Zubkova, 
2007, p. 199).  
According to Paavle (2009a),92 when it comes to the local level, the 
Sovietisation of local administration started in 1940 and ended in 1950, when 
counties and rural municipalities were abolished as administrative-territorial 
units. Paavle (2009a, p. 266) stresses that while during the 1940s the local 
government system in Estonia was two-tier in structure, in the rest of the 
Soviet Union it was single-tier. As analogies to the local administrative system 
in Estonia can be found in Latvia and Lithuania, and in light of the lack of 
equivalent studies on these two countries, Paavle hypothesises that 
Sovietisation in the three Baltic countries was broadly similar.  
                                                 
91 A discussion on whether we should talk about occupation or colonisation in the case of the Soviet 
invasion (see Annus, 2012) is outside the scope of the current thesis. As ‘occupation’ is more broadly 
used in the literature (e.g. Misiunas & Taagepera, 1993; Purs, 2012), the term is also used here. 
92 An extensive treatment of local government Sovietisation with a focus on rural municipalities 
during 1940–1950 can be found in the work of Indrek Paavle (2009a), which was written within the 
history discipline. His main conclusion was that the local level in the 1940s did not seem to be a reflection 
of the higher levels. This provides yet another reason to focus on the local level. 
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The term Sovietisation came into use in 1917 after the October Revolution, 
and referred in particular to a system modelled on the Bolsheviks’ governing 
and organisational approach (Mertelsmann, 2007). According to 
Mertelsmann, the term initially concerned political power, but subsequently 
took on a broader meaning. In the international arena, Sovietisation referred 
to the ‘reorganisation of the daily life, economy, policy, and culture based on 
the Soviet Union model’ and it had negative connotations (Mertelsmann, 
2007, p. 16). Local variations also existed, such as the East German or Polish 
model of Sovietisation. Mertelsmann described the Soviet Union as a house or 
building which ‘Stalin had established on Lenin’s foundation’, claiming that 
the main structures of the Soviet Union developed in the 1930s and remained 
broadly the same until its collapse (2007, p. 18). 
5.1 GENERAL CONTEXT 
Estonia was occupied by the Soviet Union on 17 June 1940, and the new 
government took office on 22 June (Vahtre, 2007, pp. 247–248). On 21 July 
1940, Estonia became the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (Uuet, 2002, p. 
77) and the new Constitution was adopted on 25 August 1940. Under the 
Constitution, Estonia was divided into 11 counties; four cities (Tallinn, Tartu, 
Narva, and Pärnu) did not belong under the counties, but were republic cities 
(Section 14 of the Constitution of 1940). Local councils were replaced by the 
Soviets of Working People’s Deputies, which were state bodies (Section 52 of 
the Constitution). The executive committees of local soviets were formally 
established on 17 January 1941 (Uuet, 2002, p. 78) and the first local soviet 
elections after the war took place in 1948 (Puur & Uuet, 2010).  
Germany’s invasion in late summer 1941 suspended the introduction of the 
Soviet governing system until autumn 1944. After re-occupation by the Soviet 
Union in 1944, the border between Estonia and Russia was changed and some 
rural municipalities in Estonia and Latvia were “given” or “returned” to the 
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (Nutt, 2010, p. 77). In the case of 
Estonia, this represented about 5% of its pre-WWII territory (Mälksoo, 
2005).93 
After the restoration of the Estonian SSR, the existing administrative 
territorial organisation was initially retained. The first substantial change 
came in 1945 when village soviets were created. Estonia submitted a proposal 
to establish 1,250 village soviets, although only 637 were eventually 
                                                 
93 Most of Petseri county was merged with the Pihkva oblast, and the part of Petseri county that was 
not merged with the Russian SFSR was merged with Võru county (Decree on Merging the Rural 
Municipalities and Rural Municipality Districts of Petseri County of the Estonian SSR with Võru County 
of 1945 (Eesti NSV Ülemnõukogu Presiidiumi seadlus Eesti NSV Petseri maakonna valdade ja 
vallaosade Võru maakonnaga liitmise kohta)). 
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established – an average of 2–3 per rural municipality (Uuet, 2002, p. 84; 
Paavle, 2009a, pp. 105–106). 
5.1.1 LOCAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE SOVIET UNION 
When it comes to local administration in the Soviet Union before 1940, several 
aspects are worth noting. First, by 1939 the local elections had become a 
formality with a voter participation rate of 99% (Paavle, 2009a, p. 40). Second, 
the local soviets had lost all of their powers due to total centralisation (Paavle, 
2009a, pp. 40–41). Third, by the end of the 1930s, the term “local self-
government” was no longer in use (Paavle, 2009a, p. 41), and local 
administration was defined in the Constitution as ‘local organs of state 
authority’ instead. Paavle (2009a, pp. 41–42) points out that the four main 
principles governing the policy towards local authorities in the second half of 
the 1930s were: (a) total centralisation; (b) de jure dual subordination of 
executive bodies, but de facto triple subordination; (c) rejection of the law (or 
lack of the rule of law), and (d) paternalism. The local administration system, 
developed by the end of the 1930s, remained broadly unchanged until the end 
of Soviet rule (Paavle, 2009a, p. 40). 
Reshetar (1978, p. 211) has defined dual subordination as ‘subordination to 
the soviet of an administrative unit’s own jurisdiction and to a higher 
administrative body’. The executive committee was ‘responsible both to its 
own soviet and – more significantly – to the executive committee of the next 
superior soviet, which [could] annul its decisions’ (Reshetar, 1978, p. 221). 
Hough and Fainsod (1979, pp. 490–491) also found that dual subordination 
‘reduces the leverage of the local soviets over their subordinates, for the latter 
can appeal to contravening instructions from ministerial – or “vertical” – 
supervisors’. This is something that was also mentioned during the interviews 
when interviewees were asked about dual subordination in Estonian local 
soviets.  
According to Hough and Fainsod (1979, p. 480) ‘[r]ecognizing the fact that 
all Soviet institutions are part of a single giant bureaucracy obviously is crucial 
in understanding the Soviet system, and it has several important implications’. 
In comparison to the West there was a need for coordination ‘across a far wider 
range of activities’ on an extremely large territory and ‘the merging of all 
institutional life into the governmental sphere also means that many matters 
[became] political in the Soviet Union that would not be considered in the 
West’ (Hough & Fainsod, 1979, p. 480). Reshetar highlights that the 
‘Dependence of local governmental bodies [was] especially evident in taxation 
and finance’ in the USSR. According to him, ‘the finance departments of local 
soviets [collected] all taxes, revenue policy [was] highly centralized because 
only the central government [was] empowered to levy taxes; local soviets 
[enjoyed] no independent taxing power’ (Reshetar, 1978, p. 222). 
In the bigger republics, the ‘territorial subdivision below the level of the 
union republic’ (Hough & Fainsod, 1979, p. 483) was the oblast. In small 
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republics, the oblast did not usually exist. Below the oblast (or the union 
republic) were raions, which had ‘no jurisdiction over the larger or medium-
sized cities and towns’ (Hough & Fainsod, 1979, pp. 483–484). According to 
Hough and Fainsod (1979, p. 484), there was no clear ‘line at which a town 
becomes large enough to be administratively independent of the rural raion’. 
In addition, there were ‘urban settlements’ (poselok gorodskogo tipa), but 
Hough and Fainsod again say that it was not clear why certain settlements 
were called urban settlements and others cities (1979, p. 484). The lowest rural 
administrative unit was the village soviet. 
The ‘representative’ body was respectively the city soviet, raion soviet, or 
village soviet, whose deputies were elected in uncontested elections,94 and the 
top executive body was the executive committee. Hough and Fainsod (1979, p. 
486) claim that the ‘local soviet [seemed] to have the potential for greater 
liveliness and impact than its national counterpart’ in the 1970s, mainly due 
to higher frequency of sessions at the lower levels than at the higher ones.  
While little attention was paid to the parties in the previous chapter, local 
administration during the Soviet period cannot really be studied without 
considering the role of the party organs. The party played a ‘starring role’ in 
the local soviet and was ‘the critical element in subordinating local government 
to central control’ (Young, 1997, p. 96). One ‘responsibility of the local party 
organs in relation to the administrative organs [was] to ensure that they carry 
out the decisions of the central party organs’ (Hough & Fainsod, 1979, p. 492). 
They had special powers, for example, when it came to personnel selection 
through the system of party nomenklatura.95 ‘[T]he most important policy 
decisions within the locality [were] made within the bureau of the local party 
organs rather than within the executive committee of the soviet’ (Hough & 
Fainsod, 1979, p. 501). The first secretary, the chairman of the executive 
committee, and the second secretary constituted ‘a collective Big Three’ 
(Hough & Fainsod, 1979, p. 504), although the first secretary was the top 
political figure in the locality instead of the chairman. 
In the Stalin era, the ‘political formulae and institutions’ of Eastern Europe 
within the Soviet Bloc ‘closely followed the Soviet model, although there were 
apparent differences in the extent to which this model was accepted, tolerated, 
or rejected by the populations of different states’ (Janos, 1996, p. 13). On the 
other hand, the post-Stalin period introduced greater diversity. Moreover, the 
local soviets were not regulated in exactly the same way throughout the whole 
Soviet Union. One example is that while in 1973 ‘a new system of drawing up 
                                                 
94 ‘Elections were one of the primary mechanisms through which the Soviet government distributed 
political rewards to loyal elites as well as checked their performance’ (Jones Luong, 2002, pp. 5–6). 
95 According to Thelen, the term nomenklatura refers to ‘a list of key positions, the appointments to 
which are directly or indirectly controlled by the secretariats of the CRSU at the various levels of the 
political and territorial-administrative structure of the Soviet system’ (cited in Ross, 1987, pp. 33–34). 
According to a broader definition, nomenklatura can also refer to all those persons who filled the 
positions (Tannberg, 2007, p. 256). 
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the [local] budget’ was introduced, it was operative in 1974 in ‘all the Republics 
except Estonia and Lithuania’ (Ross, 1987, p. 93). These two countries 
continued with the old system. 
5.1.2 SHORT PERIOD OF GERMAN OCCUPATION  
In the context of the current study, the period of German occupation has little 
relevance in terms of local government development in Estonia in the 1990s. 
The main reason for this claim is that the Germans did not introduce any 
lasting fundamental changes into the local government system, and their rule 
in Estonia only lasted from September 1941 until October 1944. 
Notwithstanding the brevity, in his PhD thesis Maripuu (2012a) provides a 
historical account of the administrative arrangement during the German 
occupation in Estonia.  
Although the 11 counties remained, the state was divided into seven regions 
(Järva Teataja, 1941b). During this period, the cities that were not 
subordinated to the county level comprised Tallinn, Tartu, Narva, and 
Pärnu,96 namely the same ones as under the Soviet rule in 1940/41. 
At the beginning of German occupation, Estonians in some municipalities 
tried to organise council meetings, but soon thereafter the municipality usually 
received a notification from the county government to the effect that 
convoking a local council was forbidden (Maripuu, 2012b). These attempts to 
organise local council meetings under German rule, even when the councils 
were dissolved, demonstrates path dependence from the 1930s. ‘Path 
dependency is often said to make the strongest claim in respect of how policies 
are implemented’ (Gains, John, & Stoker, 2005, p. 43), implying that even if 
the legal framework is drastically altered, the change in practices can be 
influenced by path dependence and therefore be restricted. A civil government 
was established under German rule on 5 December 1941. To this end, the 
temporary army governance was replaced with a permanent occupying power 
(Vahtre, 2007, p. 257). In December 1941, a statement was issued to the effect 
that the legislation in force on 21 June 1940 was once again valid, as long as it 
did not contradict the new German arrangements.97 It was not until May 1942 
that it was formally stated that the County Act, City Act, and Rural 
Municipality Act were in force according to the wording of 21 June 1940,98 and 
some amending provisions to these legal acts were added at the same time. 
The councils at the local and county level were not formed again, but all of the 
council’s tasks were allocated to the county governors and city/rural 
                                                 
96 First Implementing Regulation of Regulation on Establishment of Community Self-Government 
of 1942 (Kogukonnaomavalitsuse sisseseadmise määruse esimene teostamismäärus). 
97 Regulation on Law Applicable in Estonia of 1941 (Eestis kehtiva õiguse määrus).  
98 First Implementing Regulation of Regulation on Establishment of Community Self-Government 
of 1942 (Kogukonnaomavalitsuse sisseseadmise määruse esimene teostamismäärus). 
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municipality mayors, respectively. It is worth noting that the number of 
permitted advisers was high,99 in line with the German governance model.  
In April 1942, the powers of rural municipality mayors were extended with 
the aim of increasing the agricultural production to feed the troops and the 
population at large.100 In March 1943, the Director of the Interior (i.e. the 
Minister of the Interior) was entrusted with determining in which cities and 
rural municipalities the post of mayor would be an honorary post.101 In 
principle, during the German occupation, the local authorities were executive 
authorities of the occupying powers, without a council of representatives. 
Despite the fact that the local authorities had a predominantly executive 
function, local officials were usually local people and therefore the local 
residents saw them as carriers of continuity to the period of independence, 
especially since there had been a short period of Soviet occupation between 
independence and the German occupation period (Maripuu, 2012a, pp. 267–
268). 
5.2 THE SHARP END OF THE OLD SYSTEM 
This section provides a brief overview of three of the aspects that could carry 
continuity – the people, an administrative-territorial organisation, and a local 
government institutional organisation. The people aspect will be dealt with 
both in terms of staff changes as well as the fate of individuals holding posts 
under the Soviet and German occupation. In 1942, a county governor of Lääne 
county, K. R. Ruus (1942), wrote that a year of Bolshevik rule had ‘cut deep 
wounds’ into the county and rural municipalities, namely the deportation and 
arrest of many well-known local self-government figures had left unfilled gaps. 
Similarly, Zubkova (2007) regards the personnel policy as the main 
mechanism for Baltic Sovietisation. She has also highlighted that in this 
context there were conflicts between three groups of people (2007, p. 193): (1) 
between the indigenes and the Russian(-speaking) population; (2) between 
the “old” and “new” natives (i.e. those living in the country before 1940 and 
those who came from other republics); and (3) in the leadership between those 
repressed under the old regime (i.e. political prisoners) and the new leaders, 
who had been living outside the country during tough times. 
                                                 
99 The maximum number of advisers depended on the number of inhabitants – it was 16 in counties 
and cities, and 10 in rural municipalities. This was an honorary post with a term of six years. Mayors and 
county governors were required to ask advisers for their opinion on issues that used to be under the 
competence of the local council. 
100 Regulation on Extending the Powers of Rural Municipality Mayors (1942) (Vallavanemate 
võimupiiride laiendamise määrus). 
101 Regulation on Filling the Posts of City and Rural Municipality Mayors and Their Aides as 
Honorary Posts of 1943 (Linnapeade, vallavanemate ja nende abide ametikohtade auametiliselt 
täitmise määrus). 
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5.2.1 PEOPLE 
The first period of Soviet rule 
The new Government of Estonia, often dubbed a “puppet government”, was 
formed on 21 June 1940. In its declaration, the government stated that they 
would ‘initiate a local government reform, to ensure people’s effective 
participation in these’ (Lääne Elu, 1940). On 25 July 1940 an act was passed 
on the dissolution of city, rural municipality, and county councils.102 Their 
tasks were transferred to the respective governments. The dismissal of the staff 
affected both local government levels: the county level and the city / rural 
municipality level.  
Counties. The leaders of the county government were dismissed as of 1 and 
8 July 1940, mainly in accordance with the President’s directives (Truuväli, 
1966, pp. 393–394). Under these directives, new county governors were also 
appointed. Truuväli claims that the new county governors were loyal to the 
Soviet rule, as by January 1941 new county governors had only been assigned 
in five counties (1966, p. 396). After the establishment of the county executive 
committees, five county governors became chairmen of the executive 
committee (a post similar to the county governor under the old system), and 
three county governors were assigned various posts in the executive 
committee (Truuväli, 1966, p. 396).  
Cities. The city governments were dismantled in large part during the last 
week of July and the first week of August 1940, by divesting the mayors and 
aldermen of their office (Truuväli, 1966, p. 399). New city governments were 
established after the councils had been abolished by law in July. Truuväli 
claims that the fact that 27 mayors out of 32 were workers or leaders of the 
workers’ organisations was a clear sign of change in the ‘Estonian socio-
political situation’ and in the balance of power between the working and 
capitalist classes (1966, p. 401).  
Rural municipalities. When it comes to the rural municipalities, there were 
no major changes in the staff of the executive body in June–July 1940 
(Truuväli, 1966, p. 405). In accordance with the decree of 25 July 1940,103 the 
councils had been dissolved and the next step was to dissolve the executive 
bodies. On 31 July 1940 the Rural Municipality Act was amended by giving the 
Minister of the Interior powers to dismiss the mayors in some or all of the rural 
municipalities. This was followed by a decision by the Minister of the Interior 
on 31 July 1940 to dismiss all of the rural municipality mayors. On 1 August, 
the Minister appointed the majority of the new mayors. The new rural 
municipality governments were appointed upon a proposal by the county 
governments, although the Minister of the Interior rejected some of the 
                                                 
102 Act on Discontinuation of Activities of County, City and Rural Municipality Councils of 1940 
(Maa-, linna- ja vallavolikogude tegevuse lõpetamise seadus). 
103 Act Specifying the Rural Municipality Act (1940) (Vallaseaduse täiendamise seadus). 
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proposed appointments. Of the 246 appointed mayors, only 17 had been the 
mayor of a rural municipality during the ‘bourgeois era’ (Truuväli, 1966, pp. 
407–409), and hence only about 7% of the mayors remained the same.104 In 
Estonia in 1941, there was only one chairman of an executive committee of a 
rural municipality who had been the mayor of a rural municipality before 1940 
(Paavle, 2009a, p. 60).  
In order to justify giving, on 31 July, the Minister of the Interior the power 
to dismiss the mayors of rural municipalities, reference was made to the fact 
that, as the councils had been dissolved, it was not justified to allow those rural 
municipality mayors who had been appointed by the dismissed councils to 
remain in office (see Postimees, 1940). By the beginning of September, new 
staff had been appointed in all rural municipalities, with some small 
adjustments taking place until the end of the year, although the previous 
mayors remained in office in some locations due to a lack of suitable 
candidates (Paavle, 2009a, p. 50). 
Paavle (2009a, p. 43) assumes that one reason for replacing the mayors in 
the rural municipalities in summer 1940 was the need to ensure the effective 
execution of the land reform. The reform entailed dispossessing those with 
private land that exceeded a certain threshold and redistributing it to those 
without land. Its implementation called for assistance from the rural 
municipality authorities, but the majority of the previous rural municipality 
mayors were farm owners themselves (Paavle, 2009a, pp. 43–44). 
A comprehensive overview of the staff changes in 1940–1941 has been 
provided by Erik-Juhan Truuväli (1966) in his candidate dissertation, as well 
as by Paavle (2009a, pp. 43–50). Truuväli concludes that the destruction of 
the local governments was manifested in four ways in 1940/41. First, as the 
county governments were subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior under 
the legislation of the late 1930s, it was easy to replace key persons (i.e. county 
governors and county aldermen) at the county level as soon as the communists 
had gained power at the national level. Even though the former personnel 
remained in cities and rural municipalities, they had to implement new orders. 
Second, between 25 July and 25 August 1940, the local councils were 
disbanded and the top executives in the cities and rural municipalities were 
dismissed. Despite the fact that the local government structure remained, the 
bodies fulfilled the functions of the new rulers. Third, between 25 August 1940 
and 1 January 1941 continued changes in the local personnel and new 
departments, foreseen in the Constitution, were created. Fourth, as the last 
stage in the dismantling of the old local government system, in 
January/February 1941 executive committees of local soviets were created 
(Truuväli, 1966, pp. 444–446). 
                                                 
104 Paavle refers to a similar percentage (below 8%) (2009a, p. 50). 
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Short period of German occupation 
As soon as some territories were free of Russian troops in August 1941, the city 
and rural municipality governments resumed their duties there and, where 
possible, reinstated the pre-21 June 1940 staff (Järva Teataja, 1941a). Again, 
the work of local authorities was resumed before the government at the 
national level was established. Maripuu (2012b) has emphasised that in 
several municipalities the work of the local authorities was resumed with the 
help or on the initiative of Omakaitse (the home guard), who in some cases 
probably acted under the guidance of the Germans. The Germans appointed 
the county governors and city mayors, some of whom had held this post at the 
end of the 1930s, too. In Viljandi county, out of 21 appointed mayors of rural 
municipalities, 11 had been in the same position in 1940 (Paavle, 2009a, p. 
90). Hence, the situation marked a partial return to the interwar practices.  
Second period of Soviet rule 
Preparing local staff from Estonia to take up office at the local level, after 
Estonia was re-occupied by the Soviet power, started even during the German 
occupation in different areas of the Soviet Union, including the Leningrad 
oblast (Paavle, 2009a, pp. 92–93), and the trainees were, for the most part, 
women (Paavle, 2009c, p. 19). Local executive committees were established in 
parallel with the movement of Red Army troops in 1944 (Paavle, 2009a, pp. 
94–95). When possible, those people who had worked in the executive 
committees in 1940–41 were employed, but locals who had been working for 
the rural municipality government under German rule were also initially 
deemed suitable for work in the new committee (Paavle, 2009a). In autumn 
1944, there was an apparent lack of qualified workers, especially in rural 
municipalities (Paavle, 2009a, p. 99). 
In all three Baltic countries, it proved difficult to increase the number of 
Communist Party members. For example, on 1 January 1945 the number of 
party members and member candidates was as follows: 3,536 in Lithuania, 
3,692 in Latvia, and 2,409 in Estonia, while less than half were indigenes (e.g. 
only 961 in Estonia) (Zubkova, 2007, p. 190). According to Zubkova, the 
republic-level authorities in the Baltic states requested the All-Union 
Communist (Bolshevik) Party to send Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians 
(communists) who were living in the old republics of the USSR to carry out 
work for the party and work to benefit the economy in their respective 
countries. To this end, some were duly dispatched in 1945. The possibility of 
bottom-up initiatives was avoided because, according to Liivik (2014, pp. 166, 
177), by end of 1951 only two local Estonians were in the Government of the 
Republic (i.e. the rest were mainly Estonians from the Soviet Union), although 




When observing the rural municipality level, in 1944 there were only three 
Russians in 62 party organisations (based on available data), while the rest 
were Estonians, and therefore many of them did not speak Russian (Feest, 
2007, pp. 217–218). Hence, Feest stresses that the situation was challenging 
for higher-level officials who were non-Estonians or Russian Estonians, and 
who did not speak Estonian.  
Repression under different powers 
Deportation became one of the main mechanisms of Sovietisation in the Baltic 
countries in 1949–1951, and it was also used to speed up the establishment of 
collective farms (kolhoosid). But even mass deportations did not achieve the 
goal of making the Baltic countries a loyal region (Zubkova, 2007, p. 203). 
Between 1940 and 1952, over 203,000 people were deported from the Baltic 
countries to Siberia (Tannberg, 2005, p. 274). A considerable number of 
(former) local government officials were also ‘eliminated’ by means of 
deportations and arrests, and in this way continuity of competence and 
knowledge was hampered. 
In 1940–1941, of the last 11 incumbent county governors, five were 
arrested, along with several city mayors. In the case of rural municipality 
mayors, at least 38 out of 248 were arrested (Paavle, 2006a, pp. 396–397), 
namely almost one-sixth of the pre-1940 incumbents (Paavle, 2009a, p. 90). 
Of these 38, 34 perished in 1941–1942 and four returned to Estonia years later 
(Paavle, 2006a, p. 397). As for rural municipality secretaries, 48 were 
repressed in 1940–1941, which represented about 19.4% of the total number 
of the secretaries of 1940. Thirty-five from among these 48 were either 
executed, or died in captivity (Paavle, 2008, p. 266). 
During the German occupation, some of the chairmen of the local executive 
committees were killed (Paavle, 2009a, p. 90), and two former rural 
municipality mayors were executed for communist activities (Paavle, 2006a, 
p. 397). 
In 1944–1945, the Soviet state security institutions imprisoned 73 former 
rural municipality mayors, increasing the number of imprisoned rural 
municipality mayors during the Soviet occupation to 111 (Paavle, 2006a, p. 
397). Former mayors were mainly convicted of ‘betrayal of the homeland’105 
(Paavle, 2009b, p. 400). During the German occupation, at least 17 men106 
held the post of county governor, and of these at least 11 escaped to the West, 
while at least three were repressed in 1944 (Paavle, 2009b, p. 398). Paavle 
studied 12 cities and was able to identify 20 mayors during the German 
occupation, of whom at least 15 went into exile, two were sentenced to serve 
time in a correctional labour camp, and one became an assassin (agent) 
                                                 
105 Further details on specific individuals can be found in Paavle, 2009b, for example. 
106 This number also reflects the replacements. 
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(Paavle, 2009b, pp. 399–400). Information on the remaining two mayors is 
limited. 
The number of imprisoned deputy rural municipality mayors was also 
remarkable – 28 were incarcerated in 1940–1941, and 93 in 1944–1955. In 
addition, four deputy mayors were executed during the German occupation 
(Paavle, 2009b, p. 397).  
According to Paavle (2006a, p. 399), the execution or imprisonment ‘was 
only a part of the repressions. Many who were not physically destroyed were 
nevertheless forced to abandon their occupation and established way of life’. 
Paavle also explains the difference in the number of victims under the Soviet 
Union and under Nazi Germany in respect of their different aims. While the 
Soviet Union aimed to destroy the so-called “bourgeois state” as such, ‘the 
repressions of the occupying powers of Nazi Germany were directed against 
political opponents and communists and also derived from the objectives of 
their racial policy’ (Paavle, 2006a, p. 399). In his report to Stalin in April 1943, 
Lavrentiy Beria ‘listed seven categories of persons who should be arrested in 
the process of cleaning the rear area of enemy elements’ including the ‘heads 
of oblasts (districts), cities, and the administrative organs of regions’ (Paavle, 
2006a, p. 392). In sum, the majority of local government leaders of the 
independence period were eliminated, which made it easier to implement new 
practices, as the legacy practices of the past were weakened through the 
elimination of these persons. 
5.2.2 ABOLISHMENT OF COUNTIES AND RURAL MUNICIPALITIES 
The biggest changes in the administrative and territorial organisation took 
place in the rural units, in that the counties were renamed raions, the number 
of raions was increased, and the rural municipalities were replaced with small 
village soviets.  
From counties to raions 
The Soviet Union model encompassed raions, and therefore it was expected 
that they would also be established in Estonia sooner or later. Truuväli 
considered the county level to be the strongest link in the “bourgeoisie self-
government” before the events of 1940 (1966, p. 399). Given the structure of 
the county governments, this is probably true. In the Constitution of 1940, they 
were still counties and not raions, but after the constitutional amendment of 
1950, it was stated in Section 52 that the local bodies of state authority in 
raions, cities, towns, and villages were the soviets of working people’s deputies. 
Hence, the raions did not materialise in Estonia until 1950. 
In February 1949 two decrees were adopted whereby two additional 
counties were created – Jõgeva and Jõhvi. The establishment of Jõgeva county 
was justified in the decree by virtue of ‘the size of Tartu county and the large 
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number of subordinated city, rural municipality, and village soviets, which 
makes the county’s economic and political management more difficult’.107 
Jõhvi county, on the other hand, was created in the interests of the 
development of the oil shale basin.108 
Raions were not established in Estonia until 1950 because in 1946 Nikolai 
Karotamm, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of Estonia, found that the ‘personnel situation was not favourable for the 
establishment of raions’ (Paavle, 2009a, p. 141). The raions were created after 
the comprehensive collectivisation of the agricultural sector. Paavle claims 
that this was a clear indicator as to why the administrative reform was not 
implemented earlier – a mechanism was needed to control the inhabitants, 
and in the Soviet Union the collective farm (kolhoos) was the main tool for this 
(Paavle, 2009a, p. 141). Rural municipalities and counties were abolished as 
of 26 September 1950, and 39 raions were created in their place. These were 
directly subordinated to the state level and comprised village soviets, rural 
towns, and cities subordinated to the raion level. The legal basis for this was 
Section 19(b) of the Constitution.  
Three oblasts were created in May 1952, but these were abolished a year 
later, after Stalin’s death. As 10 counties had been replaced with 39 raions, it 
provided a rationale for dividing the republic into oblasts (Misiunas & 
Taagepera, 1993, p. 77). Although the oblasts only existed for a year, they have 
been etched in people’s memory and even half a century later the provision of 
state services based on four regions is seen by some as the implementation of 
Soviet Union ideas.109 
Developments in Latvia and Lithuania were quite similar to those in 
Estonia. Before 1940, Latvia had 19 counties and 516 rural municipalities, 
while Lithuania had 23 counties and 261 rural municipalities (Misiunas & 
Taagepera, 1993, p. 363). The number of counties was increased in all three 
countries in 1945–1949, before the raions were established in 1950. Oblasts 
were introduced in Lithuania in 1950, but not until 1952 in Latvia, as in 
Estonia; in 1953, the oblasts were abolished in all three Baltic countries 
(Misiunas & Taagepera, 1993, p. 79).  
Amalgamation of the raions started in 1957, with the biggest changes taking 
place in 1959 when 13 raions out of 37 were abolished (Uuet, 2002, p. 177). In 
1965, the number of raions was reduced to 15. In that context, it is noteworthy 
that while in 1950 there were on average about 25–27 deputies in the raion 
soviets, by 1980 that number had increased to 104 (Truuväli, 1986b, p. 145).  
                                                 
107 Decree on the Establishment of Jõgeva County of 1949 (Eesti NSV Ülemnõukogu Presiidiumi 
seadlus Jõgevamaa moodustamine kohta). 
108 Decree on the Establishment of Jõhvi County and Merging the City of Tapa and some Rural 
Municipalities and Village Soviets with Viru County of 1949 (Eesti NSV Ülemnõukogu Presiidiumi 
seadlus Jõhvimaa moodustamise ja Tapa linna ning mõnede valdade ja külanõukogude ühendamise 
kohta Virumaaga). 
109 See, for example, Vahter & Ideon, 2003.  
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Table 5.1  Counties/raions, rural municipalities/village soviets, and towns, 1939–1986 
 1939 1945 1950 1952 1955 1965 1986 











248  236  - - - - -  
Village 
soviets 
- - 641  641  320  238  189  
Towns 
(alev) 
- 13 22  22 28 22  24  
Source: Table compiled based on data presented in Uuet, 2002. 
Establishment of village soviets and abolishment of rural municipalities 
At the end of 1944, the issue of village soviets appeared on the agenda (Paavle, 
2009a, p. 105), and in May 1945 the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the 
ESSR adopted a formal decision on the establishment of village soviets in 
Estonia.110 On average, 2.5 village soviets were established per rural 
municipality. A village soviet was both an administrative unit and a 
governmental organisation (Paavle, 2009c, p. 24). Paavle sees the 
establishment of village soviets as a means of enhancing control over the local 
population (i.e. ‘theoretically the power was brought closer to the people, but 
at the same time the traditional ties within the rural municipality community 
were severed’) (Paavle, 2009a, p. 106). According to the decree on the 
establishment of village soviets of working people’s deputies, the village 
soviets were subordinated to the rural municipality soviets and the former 
were established to bring the Soviet power closer to the working people and to 
organise the latter more effectively for the purposes of ‘economic and cultural 
reconstruction’ in rural areas. Hence, one of the first tasks of the village soviets 
in 1945 was to compile lists of village residents (Postimees, 1945). 
Due to the merging of farms, their borders did not overlap with the borders 
of the village soviets, and therefore a decree111 was issued in 1954 whereby the 
number of village soviets was reduced from 641 to 320. The next substantial 
change in the number of village soviets took place in 1960 when 64 were 
abolished (Uuet, 2002, p. 179). 
The abolishment of the rural municipalities was also dependent on 
collectivisation. According to Paavle (2009a, p. 141), the rural municipality 
provided an alternative control mechanism until collectivisation was 
                                                 
110 Decree on the Establishment of Village Soviets of People’s Deputies in the Estonian SSR of 1945 
(ENSV Ülemnõukogu Presiidiumi seadlus küla töörahva saadikute nõukogude loomise kohta Eesti 
Nõukogude Sotsialistlikus Vabariigis). 
111 Decree on Merging Village Soviets of the Estonian SSR of 1954 (Eesti NSV Ülemnõukogu 
Presiidiumi seadlus Eesti NSV külanõukogude ühendamisest). 
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completed, and a new mechanism for controlling the population was created 
in Estonia – collective farms. ‘The abolishment of the rural municipalities 
broke traditional administrative links in substance and, with this, the 
administrative Sovietisation of the rural area was completed’ (Paavle, 2009a, 
p. 143). 
Due to the administrative-territorial changes, the number of local soviets 
decreased by 71.6% in 1948–1982, from 940 to 267 (Truuväli, 1986b, p. 138). 
The decrease can largely be explained by the replacement of ‘the three tier local 
soviets system (county – rural municipality – village) with a two tier one (raion 
– village)’ (Truuväli, 1986b, p. 139). 
5.2.3 ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL SOVIETS 
The establishment of local soviets was a gradual process, which started in 
practice with the executive committees.  
Councils replaced by the soviets of working people’s deputies 
Local soviets started to develop in Russia as early as 1905 as temporary 
organisations in the context of the revolution, and subsequently became more 
formalised in 1917 (Antal, 2010, pp. 135–136). Under Article 94 of the 
Constitution of the USSR of 1935, which was also in force in the 1940s, ‘The 
organs of state authority in territories, regions, autonomous regions, areas, 
districts, cities and rural localities (stations, villages, hamlets, kishlaks, auls) 
are the Soviets of Working People’s Deputies’. The role of the soviets was not 
to represent the will of the local people, but more to transmit the orders of the 
party to the people. Hence, these have been referred to as “transmission belts” 
(see Laaman, 1991, p. 13; Paavle, 2009a, p. 110). The real power resided in the 
Communist Party. 
Local councils were disbanded in Estonia with the decree of 25 July 1940112 
on the grounds that as all power in the ESSR belonged, according to the 
Declaration of 21 July 1940, to the people and the people exercised state power 
through the soviets of working people’s deputies, the local councils’ activities 
would not be in line with the declaration (Järva Teataja, 1940). At the same 
time, the new system was not created in haste. In October 1940, when it was 
still unclear when the soviets of working people’s deputies would be 
established in Estonia, the supervisory arrangement of the county, city, and 
rural municipality governments was modified until the soviets of working 
people’s deputies and their executive committees were effectively 
                                                 
112 Act on Discontinuation of Activities of County, City and Rural Municipality Councils of 1940 
(Maa-, linna- ja vallavolikogude tegevuse lõpetamise seadus). 
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established.113 The supervisory arrangement mainly stipulated which areas 
would fall under which central-level authority’s jurisdiction. In December 
1940, Andrey Andreyev, Chairman of the Soviet of the Union, criticised the 
slow Sovietisation in Estonia (Paavle, 2009a, p. 57). The executive committees 
of counties and certain cities were formed at the end of December 1940 
(Paavle, 2009a, pp. 57–58).  
On 26 August 1946, a regulation was issued on improving the work of the 
local soviet bodies (Eesti NSV Ministrite Nõukogu, 1961). In the regulation, 
the Council of Ministers of the Estonian SSR concluded that there were 
deficiencies in the work of several local soviet bodies, and notable deficiencies 
particularly in the work of the village soviets and executive committees of the 
rural municipalities. The local bodies were expected to become organisations 
of the masses, but the Council of Ministers found that these bodies did not 
involve people in active soviet work and put the blame for this on the county-
level officials. The regulation included 15 proposals/orders, some directly 
related to the working arrangement (e.g. executive committees of the rural 
municipalities and cities, subordinated to the county, had to meet four times 
per month, and village soviets had to hold meetings at least twice a month). 
An additional aim was to have one village deputy per ten farmsteads by 
September 1946. 
After the end of German occupation and the re-occupation by the Soviet 
Union, the first local elections were held on 18 January 1948. With these 
elections, the structure of the local soviets was aligned with the requirements 
of the Constitution (Truuväli, 1986b, p. 94). The first local elections were more 
complicated and complex than others held during the Soviet period, because 
village soviets had been established in 1945, and the residents of the rural 
areas had to elect the representatives to the soviets at three levels: county, 
rural municipality, and village (Puur & Uuet, 2010, p. 62). After 1948, the local 
elections took place every second year. At the local elections of 1948, the 
turnout was 99.19%. A total of 14,565 deputies were elected (only 8 candidates 
were not elected114), 33% of whom were female and 77% of whom did not 
belong to the party (Paavle, 2009a, p. 118; Truuväli, 1986b, p. 109). According 
to Paavle (2009a, p. 118), ‘the role of the soviets remained marginal. The 
elections and soviets were needed only to bring the governing structures 
formally in line with what was described in the Constitution’. 1948 was also 
the year of the first local soviet elections for Latvia and Lithuania, while in 
Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia, for example, these elections took 
place in December 1940 (Ant, 1994, p. 46). Ant (1994, p. 47) believes that local 
elections could also have taken place in Estonia after the deportation of 1941, 
                                                 
113 Decree on Supervisory Regime of Counties, Cities and Rural Municipalities of 1940 (Eesti NSV 
Rahvakomissaride Nõukogu määrus maakondade, linnade ja valdade järelevelvekorra kohta). 
114 These eight persons did not get elected because they did not gain the required share of the votes. 
Candidates numbered 14,573 in total, the same as the number of deputies to be elected (Truuväli, 1986b, 
pp. 96, 109). 
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if the war had not started, because Moscow would not have had any specific 
reason to be worried about the local election results. Truuväli (1986b) has 
pointed out that by 1986 there was some published data on the elections of 
1948, but no research literature as such. The (artificial) participation rate of 
99.19% is a noticeable difference compared to the previous local elections in 
October 1939, where the participation rate in Tallinn, for instance, was as low 
as 33.3%, although in some municipalities the rate was as high as 90% 
(Päevaleht, 1939). While it used to be commonplace for local people to be 
elected to local representative bodies, in the USSR leaders of the Soviet Union 
could likewise be elected to these bodies. For example, Joseph Stalin, Andrey 
Zhdanov, and Vjacheslav Molotov were elected to the Tallinn city soviet. One 
of the tools used to ensure the election of candidates involved the party asking 
members of the party committee to obtain a certificate to the effect that they 
were on a business trip and therefore had the right to cast their vote in another 
municipality (Estonian National Museum, 2005). This essentially allowed 
them to cast their vote for a candidate whose success was uncertain. 
In 1959, the total number of local deputies (including those at the raion 
level) increased from 9,621 to 11,731 (Truuväli, 1986b, pp. 139–141). On 
average, there were 15–16 deputies per soviet in 1948 (44–45 in cities, and 10 
in village soviets), but by 1980 this figure had increased to 40–41 (104 raions, 
208 republic subordinated cities, 35 towns, and 28–29 village soviets) 
(Truuväli, 1986b, p. 142), making local soviets at least de jure organisations of 
the masses. 
Executive committees 
The executive committees were the executive bodies of the local soviets and, 
somewhat similarly to previous local-level governments, formally elected by 
the representative body (i.e. the soviet). The executive committees were 
established in Estonia before the soviets of deputies. On 17 January 1941, 
decrees were issued on the establishment of the local executive committees in 
counties and cities, and in cities subordinated to the county level and rural 
municipalities. Names of the members of the executive committees of the 
counties and the four cities were published in the same decree. Therefore, in 
practice, the appointments involved consulting the party. Truuväli (1966, p. 
424) considers the establishment of the executive committees to herald the 
completion of the establishment of the local state authorities and the end of 
the old self-government system. Under the decrees of 17 January 1941, the 
county executive committees had 6–9 members and 7–9 members in the 
executive committees of the four biggest cities: the chairman, deputy 
chairman, secretary and members. Some of the members were the heads of 
certain departments (e.g. education, healthcare, trade, social security, or 
finance). In rural municipalities and small cities, the executive committee was 
composed of 3 members (the chairman, deputy chairman, and a secretary), 
and of 5 members in the cities of Rakvere, Viljandi and Valga.  
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‘A large portion of the problems derived from the fact that the 
responsibilities of the executive committees were not defined at all. There was 
no regulation stipulating the tasks, jurisdiction and area of responsibility of 
the executive committees and their members’ (Paavle, 2006b, p. 253). 
Therefore the main legal reference documents were the Constitution and the 
decrees of 17 January 1941. A person who headed the organisation department 
of a raion executive committee at the beginning of the 1950s has described 
(Estonian National Museum, 2005)115 how she had to participate in the 
meetings of party sub-organisations, where there were few discussions as 
such, but where the meeting minutes had to be drafted. She also gave an 
example of how a party organisation of a transport undertaking in a raion had 
to adopt a decision on the condemnation of an African country’s activity that 
was in violation of human rights.  
According to Paavle (2009c, pp. 19–20), a typical way to form rural 
municipal executive committees in 1944 was that ‘a responsible organiser 
(member of an operative group who could have been previously appointed as 
the executive committee chairman or partorg for that same rural municipality, 
but could also have been passing through) was sent to the rural municipality, 
and he appointed the staff of the executive committee or only the chairman on 
the spot’. The appointed staff of the executive committee or the chairman had 
been pre-approved at the county level. In the event that only the chairman was 
appointed, he/she had to find the members himself/herself, and the county 
approved the staff afterwards (Paavle, 2009c, p. 20).  
In accordance with the decrees of 18 January 1945,116 the size of the 
executive committees was increased. In the case of cities subordinated to the 
county level and rural municipalities, the maximum number of executive 
committee members was 9, and for counties and cities subordinated to the 
republic level this number totalled 11. Considering the extent of the tasks of 
the rural municipalities’ executive committees, the staff resources were 
deemed to be inadequate. In August 1945, the first secretary of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia, Nikolai Karotamm, asked 
Moscow’s permission to ‘organise land departments in the rural municipal 
executive committees, which would consist of two people’ (Paavle, 2009c, p. 
22). The request was repeated in September 1945 with an additional request 
for the education departments. The Central Committee granted permission to 
form agricultural departments, but in the case of the education departments 
permission was granted instead to ‘enlarge the staffs of county education 
department school inspectors’ (Paavle, 2009c, p. 22). The staff shortage was 
to be resolved with the inclusion of a ‘core of activists’ (i.e. unpaid manpower), 
which was common in the USSR (Paavle, 2009c, pp. 22–23). As there was a 
                                                 
115 Reply No 86. 
116 Decree on Numerical Composition of Executive Committees of Cities and Rural Municipalities 
Subordinated to the County Level of 1945 (Eesti NSV Ülemnõukogu Presiidiumi seadlus maakondliku 
alluvusega linnade ja valdade täitevkomiteede arvulise koosseisu kohta). 
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lack of such activists in Estonia, this contingent was formed ‘semi-forcibly’ 
through the establishment of the standing committees and the position of 
village deputy (Paavle, 2009c, p. 23). 
The standing committees’ statute was approved in January 1945. It was 
common for these committees to exist only on paper and not to become 
functional due to the lack of a clear objective, and as the local level had no 
decision-making powers, nobody sought their advice (Paavle, 2009c, p. 24). 
At the end of 1945, it was foreseen that for every executive committee there 
should be 5 standing committees respectively in the case of village soviets, 9 
in rural municipalities, and 10 in cities and raions. For example, in cities and 
raions a standing committee was envisaged that would foster individual and 
collective horticulture in addition to the traditional commissions such as 
culture and finance. In the Annex to the regulation on the enhancement of 
village soviets,117 the statute of the deputies118 of village soviets (külavolinik) 
was also set out. It was foreseen that the deputy had to be a local resident and 
that his territory/jurisdiction would consist of ten households. The deputy’s 
main tasks included transferring the information from the village soviet to the 
residents, organising the fulfilment of the village soviet’s orders, and 
overseeing the implementation of these orders. To some extent, these tasks 
were similar to those of the village elder during the period of Estonian 
independence. For this reason, the village deputies were initially called village 
elders in some places (Paavle, 2009a, p. 116). The deputies were not paid but, 
according to Paavle, the attractiveness of the post lay in the fact that they were 
exempt from labour and transport conscription. The real aim of appointing 
village deputies might therefore have been to gather and pass on information 
and to function as talebearers (Paavle, 2009a, p. 117). 
In 1948, when the first local elections under Soviet rule took place, a total 
of 2,539 deputies were elected to the executive committees of the village 
soviets. As there were 640 executive committee members in addition to 
chairmen, deputy chairmen and secretaries in village soviets, the executive 
committees consisted of three to four members on average (Truuväli, 1986b, 
p. 142).  
The appointment mechanism was related to the nomenklatura. In the case 
of the executive committees of the rural municipalities, both the party and the 
executive committee of a county were involved (Paavle, 2009a, p. 151). ‘The 
Communist Party ... provided the lifeblood of the Soviet regime in the form of 
cadres or key personnel that operate the political system’ (Reshetar, 1978, p. 
95). The executive committee initiated the process and the party made the final 
decision (first the party’s county committee and then the central committee). 
However, this rule was often ignored and the central committee was not always 
informed about the personnel changes (see Paavle, 2009a, p. 152). The rural 
                                                 
117 Statute of the Deputies of Village Soviets of 1945 (Külanõukogude volinike põhimäärus). 
118 ‘Village deputy’ may not be the correct term for külavolinik, as the person was not elected, but 
appointed. On the other hand, Koll (2013, p. 209), for example, uses this term. 
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municipality party committees and their nomenklatura were only used in 
1949–1950. In May 1950, the nomenklatura of the rural municipality included 
15,047 positions (Paavle, 2009a, pp. 152–153).  
Some remarks on village soviets 
The statutes of the village soviets listed 17 fields of activity, which included, 
among other things, planning and statistics, organisational work among the 
masses, agriculture, and trade. The tasks were quite general in nature. In 
October 1945 a regulation119 was issued whereby the village soviets were 
enhanced by increasing their members to a team of five. In addition to the 
chairman and a secretary, three other ‘politically loyal’ persons were to be 
elected. 
The establishment of the village soviets did not meet expectations, 
according to Paavle (2009a, p. 109). It was often the case that people did not 
know where the village soviet was located and, what is more, only two of the 
posts were paid positions – that of the chairman and the secretary (Paavle, 
2009a, p. 109). As village soviets were not capable of fulfilling the tasks 
assigned to them, the main burden of responsibility fell to the executive 
committees of the rural municipalities (Paavle, 2009a, p. 109). To this end, the 
village soviet became an irritating link between the rural municipality and its 
residents (Paavle, 2009a, p. 109). Paavle concludes that during the initial years 
the problems related to the village soviets were not so much attributable to the 
weakness of the personnel of the rural municipality, but rather to the 
complexity of the system and the extraneous level in the three-tier 
administrative system.  
5.3 LOCAL ADMINISTRATION AT THE BEGINNING OF 
THE 1980S 
According to Scurlock (1980, p. 169), ‘each Soviet constitution strictly 
represents an epoch’. As the subsequent constitution after the one in 1936 at 
the Soviet Union level was adopted in 1977, and as the Estonian SSR had two 
constitutions during the Soviet period (one adopted in August 1940 and the 
other in April 1978), 1978 duly seems to be an appropriate starting point for 
analysing the local administrative system at the end of the Soviet period.  
One reason for the adoption of the new constitution in the Soviet Union in 
1977 was ‘the passing of the dictatorship of the proletariat’ (Scurlock, 1980, p. 
171). What is clear is that the republic’s constitution of 1978 increased the role 
of the local soviets. Scurlock has identified the two biggest changes in the 1977 
                                                 
119 Regulation on Reinforcement of Village Soviets of Estonian SSR of 1945 (Eesti NSV 
Rahvakomissaride Nõukogu ja Eestimaa Kommunistliku (bolševike) Partei Keskkomitee määrus Eesti 
NSV küla töörahva saadikute nõukogude tugevdamise kohta). 
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constitution of the Soviet Union compared to its predecessor as being ‘the 
much greater legislative and administrative authority’ of the Soviets of 
People’s Deputies, and ‘the greater involvement of the people in the affairs of 
government’ (1980, p. 174). Article 76 of the Constitution of the USSR 
stipulates that a ‘union republic has its own Constitution conforming to the 
Constitution of the USSR and taking into account the particular characteristics 
of the republic’. Hence, all of the union republics adopted their new 
constitutions in 1978.  
When examining the Constitution of the Estonian SSR of 1978, it is 
apparent that the Soviet of People’s Deputies at the local level was still the 
organ of state power, but Article 125 stated that the ‘Local Soviets of People’s 
Deputies decide on all matters of local significance, proceeding on the premise 
of the general interests of the citizens living within the territory of the Soviet 
... participate in the discussion of matters of republic and All-Union 
significance, and submit their proposals in regard to them’.120 What can be 
inferred from this is that, compared to the Constitution of 1940, the local 
authorities were foreseen to have more say in local matters, at least formally. 
Due to the new Constitution of 1978, new legal acts concerning local soviets 
were adopted in 1979. 
Despite the perestroika at the end of the 1980s, the sessions of the local 
soviets took place in 1988 in the same manner as they had done 10 or 20 years 
earlier (Käbin, 1988, p. 52). Moreover, there were no major amendments to 
the legislation governing the local soviets in Estonia during the period from 
1978 to 1988. If one compares the minutes of the Põltsamaa city soviet of 1979 
with those of 1988, in both cases the session agenda was dominated by routine 
informative items. 
5.3.1 ADMINISTRATIVE-TERRITORIAL UNITS 
After 1978, there were no major changes in the administrative-territorial 
organisation. There were 15 raions and six cities that were subordinated to the 
state level, and which were also listed in the Constitution of 1978. When 
compared to the Constitution of 1940, the cities of Kohtla-Järve and Sillamäe 
were new additions. Truuväli (2008, p. 335) has called the first a 
‘conglomerate of settlement units’ and the other a ‘forbidden city’. Kohtla-
Järve had been subordinated to the republic as early as 4 April 1947 (Uuet, 
2002, p. 82) and was listed as a republic city in the Constitution of 1940, as 
amended in 1950. Sillamäe town was categorised as a city subordinated to the 
republic in June 1957 (Uuet, 2002, p. 155). In 1947, the construction of a 
uranium enrichment plant got underway in Sillamäe, which was classified 
information. The town was also situated in a specific zone, which could only 
be accessed by means of a permit. Hence, the reason for adding Sillamäe to the 
                                                 
120 Article 125 of the Constitution of the Estonian SSR of 1978 was identical to Article 146 of the 
Constitution of the USSR of 1977.  
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list of republic-subordinated cities did not stem from its size, but from its 
importance. Further, the number of village soviets had decreased as a result of 
amalgamations, and by 1979 there were 194 in existence. 
5.3.2 LOCAL SOVIETS 
The first special law on local soviets in Estonia was adopted in 1968 (Uuet, 
2002, p. 192).121 As the new Constitution was adopted in 1978, new special laws 
on local soviets followed suit the year after. At the end of the 1980s, the main 
legislation governing the work of the local soviets comprised the Constitutions 
of the USSR and ESSR, the USSR Act on the status of the USSR deputies, and 
the ESSR Act on the soviet of people’s deputies (either on raions, cities and 
city raions, or towns and villages, respectively). The real power, to the extent 
that it existed, was still in the hands of the executive committee, not in those 
of the soviet. 
In June 1987, local elections in Estonia still took place under single-
candidate election principles and single-mandate constituencies. However, 
some experiments with competitive elections were conducted in the Soviet 
Union that same year – ‘about 5 percent of the local deputies were to be elected 
in the new multimember districts’ (Hahn, 1988, p. 434). In Estonia, the 
number of candidates exceeded the number of mandates in Haapsalu raion 
(Liivik, 2011, p. 1). 
During the whole period, it was deemed important to involve as many 
people as possible in the work of the local soviets. Table 5.2 illustrates how one 
of the requirements of the Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union was implemented (CPSU, 1961, p. 93): 
To improve the work of the Soviets and bring fresh forces into them, it 
is advisable that at least one-third of the total number of deputies to a 
Soviet should be elected anew each time so that fresh millions of 
working people may learn to govern the state. The Party considers 
systematic renewal of the leading bodies necessary to bring a wider 
range of able persons into them and rule out abuses of authority by 
individual government officials. It is advisable to introduce the 
principle that the leading officials of the Union, republican and local 
bodies should be elected to their offices, as a rule, for not more than 
three consecutive terms. 
                                                 
121 In 1968, the Act on Village and Town Soviets of the Estonian SSR was adopted (Seadus Eesti NSV 
küla ja alevi töörahva saadikute nõukogu kohta), followed in 1971 by the Act on Raion Soviets of the 
Estonian SSR (Seadus Eesti NSV rajooni töörahva saadikute nõukogu kohta), and the Act on City and 
City Raion Soviets of the Estonian SSR (Seadus Eesti NSV linna ja linnarajooni töörahva saadikute 
nõukogu kohta).  
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Table 5.2  Renewal of the composition of soviets in the Estonian SSR (percentage of 
deputies elected to the soviet for the first time compared to all deputies) 
Soviet level 
Election year 
1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1980 
Raion 60.1 68.1 58.8 65.4 64.0 57.0 46.8 52.4 47.9 44.9 52.0 
Republic city 60.0 59.4 55.9 72.6 67.6 60.2 48.7 59.2 60.2 52.4 58.5 




63.0 66.7 57.9 69.7 59.7 48.1 44.1 44.3 44.9 40.7 49.1 
Village 54.1 52.3 47.1 58.1 53.2 43.1 39.4 40.3 41.9 40.4 48.6 
Town 59.1 52.0 45.3 66.1 53.2 49.8 44.1 45.2 48.8 44.9 52.0 
Source: Truuväli, 1986b, p. 152. 
 
The Soviet Union period also brought more females to the local soviets and 
to their executive committees. For example, while in 1948 32.6% of the 
deputies were female, in 1980 this indicator had already risen to 49.1%. When 
it came to the chairs of the executive committees, 56% of the chairs in village 
soviets were female, for example, and 75% in town soviets in 1982 (Truuväli, 
1986b, p. 170). 
Raion soviets 
Raion soviets were elected under the Act on Raion Soviets of 1979122 for a term 
of two and a half years by the people living in the territory of the respective 
raion. According to Section 8 of the act, the raion soviet had the power to annul 
the acts of the soviets and executive committees of the cities subordinated to 
the raion level, towns, and villages where these acts did not comply with the 
law. The soviet of people’s deputies’ sessions had to be held at least four times 
per year. Both the higher- and lower-level soviet deputies were able to 
participate in the sessions with an advisory vote, although those at the lower 
level were able to attend by invitation only. 
The executive committee was a collegial body whose members – the 
chairman, deputy chairmen, secretary, and five to seven additional members 
– were elected from and by the soviet of people’s deputies. Under Section 43, 
the executive committee was accountable both to the local soviet that elected 
it and to the Council of Ministers of the ESSR. In line with dual subordination, 
the raion soviet and the Council of Ministers had the power to annul the 
decisions and orders of the raion’s executive committee. In turn, the raion 
executive committee had the power to annul decisions made by the lower-level 
executive committees.  
                                                 
122 ESSR Act on the Estonian SSR Raion Soviet of 1979 (Eesti Nõukogude Sotsialistliku Vabariigi 
seadus Eesti NSV rajooni rahvasaadikute nõukogu kohta). 
Abolishment of local self-government 
118 
The departments of the executive committee were subordinated to the 
raion soviet and its executive committee as well as to the respective higher 
authorities. To this end, the financial department of a raion (or city) was 
subordinated to the raion (or city) soviet of people’s deputies, to its executive 
committee, and also to the Ministry of Finance of the ESSR. There were 21 
financial departments in Estonia (15 at the raion level and 6 in independent 
cities). Salaries and bonuses of the financial department were paid from the 
Ministry of Finance’s budget, namely there was no budget line for the 
department in the raion budget. Based on these financial departments, a tax 
authority was created at the beginning of the 1990s (personal interview, 8 
February 2011).  
Executive committee administrations existed in addition to the 
departments of the executive committee. The establishment of the 
departments and administrations and the appointment of their leaders were 
under the exclusive competence of the people’s deputies’ sessions. The 
appointment of other top-level officials of the departments and 
administrations was under the competence of the executive committee. The 
latter held meetings at least once a month. For example, 17 executive 
committee meetings were held in the Paide raion in 1987, but only three 
sessions of the raion soviets. Standing committee meetings were more 
frequent (Paide Rajooni Rahvasaadikute Nõukogu Täitevkomitee, 1987).  
The list of standing committees and their respective tasks were set out in 
the Act on the Raion Soviets. Only the deputies belonged to the standing 
committees, and not the members of the executive committee. In addition, the 
soviet could establish temporary committees. Cooperation between standing 
committee members of a raion and of a town or village was one form of 
coordination that also took place through the sessions held on the premises of 
local enterprises (Kodu, 1979, pp. 31–32). In addition, the chairmen of the 
respective standing committee at the town or village level took part in standing 
committee meetings at the raion level and contributed to drafting the raion 
standing committee’s work plan (Kodu, 1979, p. 32). 
Under Section 75 of the Act on the Raion Soviet of 1979, the deputies were 
expected to follow national interests, to consider the needs of the people in 
their constituency, and to implement electorate guidelines. If a deputy’s 
employer wished to release him or her from the duties connected to their main 
job, the pre-approval of the raion soviet or the executive committee was 
required. This was only one of several guarantees and benefits that a deputy 
was entitled to. 
Raions continued to have no jurisdiction over the larger cities. Compared 
to the lower-level soviets, one of the differences concerned the larger 
budgetary powers. The centralisation that took place in the 1970s resulted in 
the consolidation of the management functions of different organisations 
(schools, kindergartens, libraries, etc) in rural areas to the executive 
committee of the raion. Lower-level soviets did not have their own 
bookkeeping function (Russak, 2009, p. 64). The deputy chairman of a raion 
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soviet’s executive committee who was interviewed (personal interview, 7 
February 2011) even said that, figuratively speaking, he was basically a city 
mayor because the departments of public utilities, education, and culture – all 
of which were city-related – were under his jurisdiction. 
Based on a summary of the Paide raion executive committee’s work in 1987 
(Paide Rajooni Rahvasaadikute Nõukogu Täitevkomitee, 1987), one of their 
main tasks was to broaden socialist democracy, as required by the party. This 
implied increased contact and involvement with the population, and meetings 
with working people were one means of fostering this. 
In November 1986, Gorbachev’s perestroika idea ‘gave a big boost to 
democracy movements in Eastern Europe’ (Giugni, 1998, p. 372). It also 
motivated the Harju raion executive committee to submit a proposal to the 
Council of Ministers of the ESSR on increasing the relevance of the raion 
soviet. The aim was to bolster the power of the executive committee in the 
management of economic and social issues (Russak, 2009, pp. 68–69). The 
head of the financial department of the Harju raion had also been leading the 
work on drafting the concept of the self-managing village soviet (Russak, 
2009, p. 69). The fact that a raion level was willing to grant the lower levels 
greater powers might have indicated a wish to return to local self-governance, 
which the Soviet power had eliminated. 
City, town and village soviets 
In the 1980s, the soviets of people’s deputies were elected at the local level for 
a period of two and a half years, in a similar fashion to the raion level, but there 
was still only one candidate per seat. 
The operations of the city and city raion soviets and town and village soviets 
were regulated rather similarly.123 The structure of the city soviet is presented 
in Figure 5.1. In the case of the city soviets, the specific rights and duties 
depended on whether the city was subordinated to the republic or the raion 
level. Similarly to the raion, the soviet sessions were to be held at least four 
times a year. 
 
                                                 
123 ESSR Act on City and City Raion Soviet (ENSV seadus linna ja linnarajooni rahvasaadikute 
nõukogu kohta) and ESSR Act on Town and Village Soviet (ENSV seadus Eesti NSV alevi ja küla 
rahvasaadikute nõukogu kohta) (as of 1987). 
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 Figure 5.1  Structure of city soviet 
The village soviets had somewhat different tasks, however, as they were 
highly involved in operating the collective and state farms. At least one person 
indicated in his responses to the Estonian National Museum questionnaire124 
(Estonian National Museum, 2005, p. 124) that agricultural holdings had 
more power in rural areas than village soviets had, because the activities of the 
holdings determined the life and conditions in the village. The same 
sentiments were confirmed by another respondent about the 1960s, and yet 
another about the 1970s (Estonian National Museum, 2005, pp. 26, 211). As 
the collective farms in rural areas provided local services, the Soviet system 
‘restored the old (pre-1918 republic) pattern of local government in Estonia 
that was once operated by the main economic structure (manors)’ (Sootla, 
Kalev, & Kattai, 2009, p. 53). The post of chairman of the village soviet was not 
very prestigious (Russak, 2009, p. 72). On the other hand, there were also 
village soviets which exercised authority (Estonian National Museum, 2005, 
p. 199). As a rule, however, the village soviets did not decide anything, but were 
‘simply the arm extension of the state in a village’ (Russak, 2009, pp. 18, 26–
27). Village soviet budgets were comprised of maintenance costs and the 
salaries of a handful of people, therefore village soviets did not participate in 
the process of the establishment of the budget. The chair of the executive 
committee of a village soviet had no room for manoeuvre when it came to 
finances, and he or she had only a partial say in the allocation of car purchase 
permits, for example (personal interview, 8 February 2011). 
The executive committee members were elected from among and by the 
members of the soviet of people’s deputies. The executive committee of a city 
or city raion was composed of a chairman, deputy chairmen, secretary, and 5 
to 11 members in accordance with the Act of 1987. For towns and villages, the 
set-up comprised a chairman, a deputy chairman, a secretary, and 2 to 4 
                                                 
124 The Estonian National Museum houses a collection of people’s narratives and memoirs. In 2005 
the questionnaire theme was Inimene ja võim (Person and power).  
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members. The structure of the executive committee was more complex than 
that of the city government during the interwar period. 
When it came to the village soviets, in 1980 71.4% of the members of the 
executive committee belonged to the CPSU; the corresponding figure in 1948 
was 12.1%, 20.2% in 1953, and 37.1% in 1957 (Truuväli, 1986b, p. 149). It is 
also worth pointing out that the educational level attained by members also 
increased during that period: while in 1948 only 25.5% of the members of the 
executive committee had an educational level higher than the basic level, in 
1957 this figure was 40.8%, while in 1980 it topped 98.5% (Truuväli, 1986b, p. 
149). 
The fact that the local soviets did not possess real power as such was also 
illustrated during the interviews: 
[...] the local government of the Soviet time cannot be seen as local self-
government. It was purely an extension of the arm of the state and 
implemented the guidelines given by the erstwhile party. This is 
because if we think about the local soviet and executive committee, all 
of the issues discussed in the local soviet were prepared at some higher 
level far away. [...] In reality, the decisions were just approving the 
decisions already adopted at the higher level. If we think about the 
local soviet agenda items, then the majority of these were all provided, 
as well as the replies. There was really not much chance of giving a 
different reply; people may have thought differently, but they were not 
inclined to voice their thoughts out loud. 
 (Personal interview, 21 September 2010)125 
Despite the fact that there was no mayor during the Soviet period, but 
rather a chairman of the executive committee (täitevkomitee esimees), in 
several cities people unofficially used the term ‘city mayor’ (linnapea) 
(personal interview, 23 September 2010; Lukas, 2007, p. 184) or ‘rural 
municipality mayor’ (vallavanem, in the case of a rural municipality) (Lukas, 
2007, p. 27). The use of interwar local government terminology at the end of 
the 1980s, also in the media, can be seen as a way of dismantling the iron 
curtain piece by piece (Lääne, Mäeltsemees, Vare & Kattai, 2017, p. 87). The 
chairman and the members of the executive committee were appointed by the 
local soviet from among its deputies. The executive committee chairman’s 
term was equal to that of the people’s deputies, and a chairman of the people’s 
deputies’ session was elected at every session accordingly.  
The fact that the executive committee was still more important than the 
soviet of people’s deputies is reflected in the legislation of 1979 in that the 
soviet meetings were to be held at least four times per year. If we view the 
minutes of the soviet of people’s deputies’ sessions in Põltsamaa city in 1979, 
                                                 
125 The interviewee had become a local soviet deputy in 1985 and the chairman of the executive 
committee of a small city in 1987. 
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it is clear that the majority of the agenda items were informative. The executive 
committee held meetings once per month on average and they also took some 
decisions. In 1988, five soviet sessions and 14 executive committee meetings 
were held in the same municipality.  
The raion city’s executive committee was accountable to both the city 
soviet, which appointed it, and to the executive committee of the raion. 
Similarly, the executive committee of a republic city was accountable to its 
soviet and to the Council of Ministers. 
5.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The local authorities’ transformation to the Soviet system was different from 
the transformation that occurred in 1917 and the years that followed, the main 
difference being that under the Soviet power there was a model according to 
which the local government in Estonia had to be transformed, at least formally. 
The general legal framework was foreseen in the Constitution of the USSR, 
which came into force in Estonia in August 1940.126 There was little room for 
debate as it entailed, as in many other countries, ‘the imposition of the Soviet 
(Stalinist) State model to ensure a centralist Communist Party rule’ 
(Wollmann, 2010, p. 252). Likewise, it was a transformation to ‘a regime that 
sought to control all aspects of public and private life’ (Fijalkowski, 2010, p. 1). 
As we have seen, the Estonian authorities sent requests to Moscow to have the 
formal structure of local authorities adapted to the Estonian context, but these 
requests were often rejected. 
For Joseph Stalin, ‘proper leadership’ involved putting emphasis on the 
‘selection of officials’ and ‘checking up on fulfilment’ (Stalin, 1995, p. 11), and 
hence personnel changes were to be expected. Due to the nomenklatura 
system, special patron-client relations developed (i.e. officials being 
dependent on the persons who had appointed them) at all levels of power 
(Tannberg, 2007, p. 257).127  
                                                 
126 The constitution emphasised that the local organs of the state authority were the Soviets of 
Working People’s Deputies, elected every two years (Articles 94 and 95). The executive and 
administrative organs of the Soviets of Working People’s Deputies are the Executive Committees, duly 
elected by deputies, consisting of a Chairman, Vice-Chairmen, a Secretary and members (Article 99). 
When it came to dual subordination, it was stated that: ‘The executive organs of the Soviets of Working 
People’s Deputies are directly accountable both to the Soviets of Working People’s Deputies which 
elected them and to the executive organ of the superior Soviet of Working People’s Deputies’ (Article 
101). 
127 According to Tannberg, the leaders of the Soviet Republics also had their so-called patrons in 
Moscow who put in a good word for them. One such case concerned the relationship between the 
Estonian party leader, Karotamm, and the Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, Andrei Zhdanov, 
from 1940 until 1948 when Zhdanov died (Tannberg, 2007, p. 257). 
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Local self-government was demolished forthwith within the first year of 
Soviet occupation. This was carried out mainly by eliminating the local leaders 
in 1940 and replacing the local governments with local bodies of central 
government. The first local elections during the Soviet era did not take place 
until 1948, but even then we cannot talk about elections and the representative 
body in the same way as during the independence years. Indeed, it is more 
appropriate to talk about nomination rather than election in this context. Even 
though local elections were held from 1948 onwards, they were not 
competitive and the soviets remained ‘local bodies of the state authorities’ 
under the constitution and legislation. Consequently, it is not possible to talk 
about local self-government as such during the Soviet era. Comparing the 
interwar local government and the Soviet local authorities might seem like 
comparing apples to oranges or a green apple with a red one: ‘when one seeks 
to distinguish the colour quality of redness between the two [apples, it] does 
not make particular sense; yet if one compares an apple with an orange when 
one seeks to compare their nutritional qualities, this should arguably make 
good sense’ (Platsas, 2008, p. 7; emphasis in original). 
First of all, the formal rules governing local administration were more 
detailed in the Constitutions of 1940 and 1978 than they were in the interwar 
constitutions. A case in point is the list of departments of the executive 
committee in the constitution. Although ‘[h]uman beings may come to prefer 
a given institutional arrangement because it is what they are used to’ (Steinmo, 
2008, p. 129), it was not possible at the local level in many places during the 
Soviet era to continue with the old practices under the new rules. For one, most 
of the people occupying top posts at the local level had been eliminated, and 
for another, the new personnel were often trained according to the new norms. 
This interrupted the path and former positive feedback mechanisms. Instead, 
the abroad-trained personnel without experience in the interwar local 
government helped to enforce the new path. 
In the 1920s and 1930s, one of the main issues concerned whose interests 
the county should represent (the state or local government or both), and 
whether this level was needed at all. As the institutions across the Soviet 
republics were more or less identical, there was little leeway for adapting the 
structures formally to meet local needs. One example was the abovementioned 
case of asking for permission to create specific departments within the 
executive committees in autumn 1945. Moreover, as local soviets were state 
authorities, the formal regulation was centralised. The local soviets were the 
channels and sources of information for the higher levels. They were also used 
to involve as many people as possible. If we consider the percentage of people 
who were voted into the local soviets for the first time from 1957 to 1980, on 
average it was usually between 42.7% and 63.1%.128 Knowing that these people 
were pre-selected, it once again demonstrates a tool for mass participation, 
and indicates that involvement was more important than representation.  
                                                 
128 Based on data in Truuväli, 1986b, p. 152.  
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In the 1920s and 1930s, public services were partly the responsibility of the 
local authorities, but during the Soviet era enterprises took care of social 
affairs in the rural areas. The somewhat bottom-up system of the interwar 
period was replaced with a top-down one, run by the Communist Party.  
Despite the fact that external factors caused a departure from the path-
dependent development of local government in Estonia, and institutions were 
at least formally replaced with a pre-determined model, there were practices 
that reflected the remnants of the interwar system – the chairman of the 
executive committee was sometimes referred to as mayor; in some raions the 
chairmen of the executive committees held monthly meetings or training days 
in the raion on the day they went there to pick up the payroll money for the 
village/town/city soviet officials (personal interview, 7 February 2011), and so 
forth. Darden and Grzymala-Busse (2006, p. 111) have analysed the 
communist exit from power in the former Soviet Union countries and argued 
that ‘precommunist nationalist schooling produced the shared memories and 
standards that made popular acceptance of communist rule unlikely’. By all 
accounts, at the onset of communist schooling, Estonia was a country with one 
of the highest literacy rates (99%) (Darden & Grzymala-Busse, 2006, p. 114). 
To conclude, in the 1940s the development of local government moved onto 
a new path, mainly pre-determined by foreign powers. There is enough 
evidence to claim that the old, interwar institutions were mainly ‘abolished’ or 
replaced. This substantiates the exploration of possible institutional revivals 
of the interwar period in the post-communist period.    
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6 DEMOCRATIC REVIVAL AT THE LOCAL 
LEVEL  
This chapter focuses on the main aspects related to the re-establishment of 
local self-government in Estonia. First, an overview will be provided of the 
principal legislation on local government during the period from 1989 to 1993, 
which also marked a critical juncture. After that, key aspects of the effective 
creation of local self-government will be analysed, as well as the electoral 
system and the mayor’s role in the post-communist period. 
6.1 GENERAL CONTEXT 
Crucial developments took place at the end of the 1980s, both at the Soviet 
Union level and at the level of its republics, which paved the way for the 
independence of the latter. ‘In many ways Estonia set the pace in political 
development among erstwhile USSR republics during the crucial years of 
1989–93. It was the first to adopt a new constitution (on 28 June 1992) and to 
hold post-independence parliamentary elections (on 22 September 1992)’ 
(Grofman, Mikkel, & Taagepera, 1999, p. 227). Estonia was also the first 
republic in the USSR to adopt a Declaration of Sovereignty on 16 November 
1988. This Declaration ‘created a possibility to start the administrative and 
local government reform’ (Reimets, 1998, p. 19) in Estonia, and stated the 
supremacy of the Estonian SSR law.129 
According to Maruste and Schneider (1997, p. 23), the declaration was 
formally legitimate, as ‘the Constitution recognised the sovereignty of the 
Union Republics’, but the problem was that ‘sovereignty’ had a different 
meaning in the Declaration than it did in the USSR in general. ‘In the 
totalitarian USSR the sovereignty of a Union Republic meant limited 
autonomy, mainly in deciding internal issues’ (Maruste & Schneider, 1997, p. 
23) or ‘freedom to act within the framework of the Soviet Union’ (Kalmo, 2011, 
p. 271). On the other hand, the Declaration set out the supremacy of Estonian 
law on the territory of Estonia over the law of the Soviet Union. The USSR 
leadership deemed the Declaration to contradict the Constitution of the USSR 
and hence to be null and void (Maruste & Schneider, 1997, p. 23), ‘but they 
also admitted that it was an expression of legitimate concerns’ (Kalmo, 2011, 
p. 282).  
                                                 
129 The Estonian Supreme Council anchored in the Declaration of Sovereignty two principles related 
to USSR legislation – in the future the amendments to the USSR Constitution would come into force on 
the territory of the Estonian SSR only after they had been approved by the Supreme Council of the 
Estonian SSR, and the respective amendments had been made in the Constitution of the Estonian SSR. 
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Käbin (1988, p. 51) stated at the beginning of 1988 that during the 
perestroika period one of the most important tasks of the constitutional law 
experts and politicians was to re-establish the correct and adequate content of 
the term ‘sovereignty of the union republic’. Walker (2003, p. 1) claims that 
‘“Sovereignty” killed the Soviet Union [...] as a territorial state’. He argues that 
the ‘anti-union opposition’ used the concept of sovereignty increasingly 
effectively compared to other concepts (e.g. democracy) in order to ‘challenge 
the authority of the USSR’s central government’ (2003, p. 1).  
On 16 November 1988, the Supreme Council of the Estonian SSR also 
discussed the proposed changes to the Soviet Constitution and deemed them 
to contradict the resolutions of the 19th conference of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union. Based on the stenograph of the session (SSCE, 1989, pp. 37–
39), it can be claimed that the Declaration of Sovereignty was a 
countermeasure to the proposed amendments to the Soviet Constitution. As 
one of the deputies said (SSCE, 1989, p. 37): ‘With the respective amendments 
and supplements to the Constitution of the Estonian SSR, we simultaneously 
disprove the claim that there would be no legal mechanism which could block 
the ideology that is presented in the amendments to the Soviet Constitution, 
and which limits the sovereignty of a Soviet republic’. The use of the term 
sovereignty and its interpretation can be regarded as an example of what 
Mahoney and Thelen (2010, p. 4) have argued, namely that ‘institutional 
change often occurs precisely when problems of rule interpretation and 
enforcement open up space for actors to implement existing rules in new 
ways’. 
Over time, Estonian measures to regain political and economic 
independence became more varied and specific. These measures included, for 
example, negotiations, proposals to restore the Republic of Estonia on the 
basis of the Tartu Peace Treaty, and focusing on a specific way to break away 
from the Soviet Union (Maruste & Schneider, 1997, p. 28). On 30 March 1990, 
the Supreme Council of the Estonian SSR adopted a decision130 in which it 
announced the re-establishment of the Republic of Estonia (restitutio ad 
integrum), and a transition period that would culminate in the establishment 
of the constitutional state authorities of the Republic of Estonia. The Act on 
the Fundamentals of the Temporary Arrangement of Governance of the 
Republic of Estonia was adopted on 16 May 1990. The name ‘Republic of 
Estonia’ was duly stipulated in the legislation131 on 8 May 1990. 
Moscow disapproved of these developments and threatened Estonia with 
an economic blockade to force the Baltic country to reconnect with the Soviet 
Union (Maruste & Schneider, 1997, p. 29). However, in January 1991, an 
agreement was signed between the Russian SFSR and the Republic of Estonia, 
recognising the sovereignty of both states. In the referendum in March 1991, 
                                                 
130 Decision on National Status of Estonia of 1990 (Eesti NSV Ülemnõukogu otsus Eesti riiklikust 
staatusest). 
131 Act on Estonian Symbols of 1990 (Seadus Eesti sümboolikast). 
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Estonian residents supported Estonian independency. On 20 August 1991, the 
day after a failed coup attempt, nationhood was re-established ‘both de jure 
and de facto’ (Maruste & Schneider, 1997, p. 30), and a decision was made to 
form a Constitutional Assembly to draft the new Constitution, not least 
because the Constitution of 1938 was outdated. 
Decentralisation in Estonia started with political decentralisation because 
local elections under new regulations took place at the end of 1989. 
6.2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND FOR ADMINISTRATIVE 
REFORM 
Although ‘transformation and systemic change is [...] only to a limited extent 
a matter of law making’ (Elster, Offe, & Preuss, 1998, p. 18), the legislation on 
local government defined the roles and powers of different actors at the local 
level. The main steps towards the restoration of local self-government took 
place in 1989 (Mäeltsemees, 2014): 
• 8 August 1989 – Local Soviets Election Act and Decision on 
Implementation of Administrative Reform. According to 
Mäeltsemees (2013), this decision was the first legal act of its kind 
in Central and Eastern Europe which stipulated the establishment 
of a (democratic) public administration that was different from the 
centralised system; 
• 10 November 1989 – Local Government Fundamentals Act (LGFA); 
• 6 December 1989 – Decree on the Creation of an Administrative 
System Based on Local Government; 
• 10 December 1989 – Elections of local councils (the first (almost) 
free election for half a century). 
The administrative reform, initiated at the end of the 1980s in Estonia, 
implied the ‘introduction of a self-regulatory management model, where a 
certain territorial group of people solves all the issues it is capable of solving, 
either independently or through the representatives it has elected’ (SSCE, 
1990, p. 24). The territorial administrative system of local government was 
determined in May 1989 in the Act on Principles of Economic Autonomy for 
Estonia, which included a provision on the decentralisation of local 
administration. It foresaw that the territorial administrative system of the 
Estonian SSR would consist of:  
a) County cities, towns and rural municipalities as the primary or lower-
level administrative units (to be formed on the basis of the raion-
subordinated cities, towns and village soviets); and  
b) Cities and counties of the republic as the secondary or higher-level 
administrative units (to be formed on the basis of cities subordinated 
to the republic, and on the basis of raions).  
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According to Almann (1995, p. 448), while the Continental European 
model was followed for the most part in the decentralisation of local 
government, the interwar system was observed when it came to the 
organisational development of local self-government. In the case of the legal 
acts of 1989, these were drafted primarily by intellectuals with the involvement 
of a broad range of actors. The principles or bills were sometimes published in 
the main newspapers and received feedback from various groups and 
individuals. On the other hand, the legislation of 1993 was driven more by 
political considerations. 
Local Soviets Election Act of 1989 
The new local government system that was to be established was one of the 
prerequisites for the transition to a ‘self-managing Estonia’, while the election 
of local representative bodies would launch the administrative reform, led by 
the newly elected representative bodies (SSCE, 1990, pp. 23–24).  
The opinions and feedback submitted on the Local Soviets Election Bill 
were legion, amounting to more than 1,500 pages. Feedback was also received 
from Professor Rein Taagepera (1988), who was working at that time at the 
University of California. In addition to the requirement of supporting 
signatures, he proposed introducing the bail requirement to pre-empt a person 
from running as a candidate too easily. Added to this, he recommended multi-
mandate electoral districts, clarifying how the mandates should be allocated 
or awarded, as it was apparent that those who had drafted the principles of the 
bill did not really know the specificities of the procedure and how to design it. 
In this way, Taagepera was able to pinpoint any bottlenecks that might occur. 
As all of this was taking place in 1989, efforts were made not to contradict 
the provisions of the USSR Constitution when drafting the election acts (Vare, 
1989, pp. 87–88). In addition, it was hoped that the use of multi-mandate 
districts would reduce possible tensions between different nationalities (Vare, 
1989, p. 91). Hence, the context was not without its constraints.  
The bill of the Local Soviets Election Act foresaw that the local soviets 
themselves would be able to decide whether to use a single-mandate or multi-
mandate electoral district (SSCE, 1990, p. 26). It also proposed a two-year 
residency requirement in the respective municipality as a prerequisite for 
being able to vote (SSCE, 1990, p. 27), but the ‘Soviet protests forced 
suspension of this restriction’ (Grofman, Mikkel, & Taagepera, 1999, p. 231). 
Initially, a single non-transferable vote system was offered, but after public 
consultations it was decided that the bill would be presented to the Supreme 
Council introducing a single transferable vote method, as the latter reduces 
the number of wasted votes. This was considered to be the most rational 
choice, based on the general practice in the rest of the world (SSCE, 1990, pp. 
32, 35). In addition, ‘it satisfied the Communists’ need to avoid party lists while 
still leading to a form of proportional representation’ (Grofman, Mikkel, & 
Taagepera, 1999, p. 236). Compared to the old system, several changes were 
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fundamental and therefore an amendment to the Constitution of the Estonian 
SSR was required.  
The most debated issue during the public consultations and also in the 
Supreme Council was the suffrage qualification or, more precisely, the 
residential qualification (paiksustsensus). The proposals varied from no 
residential qualification requirement to a requirement of Estonian residency 
for a period of 10 years in the case of voters, and 20 years for candidates (SSCE, 
1990, p. 86). As ESSR citizenship was not legally defined elsewhere in the 
legislation at the time, a decision was made to introduce the requirements for 
a citizen’s voting right into the local authorities’ election act (SSCE, 1991, p. 6). 
Although it was recognised (SSCE, 1991) that the retroactive effect of the 
residential qualification of two years was not in line with the principle of the 
rule of law, it was nonetheless retained. In October 1989, two months after the 
adoption of the Election Act, a decision was taken not to implement the legal 
provision on the residential qualification for the local elections in December 
1989 (SSCE, 1991, pp. 6, 92). This reveals the activation of a communist legacy, 
which Crawford and Lijphart (1995) have called the ‘legacy of incomplete 
nation building’, and which, according to them ‘means that the issue of who is 
included in the nation and who is not included’ had been placed on the political 
agenda (pp. 186–187; emphasis in the original). 
The finally adopted Election Act set out the following: 
• The mandate of local soviets would be five years; 
• Electoral districts would be single-mandate or multi-mandate; 
• There had to be more candidates than mandates in every electoral 
district; 
• The right to vote would be granted to Estonian citizens who had 
been living in the territory of the respective local soviet for at least 
two years prior, or in the ESSR for a total of five years; 
• The right to run as a candidate would be granted to Estonian citizens 
who had been living in the territory of the respective local soviet for 
at least the last five years, or in the ESSR for a total of 10 years; 
• Every voter had one vote. 
Decision on administrative reform in the Estonian SSR 
The decentralisation of territorial administration and the composition of the 
territorial administrative system had already been laid out in the Act on 
Principles of Economic Autonomy for Estonian SSR of 1989 (Section 11). This 
was repeated in the Decision on the Implementation of Administrative Reform 
of 8 August 1989. The second tier was going to be both the self-governing level 
and the national administration’s regional level. The republic cities were also 
going to fulfil the functions of the primary-level local government. 
In line with the Decision, it was foreseen that in order to transition from 
the old administrative system to a self-government-based administrative 
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system, an administrative reform would need to be carried out in Estonia from 
1990 to 1994. The reform was to comprise the following: 
1) Decentralisation of the power to local self-government levels and a 
clear separation of national and local self-governmental management; 
2) Reorganisation of the territorial-administrative structure. 
The responsibility for implementing the reform at the local level was given 
to the local councils (i.e. the representative bodies). The county councils and 
republic city councils were to become operational as of 1 January 1990. In the 
case of the primary level, the representative bodies started to function as 
councils only after the self-governing status of the municipality in question 
had been endorsed. It had to be ensured through the administrative reform 
that the ‘local government system would be capable of solving practical issues 
of ownership reform, land reform, agricultural reform and other reforms 
under discussion, and to implement those reforms’ (Almann, 1995, p. 449).  
In February 1991, the government adopted a regulation on the formation 
of the Administrative Reform Committee of the Government of the Republic 
of Estonia. The committee was composed of 21 members, including different 
ministers or their deputies, mayors of different types of administrative units, 
representatives of local government associations, and the chairman of the 
administrative reform expert committee. Based on the statute of the 
administrative reform committee,132 the main tasks of the committee were (a) 
to improve the management of the administrative reform at the state level, (b) 
to analyse and resolve issues related to the activities and structure of 
government bodies and to the re-establishment of the local government 
system, or to draft corresponding/relevant proposals, and (c) to co-ordinate 
the activity of the government, and local government bodies and their 
associations. 
Local Government Fundamentals Act of 1989 
Estonia was the first of the transition countries to adopt a local government 
act.133 The urgency for a legislative framework for local government was 
reinforced by the approaching local elections, which were to be held on 10 
December 1989 (Lääne, Mäeltsemees, & Ludvig, 2012, p. 10). On 29 May 1989, 
                                                 
132 Regulation on Approval of “Statute of the administrative reform committee” of 1991 (Eesti 
Vabariigi Valitsuse määrus “Eesti Vabariigi Valitsuse haldureformi komitee põhimääruse” 
kinnitamise kohta). 
133 ‘Estonia was followed by Lithuania in 1990 (Law on the Fundamentals of Local Government, 
12.02.1990), Latvia (Law on Local Governments, January 1990), Poland (Act 95 of 1990 on Local Self-
Government), Slovakia (Act No. 369/1990 Local Government Act), Czech Republic (Act of the Czech 
National Council No. 367 of 1990 on municipalities), Hungary (Act No L1990 on Local Self-
Government). [...] In 1991 the local government act was adopted in Bulgaria, the former Yugoslavia 
Republic of Macedonia, Romania and Belorussia, in Albania in 1992, in Slovenia in 1993, and a year later 
in Ukraine’ (Mäeltsemees, 2013). 
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the Council of Ministers of the ESSR decided to establish several working 
groups, including one on local government, which was given the task of 
drafting the local government act by 1 September 1989 (Eesti NSV Ministrite 
Nõukogu, 1989, May 29, pp. 1, 6). This working group published the main 
principles of the act in newspapers on 13 July, and the bill itself in October 
1989. They received feedback from ministries, many local soviets and experts, 
including, for example, the Finnish Commission for Local Authority 
Employers (Kunnallinen Työmarkkinalaitos). The latter emphasised the 
importance of the rural municipalities and their size, but also the local-central 
relations (see Juurinen, 1989). The Local Government Fundamentals Act 
(LGFA) was adopted on 10 November 1989, creating ‘the legal basis for 
restoration of the local government system’ (Olle, 1996). The LGFA was the 
first main legal act of the legislative package of the Self-Managing Estonia (or 
an Economically Autonomous Estonia, IME134) (SSCE, 1991, p. 28). The aim 
was to implement the gradual and contractual transfer of tasks and 
responsibilities from the raion/county level to the cities and rural 
municipalities, whereas a highly disputed issue was how to define the 
competences of different authorities (SSCE, 1991, p. 30). The LGFA only set 
the general framework for local government and included numerous 
references to the city, rural municipality, and county acts, which were to be 
adopted in the future and would determine the tasks of the local authorities in 
more detail. The bills were drafted at the Ministry of Justice, but no legislative 
proceeding followed. The idea of separate, special laws was dropped after an 
analysis of the interwar Estonian system and the Nordic countries’ experience 
(Lääne, Mäeltsemees, Vare & Kattai, 2017). While the Estonian interwar 
experience provided the inspiration for establishing separate acts, the Nordic 
experience – especially that of Finland – suggested a common act. 
The LGFA foresaw a two-tier local government system and four local 
government bodies: a council (or city/rural municipality soviet), a mayor (or 
chairman executive committee), a city/rural municipality government (or 
executive committee), and an audit committee. The operational arrangements 
for the local government bodies were left to the local councils and would be 
determined in the statute. Hence the practices in different municipalities 
varied.  
The LGFA, in contrast to the subsequently adopted Local Government 
Organisation Act of 1993, stipulated that ensuring the general employment of 
local residents was also under the competence of the local government bodies 
(Section 7(2)(5) of LGFA). A similar duty fell to the local soviets under the 
previous legislation135 and can be seen as a remnant or legacy of the previous 
system. 
                                                 
134 The Estonian acronym for this was IME (Isemajandav Eesti), which means ‘miracle’ in Estonian. 
135 See Section 26 of the Act on the City and City Raion Soviet of the Estonian SSR as of 1987 (Eesti 
Nõukogude Sotsialistliku Vabariigi seadus Eesti NSV linna ja linnarajooni rahvasaadikute nõukogu 
kohta).  
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Mäeltsemees (2013) has pointed out that the following aspects only 
appeared in the LGFA of 1989 and not in the Local Government Organisation 
Act of 1993: 
• Two-tier local government; 
• Residents would also exercise local government directly through 
referenda; 
• Adoption of rural municipality, city and county acts; 
• Four local government bodies – council, government, mayor, audit 
committee; 
• In the primary-level local government units, the chairman of the 
council was also the mayor; 
• The secondary-level local government council had the right to 
suspend the decisions of the primary-level local authorities if these 
decisions were not in line with the law; 
• The council would be considered unable to act and would be re-
elected if it failed to achieve a quorum at least three times within a 
two-month period. 
The two-tier local government and the fact that the chairman of the local 
council was also the mayor can be linked to the context at that time and are 
elaborated in Sections 6.3.1 and 6.4.2 of the current dissertation. A local 
referendum was also provided for in the Local Government Organisation Act 
of 1993, although the latter did not refer to direct democracy explicitly. The 
provision on direct democracy via referenda was not described in detail in the 
LGFA nor in other legal acts and, according to Olle (2002, p. 162), there is no 
information to the effect that any local referendum took place between 1989 
and 1993. 
Local government associations were probably the first institutions in the 
Republic of Estonia to be restored based on legal continuity (Mäeltsemees, 
2013). The possibility for the restoration of the associations was stipulated in 
the LGFA of 1989. The Association of Estonian Cities was restored in May 1990 
and the Association of Municipalities of Estonia in September 1990.136 These 
institutions would be an interesting topic for further research from a path 
dependence and legacy explanations perspective, especially as they were 
restored legally based on interwar associations. 
Local government in the Constitution 
Similarly to the interwar constitutions, the Constitution of 1992 contained a 
section on local government. The chairman of the administrative reform 
expert committee noted that the local government part of the Constitution of 
1938 was also apt and appropriate for the 1990s (Eesti Vabariigi 
                                                 
136 Regulation on the Restoration of the Association of Estonian Cities and the Association of 
Municipalities of Estonia of 1990 (Eesti NSV Valitsuse määrus Eesti Linnade Liidu ja Eesti 
Maaomavalitsuste Liidu tegevuse taastamise kohta). 
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Põhiseadusliku Assamblee VII toimkond, 1991, October 5, p. 11) and some 
members of the working group proposed reinstating this part of the 
Constitution of 1938 (Eesti Vabariigi Põhiseadusliku Assamblee VII toimkond, 
1991, October 11). Representatives of the European Council and German 
Constitutional Court also supported the approach that the local government 
section in the Constitution should be short and straightforward (Eesti 
Vabariigi Põhiseadusliku Assamblee III, IV ja VII toimkond, 1991, October 
28). 
The most debated issue in the Constitutional Assembly concerning local 
government was the number of tiers. Based on the stenograph of the 
Constitutional Assembly (CCA, 1997), the proposal on which the Assembly 
based its discussions foresaw a two-tier local government. Clear grounds for 
this were not given. However, one of the authors recognised (see CCA, 1997, p. 
139) that society was divided over the issue, with some preferring a one-tier 
local government system and others leaning towards a two-tier approach. By 
way of a compromise, the powers of the second tier had been reduced in the 
proposal. 
Initially, support for a two-tier local government prevailed in the 
Assembly’s working groups, with the formation of the second level based on 
delegation (i.e. not directly elected) (CCA, 1997, pp. 145–146). Supporters of 
the one-tier approach mainly took the Finnish system as an example, as this 
was the one they were most familiar with (CCA, 1997, pp. 212–213). Due to the 
importance of the vertical power structure and the wish to maintain flexibility, 
some members proposed that the question of tiers should not be settled in the 
Constitution, but in special acts (e.g. CCA, 1997, pp. 213–214, 339–340, 345). 
Mayors of the rural municipalities preferred a one-tier system, while county 
government or raion executive committee members supported the two-tier 
system (CCA, 1997, p. 342). 
Some members of the Assembly proposed that certain issues (e.g. 
healthcare) could be dealt with by rural municipality associations, which 
would eliminate the need for the county administration (CCA, 1997, pp. 215–
216). Many arguments in favour of the one-tier system were related to a wish 
to re-establish strong rural municipalities, which was often related to 
nationhood and symbolised the ‘true units of self-government’ (CCA, 1997, p. 
348). However, it was also seen that the ‘introduction of second tier means 
continuation of the raion power in the self-governing system. This is a pure 
Soviet element’, which implied maintaining the artificial structure created 
during the Soviet period (CCA, 1997, pp. 215, 341). The interest lay in de-
institutionalising137 the raion administration. In the end, the Assembly 
decided not to prescribe the number of local government tiers in the 
Constitution. 
                                                 
137 De-institutionalisation ‘implies that existing institutional borders, identities, rules, and practices; 
descriptions, explanations, and justifications, and resources and powers are becoming more contested 
and possibly discontinued’ (Olsen, 2009, p. 10). 
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By the beginning of 1992, there was still no consensus on what the local 
government subjects should be. There were three main options (CCA, 1997, p. 
766): (1) not to set out the self-government subjects in the Constitution; (2) to 
set out only those on which there was a consensus; or (3) to use the text from 
the Constitution of 1938. The second option was put to the vote, with the 
possibility of other units being established in a special law if required, in order 
to allow the local government system to develop naturally. The Constitution 
was duly adopted on 28 June 1992. 
To this end, determining the tiers in the Constitution was influenced by at 
least two historical lessons or experiences – the positive memory of the strong 
rural municipality during the interwar period, and the negative experience of 
the raion as a second tier and an artificial creation. 
An interesting parallel between the Constitution of 1934 and that of 1992 is 
that in both cases it is possible to interpret the provision on local government 
units in two ways. According to one interpretation, the Constitution set out a 
one-tier local government. This formed the basis for abolishing the county 
level as a local self-governing tier and replacing the two-tier system with a 
single-tier alternative in 1934. Based on the other interpretation, legislators 
could still establish a two-tier local government by means of special acts. 
Claims have again been made that the Constitution of 1992 essentially 
established a one-tier local government system (e.g. Kenapea, 1996), despite 
the fact that the Constitution still provided the leeway for establishing a two-
tier local government by enacting special laws (see Madise, et al., 2012, p. 867), 
as did the Constitution of 1934. 
Local governments are rural municipalities and cities. Other local 
governments may be formed on the basis of and pursuant to a 
procedure provided by the law. (Constitution of 1992, Section 155) 
The State exercises governance at the local level through city, town and 
rural municipality self-governments, if no special authorities have 
been established in the legislation. (Constitution of 1934, Section 34) 
Another aspect worthy of note concerns the duration of the mandate of 
local councils. Although a mandate of four years was proposed, several people 
who were active at the local government level supported a shorter mandate at 
the Assembly meeting. Being elected was seen as a bonus or a reward for those 
working in the council as non-professionals in addition to their daily job, and 
more frequent elections were seen as a way to ensure that members of the 
council were active enough (CCA, 1997, pp. 676–677). The Constitution of 
1992 shortened the mandate of local councils from five to three years. 
However, the very first amendment to the Constitution was made in 2003, and 
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with it the duration of the council mandate was set at four years.138 The 
initiators justified the change by arguing that (a) parliament was elected for 
four years and hence the council’s mandate should be the same, and (b) society 
had become more stable and decisions more long-term-oriented, and hence 
the local government bodies should become more permanent. 
Local Government Organisation Act of 1993 
The Local Government Organisation Act of 1993 (hereinafter LGOA) was 
adopted based on the Constitution of 1992 and anchored the principle of a one-
tier local government in Estonian legislation. But prior to that, the one-tier 
system was formulated in the decision of 12 May 1993.139 The LGOA, adopted 
in June 1993, repealed the LGFA of 1989 and the Decree on Senior Officials. 
While according to the LGFA there were four local government bodies, the 
LGOA set out only two – the council and the government. In practice not much 
changed, however, because the audit committee was a mandatory committee 
of the council, and the mayor was part of the city or rural municipality 
government. 
The draft LGOA was developed based on the Rural Municipality Act of 1937 
and the City Act of 1938, the principles of the European Charter of Local Self-
Government, and the respective legal acts of other countries, particularly those 
of Finland and Sweden (see Kohaliku omavalitsuse korralduse seaduse 
töörühm, 1993, March 29). The working group that drafted the act did not 
follow the legislation of the late 1930s strictly, because the legislation on local 
government at that time was too state-focused and highly detailed (Kohaliku 
omavalitsuse korralduse seaduse töörühm, 1993, March 29). The 
overregulation might have jeopardised the development of the local 
government (Kohaliku omavalitsuse korralduse seaduse töörühm, 1993, 
March 1). In addition, in the later stage of drafting, and based on the feedback 
from the expert committee, a decision was made not to present the 
competencies of the local municipalities in a highly detailed manner, but 
rather to follow the principle that “everything which is not forbidden is 
allowed” (Kohaliku omavalitsuse korralduse seaduse töörühm, 1993, March 
29). 
                                                 
138 As of January 2018, the Constitution of 1992 has been amended five times. Of these amendments, 
two concerned local government: in 2003 when the term of the local councils was changed, and in 2016 
when the voting age for local elections was lowered from 18 to 16 years. 
139 Parliament Decision of 1993: ‘Drafting of legal acts regarding local government’ (Riigikogu otsus 
‘Kohalikku omavalitsust käsitlevate seaduste väljatöötamine’). The decision contained three main 
points: (1) when formulating local government legislation, parliament considers that local government 
units comprise only cities and rural municipalities; (2) at the county level, a county assembly will be 
established as a delegated representative body; and (3) national administration at the county level will 
be exercised through county governments.  
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The two main principles that the bill was based on were (Kohaliku 
omavalitsuse korralduse seaduse töörühm, 1993, March 1): 
• A single-tier city and rural municipality government; 
• A county is an institution of state administration in the area, with a 
county governor as a state representative. 
One reason for this arrangement was the need to implement the land and 
ownership reform. As already mentioned, the LGOA of 1993 separated the post 
of mayor and the chair of the council both in cities and in rural municipalities. 
The LGOA is still in force and has been amended at least 84 times. 
6.3 DECENTRALISATION 
Local authorities had no real autonomy during the Soviet period and therefore 
decentralisation was inevitable in order to recreate local government as such. 
The county level (i.e. the former raion level) played an important role during 
the early years of decentralisation, partly because the raion soviet had a 
considerable role in the administrative system. 
6.3.1 THE ISSUE OF THE COUNTY LEVEL 
From the 1990s until today, the county level has constantly been searching for 
its role or place in the general administrative system. It is necessary to 
differentiate between the county government (maavalitsus) and the local self-
governance element at the county level. Self-government at the county or 
regional level has been in the form of second-tier local self-government (1989–
1993), mandatory delegated self-government (maakogu; 1993–1994), and 
voluntary delegated self-government in the form of the county’s local 
government unit associations (since the end of 1994) (Mäeltsemees, 2009). 
When it comes to the county government, the changes can be summarised 
as shown in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1  County governance patterns and the main legal act 
Years Pattern of county governance 
(Sootla & Laanes, 2015) 
Legal act governing county 
government 
1989–1993 Dual pattern with strong elements of 
a fused system 
LGFA of 1989 
1993–1999 Strong prefect in charge of 
generalist office 
1993–1996 – County Administration 
Act; 
1996–2017 – Government of the 
Republic Act 
2000–2017 Deconcentrated unit of a Ministry 
 
Since 1989, the formal pattern of county governance has been a dual one, 
with strong elements of a fused system (Sootla & Laanes, 2015). This fused 
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pattern, where county government had both state and local functions, was an 
iterim model. During the period from 1989 to 1994, the county government 
was regarded as a substitute of sorts for central government and municipalities 
in compensating for their temporary deficiencies (Sootla & Laanes, 2015, p. 
206). The development of the county government was also influenced by the 
fact that, during the Soviet time, a lot of power was concentrated in the 
raion/county, which duly had to be redistributed. 
In the initial principles of the LGFA of 1989 (Kohaliku omavalitsuse 
seadusandluse töögrupp, 1989), it was foreseen that a council of leaders of the 
primary level units could also be established as an advisory body in parallel 
with the elected county council. The chairman of the county council was going 
to be the county governor, elected by the county council and endorsed by 
parliament, accountable both to the council (for the execution of the council’s 
decisions) and to parliament (for the execution of state policy in the county). 
In the final Act, the posts of county governor and chairman of the council were 
still separate, and the residents of the county elected the county council.  
During the process of drafting the Constitution of 1992, the question of who 
should elect or appoint the county governor also came under discussion. As 
one member of the Constitutional Assembly pointed out (CCA, 1997, p. 787), 
there was a fear that if the county governor was appointed by the President at 
the Government of the Republic’s proposal, the possibility to create second-
level self-government might be eliminated. The option that the Government of 
the Republic itself would appoint the county governor was also seen as too 
dangerous by experts, and hence it was an argument for stipulating in the 
Constitution that the president would appoint the county governor. One way 
to overcome the strict determination of tiers was to add that the president 
would also hear the opinion of the respective county’s local governments and 
gain their approval. The county governors at the time were strongly against the 
idea that the county level would represent only state interests (CCA, 1997, p. 
788). In the end, only cities, towns, and rural municipalities were listed as local 
government units in the Constitution, leaving the county without 
constitutional protection. 
A two-tier local government system in Estonia has always (both during the 
interwar period and in the 1990s) resulted in antagonism (Moll, 1998, p. 23) 
between the central and local authorities at the county level. The question of 
tiers was something that several members of the Constitutional Assembly 
wanted to leave to parliament to decide as they themselves deemed that they 
did not have sufficient competence in 1991/92. Even in May 1993, parliament 
was discussing the relative merits of the one-tier and two-tier systems. In 
addition, some members of parliament (see E. Spriit in Riigikogu Verbatim 
Record, 1993, May 12) still raised the question of whether it would be possible 
to postpone decision-making with regard to the county level. Some arguments 
were similar to the discussions during the interwar period [‘there is a need for 
a tier between rural municipality and state’ (Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 1993, 
May 12)], and it was even recommended that the legislation of 1937/38 should 
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be used as a model.140 On the other hand, it was complicated to distribute 
functions between the county and primary levels, especially if the county 
council were to be directly elected, to meet the actual local self-government 
definition. A solution came in the form of the county assembly (maakogu), 
which existed for a short period of time between 1993 and 1994.  
The introduction of a single-tier local government in 1993 can be seen as ‘a 
victory of the new political elites’ (Sootla & Laanes, 2015, p. 208). According 
to Kettunen and Kungla (2005, p. 362), at least three factors account for the 
abolishment of the two-tier system: (1) ‘the strengthened local leaders 
perceived regional government as competing units, the powers of which 
should be kept at a minimum’, (2) ‘there was a general perception among the 
politicians that Estonia is too small a country for an entrenched regional level 
government’, and (3) the increased proportion of Russian minorities in the 
population compared to the pre-Soviet Union period, which represented 
‘considerable potential for the emergence of regionalist demands’. Sootla et al. 
(forthcoming) have pointed out that although the preparation of the LGOA of 
1993 involved ‘open but time-consuming’ discussion over the need for a 
second tier self-government, the process ‘was interrupted by the leading 
coalition – Pro Patria – in the Estonian Parliament’ by using the majoritarian 
method and by abolishing the second tier of local self-government with the 
decision of 12 May 1993; this action ‘was largely inspired by short-term 
interests’ to win local elections. The coalition had maintained stronger 
positions at the primary level, while the opposition had maintained stronger 
positions at the county level. 
The County Administration Act of 1993 was a relevant piece of legislation 
both for local government reform and for state administration reform in 
general. The bill of the County Administration Act was submitted to 
parliament a few hours before the LGOA of 1993 was adopted (Riigikogu 
Verbatim Record, 1993, June 9), and hence the County Administration Act had 
to be adapted to the LGOA, in that the latter reduced the available alternatives 
for the design of county administration. What this demonstrates is that timing 
and the order of events matter when it comes to the development of 
institutions. County governments were to be analogous to the ministries and 
were to determine their own structure (Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 1993, June 
9). As the county governor was to be a state official, he was appointed by the 
Government of the Republic, but in order to ensure that the nominee was also 
acceptable to the local municipalities, the candidate had to be approved by the 
county assembly (maakogu). The purely political appointment or removal 
from office of county governors was to be avoided with the mandatory 
approval by the assembly (see Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 1993, June 9). The 
                                                 
140 For the county level, an option was also considered that was somewhat similar to the system 
under the County Act of 1938, whereby there would be a body composed of a representative from the 




main task of the county government was to implement national policies, while 
also taking regional specificities into consideration. 
The gradual decline of the county level started after the reform of 1993 and 
resulted in the reorganisation of a rather autonomous county administration 
(in the mid-1990s) into a deconcentrated unit of the Ministry of the Interior in 
2004 (Sootla, Selg, Lääne, & Kattai, forthcoming), where the ‘county 
administration was subordinated administratively to the unit of local 
government at the Ministry of the Interior’ (Sootla & Kattai, 2010, p. 584). The 
cancellation of county governors’ attendance at the Cabinet sessions in 1999 
‘could be considered a symbolic turning point in the transformation of county 
governor as the balancing and mediating actor between local and central 
government into the mere administrative official of a ministerial unit’ (Sootla 
& Laanes, 2015, p. 209).  
In 2001 a strategy was presented for the administrative reform of local 
government. It proposed that the county governor would retain a supervisory 
role and administrative tasks in the county would be transferred to the local 
government associations. According to Sootla and Lääne (2012, p. 304), this 
would have resulted in an even stronger local government system in the second 
tier. Instead, the tasks were transferred to the state authorities. 
By 2003, ‘the county governments had lost the majority of their 
administrative tasks and many county governors entered politics’ (Sootla & 
Laanes, 2015, p. 210). In 2003, the Minister of Regional Affairs, Jaan 
Õunapuu,141 presented a regional administration reform concept whereby the 
county assembly (maakogu) had a central position. The assembly would have 
been a representative body, with a chairman elected from and by the assembly. 
The members of the assembly would have been elected from among the 
members of the local councils (i.e. members of the city and rural municipality 
councils), and the number of representatives per local council would have been 
based on the number of residents in the respective municipality. This 
document tried to bring into use a ‘county governor’s office’ where the county 
governor, elected by the county assembly, would have been an executive body 
(together with its office) of the county assembly. The change would have 
implied the drafting and adoption of a County Act. National tasks would have 
been executed by the state’s service centres. The reform remained on paper, 
however, and was not implemented due to disagreements among the coalition 
partners. 
In spring 2004, a different change was implemented in that the 
Government of the Republic Act was amended and the county governors’ 
position weakened further. It became possible to dismiss a county governor in 
the event of problems concerning cooperation between the governor and 
central government. Kungla (2010, p. 178) claims that ‘county governors have 
been viewed as small or minor “rulers” who obstruct the efforts of ministers to 
ensure the smooth implementation of policies within their own territories’. 
                                                 
141 Before becoming the Minister of Regional Affairs, Õunapuu was a county governor for a decade. 
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Since autumn 2015, the county governments have been under the Ministry 
of Finance, instead of the Ministry of the Interior. In January 2017, the 
government decided to abolish the county governments as of 1 January 2018. 
This decision is related to the implementation of administrative-territorial 
reform, which resulted in a significant decrease in the number of local 
municipalities. 
6.3.2 THE PROCESS OF GRANTING SELF-GOVERNING STATUS TO 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS 
Estonia chose to establish the local government units gradually, based on the 
local authorities’ ability to develop and present socio-economic development 
plans and statutes. While the councils of counties and independent cities 
started their operations on 1 January 1990, the municipalities at the primary 
level (cities, towns, and rural municipalities) continued as local soviets until 
they had presented the required documents – a statute and a development 
plan. One aim of the development plan was to map the ‘population, social and 
technical infrastructure, finances, natural resources, and so forth’ 
(Mäeltsemees, 2000, p. 241). As the municipalities did not have their own 
financial resources at that time, the development plan was more akin to a 
vision (personal interview, 21 September 2010). Municipalities sometimes 
used each other’s development plan as an example. One interviewee claimed 
(personal interview, 21 September 2010) that he had witnessed several cases 
where the plan he had drafted was used, and sometimes the name of the 
municipality had not even been changed. One reason for this might have been 
that computer literacy was limited and computers had technical problems (e.g. 
work was not saved properly or was lost). Drafting the development plan might 
have also increased local activism (personal interview, 7 February 2011). As 
local soviets could consult specialists in the raion soviet/county government 
when they required certain data or advice regarding the development plan, the 
plans presented by the local soviets to the county government were usually 
approved by the latter (personal interview, 7 February 2011). 
The first primary-level local government units where self-governing status 
was re-established with the decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Council 
of 25 September 1990 were the city of Kuressaare and the rural municipality 
of Muhu (as of 1 October 1990), with the last ones becoming local self-
governments in 1993, after the local elections in October that year. The process 
took several years (see Table 6.2).  
Table 6.2 Number of local government units to which self-governing  
status was granted 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 




During the period from 1990 to 1993, there were municipalities with two 
different legal statuses at the primary level of local government, with some 
having self-governing status and others not. This created problems in 
organising the work at the local level because, according to the Decree of the 
Presidium of the Estonian SSR Supreme Council of 6 December 1989 on the 
Creation of an Administrative System Based on Local Government, the 
respective secondary-level local government bodies fulfilled the functions and 
managed the resources of the primary-level rural municipality, town or city 
until the self-governing status of the latter was established (Almann, 1995, p. 
449). In addition to the fact that the mayors or chairmen of different local 
soviets and local governments had different powers, they also had to operate 
in different legal environments. 
The transfer of functions from county level to cities and rural municipalities 
did not always go smoothly. In the feedback to the Constitutional Assembly in 
November 1991 the Association Establishing Rural Municipalities in the 
County of Võru pointed out that the ‘county’s support for the primary-level 
self-governments in the takeover of the functions is scarce and the county is 
looking for reasons not to transfer those functions’ (Võrumaa Valdu Asutav 
Liit, 1991, November 4, p. 126) to the primary level.  
The process of granting self-governing status was clearly separated from 
the possible merging and splitting of the municipalities. At the end of 1992 it 
was assumed that the questions regarding the amalgamations and splitting of 
the municipalities would be regulated in the LGOA of 1993 (Riigikogu 
Verbatim Record, 1992, December 9). 
The borders of the rural municipalities were not altered at the beginning of 
the 1990s. A wish was expressed to change the borders based on: (1) the end 
of the 1930s, (2) some other year of independence, or (3) the period of large, 
successful holdings (Mäeltsemees, 2009). The territorial division changes that 
took place between 1989 and 1993 were mainly directed towards the creation 
of new administrative units and restoring the historical names of counties and 
rural municipalities (Uuet, 2002, p. 235). For example, Kernu village soviet 
was merged with Nissi village soviet in 1960, and Kaiu village soviet was 
merged with Juuru village soviet in 1972 (Uuet, 2002, pp. 180, 199). In both 
cases, locals wanted to restore the initial units at the beginning of the 1990s 
(Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 1992, December 9), indicating that after 20–30 
years the separate local identities had prevailed. Kernu rural municipality was 
duly separated from Nissi, and Kaiu from Juuru in 1993. This was a 
parliamentary decision in light of the fact that there was still no legislation 
regulating the establishment of administrative units in 1993. The explanatory 
memorandum on the draft decision stated that there were about ten 
administrative units at the time ‘where the economic and social composition 
of the territories merged into village soviets is not monolithic and justified’ 
(Riigikantselei, 1992). The government emphasised the municipalities’ right 
to self-determination, and a head of department at the Government Office 
stated in parliament that local self-government is ‘like a plant for which the 
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conditions for growth have to be created, and which should not be bent in one 
direction or another’ (Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 1993, August 9). Drechsler 
claimed in 2013 that one of the great successes of Estonian policy during the 
last two decades had actually been that mandatory amalgamations of small 
rural municipalities for the purpose of non-existent efficiency had been 
avoided (2013, p. 162). 
6.3.3 ADMINISTRATIVE TERRITORIAL UNITS – PARTIAL SURVIVORS 
OF THE SOVIET ERA 
When it comes to the types of administrative units, there is a clear link with 
the interwar period, because village soviets and raions were replaced with 
rural municipalities and counties. In the 1990s, all of the county names142 of 
the interwar administrative system were re-established where possible (Sepp 
& Veemaa, 2010) and some had also kept their initial name throughout the 
Soviet era as well (see Appendix A). The county borders were influenced by 
Soviet rule (see Figure 6.1), not so much due to the fact that there were 39 
raions, but to the fact that at the end of the Soviet period there were 15 raions 
instead of 11 counties. This leads to the assumption that as the regional or 
county-level administrative-territorial division has been broadly the same 
between the 1990s and 2017 as it was during the interwar period, it should 
enforce path dependence.  
 
 
                       –  county borders in 1938;              –  raion borders in 1989 
Figure 6.1  Borders of counties (1938) and raions (1989) 
Source: National Archives of Estonia, with author’s modifications. 
                                                 
142 These county names were already in use before the interwar independence years. 
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The number of rural municipalities decreased during the interwar period 
from almost 380 to 248, mainly as a result of the extensive territorial reform. 
In the Soviet period, the rural municipalities were replaced in 1950 with 641 
village soviets and, over time, the village soviets were reduced to 189 by 1986 
(see Table 6.3). The creation of village soviets was a natural part of the Soviet 
system and it ‘broke traditional administrative links’ (Paavle, 2009a, p. 143). 
At the beginning of the 1990s, rural municipalities were re-established largely 
based on the village soviets. Some of the municipalities reinstated their 
historical names and some, which had been amalgamated during the 1960s 
and 1970s, were split at the request of the local people in 1993 in order to 
restore the pre-Soviet units.  
Table 6.3 Administrative units in selected years during 1922–2018 
  1922 1939 1950 1965 1986 1992 2000 2018 
Cities 13 33 32 32 33 35 42 15 
Towns 19 - 22 22 24 27 - - 
Rural municipalities 378 248 - - - 79 205 64 
Village soviets - - 641 238 189 114 - - 
Counties 11 11 - - - 15 15 - 
Raions - - 39 15 15 - - - 
 
In the case of cities, the changes were more limited, and the cities have 
remained largely as they were also during the Soviet period. At the same time, 
at the end of the 1930s and during the Soviet period, the cities were divided 
into different categories with different subordination. The question of whether 
the capital city should have a different status than other cities is raised every 
now and then,143 sometimes with reference to the City Act of 1938. A possible 
explanation for why the capital city has not acquired a different status 
compared to other cities might be that whenever the issue has been raised, the 
mayor of Tallinn and the Prime Minister have been from different political 
parties. Conferring a special status on a city where almost one-third of the 
country’s population resides, requires a politically weighted decision, and 
hence the political context has not been conducive to singling out the capital 
city for special treatment. 
The possibility to harmonise the powers of cities and rural municipalities 
was created with the Constitution of 1934 and the abolishment of county self-
government, but the rural municipalities were not granted the same status as 
                                                 
143 In 1994 and 1998, Tallinn City Council submitted a proposal to the Government of the Republic 
to adopt a law on the capital city or on the status of Tallinn (Lõhmus & Tõnisson, 2006, p. 54). In 2002, 
the draft legislation (Bill No. 1190) was handled in parliament, according to which supervision over 
Tallinn would have passed from the county governor to the branch ministries, and Tallinn City Council 
would have been able to delegate some decision-making powers to executive bodies, but parliament did 
not support the amendment.  
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the cities. Today, both are regulated by the same legislation and function under 
the same rules, namely differentiation between cities of different sizes, as well 
as differentiation between cities and rural municipalities has been abolished. 
Territorial reform and the amalgamation of municipal units due to their 
small size have been on the agenda since the mid-1990s. The amalgamation or 
change has been resisted both by some political parties and by local 
municipalities. The Reform Party was a veto player for years, but in the end 
tabled the reform plan in 2016, which initiated the biggest administrative-
territorial change within the last quarter of a century.144 In the case of 
amalgamation, the opportunity for a critical juncture was missed at the 
beginning of the 1990s because several municipalities wanted to amalgamate, 
either to restore their interwar identity or for economic reasons, but no 
legislative framework existed to implement the amalgamations. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, democracy was the principal aim and therefore 
amalgamations were not on the agenda. This missed opportunity, in terms of 
voluntary amalgamations, can be seen as a variable supporting path 
dependence and ‘stickiness’ in the local government system. 
6.3.4 ATTEMPTS AT TERRITORIAL REFORM 
Since 1997, every Minister of Regional Affairs has tabled his own plan for 
restructuring local and regional governance145 (Mäeltsemees, Lõhmus, & 
Ratas, 2013, p. 74). The main argument for territorial reform has been that 
some municipalities are so small that they do not have the administrative 
capacity to provide all of the necessary services to the required standard. 
Attempts at administrative-territorial reform have been influenced, at least to 
some extent, by the Soviet and interwar legacies, both of which have hindered 
reform. Experiences relating to the top-down reforms and experiments of the 
Soviet period, on the one hand, and local identity on the other, which in some 
cases dates back to the interwar period, have also had an effect. Some cities, 
which were also cities during the interwar period, started to reuse their 
                                                 
144 After the municipal elections of October 2017 there are 79 municipalities (cities and rural 
municipalities). 
145 In 1998 – Avaliku halduse arendamise alused/The fundamentals of public administration 
development; 2001 – Haldusreform kohaliku omavalitsuse valdkonnas/Administrative reform in local 
municipalities; 2003 – Regionaalhalduse reformi kontseptsioon/Concept Paper on the Reform of 
Regional Administration; 2007– Regionaaltasandi halduskorralduse korrastamise lähtealused/Guiding 
principles for organising the administrative arrangement at the regional level; 2009 – 
Haldusterritoriaalse korralduse reformi seaduse eelnõu/ The Draft Act on the Reform of Administrative-
Territorial Organisation (Mäeltsemees, Lõhmus, & Ratas, 2013, p. 74); 2013 – Omavalitsuskorralduse 
reformi seaduse eelnõu/The Draft Act on the Reform of Self-government. 
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insignia from the 1930s,146 emphasising the continuity from the pre-Soviet 
time.  
The Territory of Estonia Administrative Division Act was finally adopted in 
1995 and governed, among other things, the alteration of the administrative-
territorial organisation. From 2002, the government started to encourage 
voluntary amalgamations of municipalities, instead of ‘centrally initiated 
involuntary amalgamations’ (Kettunen & Kungla, 2005, p. 363). For that 
purpose, the Promotion of Local Government Merger Act was adopted in 
2004. The principles of the provision of financial support for the 
amalgamation had already been approved at the Cabinet meeting in March 
1999 (see Vabariigi Valitsus, 1999, March 17). Between the years 1996 and 
2015, 30 voluntary amalgamations duly took place (Rahandusministeerium, 
2016b).  
A reference to the administrative-territorial reform can be found in the 
government’s coalition agreement of 1999, for example, which aimed to bring 
decision-making closer to the people by increasing the role of local 
government and strengthening the municipalities. One of the measures for 
achieving this was to implement an administrative-territorial reform, based 
on systematic analysis and considering the individuality of each municipality. 
In 2001, draft legislation was also prepared, but the idea did not receive 
sufficient political support. Moreover, in 2009 and 2013, different Ministers 
of Regional Affairs tabled a reform plan accompanied by draft legislation, but 
again there was insufficient support from other coalition partners, especially 
from the Reform Party. 
In 2009, the Auditor General (Oviir, 2009) sent a letter concerning the 
administrative reform, or rather the lack thereof, to the Members of 
Parliament and of the Government, as well as to the leaders of the 
constitutional institutions. In the letter, he criticised the voluntary 
amalgamations because, in some cases, the practice had resulted in strange 
new units that did not follow the logic of the population centres, and he also 
found that the state-led reforms had been stymied due to parties’ political 
interests.147 Mäeltsemees (2016, p. 83) points out that ‘the administrative-
territorial reform has so far failed largely due to the fact that the reform has 
been a purpose in itself’, particularly as little has been done to define the 
responsibilities of the units and the financing principles related to them. 
The Cabinet that assumed office in spring 2014, still led by the Reform 
Party, decided to abolish the post of Minister of Regional Affairs and to merge 
it with the post of Minister of Internal Affairs instead. The idea of abolishing 
                                                 
146 For example, in 1992, the cities of Jõhvi, Keila, and Narva adopted the coat of arms that was 
approved in 1937/38; in 1994, the city of Rakvere adopted the coat of arms approved in 1937; in 1995, 
the city of Jõgeva started to officially reuse the coat of arms approved by the Minister of the Interior in 
1938; and in 2000, the city of Elva started to use the coat of arms approved by the local council in 1938.  
147 ‘As soon as parties try to use the fig leaf of administrative reform to retain or strengthen their 
political position or to achieve a political position, it perishes.’ (Oviir, 2009)  
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the former had been mentioned by the Reform Party as early as 2011, however. 
The turning point, or critical juncture, for the territorial reform occurred when 
the Cabinet established the post of Minister of Public Administration in 2015 
(under the Ministry of Finance), which was filled by the Reform Party – one of 
the main veto players in the previous reform attempts. Minister Arto Aas took 
office in April 2015, and in June 2016 parliament adopted the Administrative 
Reform Act. 
As the size of the municipality was the only criterion148 for amalgamation, 
it is questionable whether the reform was able to increase local democracy and 
decrease variations in service provision because the deadline for voluntary 
amalgamations, or more precisely signing the merger agreements, was 
January 2017. By mid-2017, there were not even any legal proposals for how 
the functions or financing of local government would change, although this 
legislation had been promised. Whether the administrative capacity of 
Estonian local government units is mainly determined by the size of the 
municipality or not would be a topic for another long discussion. The local 
government capability index (Geomedia, 2014) also lists three municipalities 
with 4,000–7,000 inhabitants among the top 10 municipalities, while the 
Statistical Office of Estonia (Servinski & Meres, 2015) has proposed that the 
(geographical) location of the municipality has a greater impact on the 
administrative capacity than its size has.  
Coming back to the Administrative Reform Act, the Minister of Public 
Administration hoped that parliament would not introduce major changes 
into the Administrative Reform Bill (Riigikogu põhiseaduskomisjon, 2016, p. 
3). This – coupled with the urgency of the reform, resistance to the previous 
reform proposals, and the avoidance of questions on local government 
functions and the revenue basis – is an indication that amalgamation was at 
least partly seen as a means of gaining better results for the Reform Party at 
the subsequent local elections.  
As a result of the vote of no-confidence for Prime Minister Taavi Rõivas in 
November 2016, the Reform Party left the government. The posts of Prime 
Minister and Minister of Public Administration went to the Centre Party, 
which had criticised the Administrative Reform Act of 2016 in parliament. 
They decided to proceed with the reform nonetheless as it was too late to 
reverse it. 
Possible alternatives. In 2015, after a decade of discussion on the local 
government reform, the two main options were (semi-)mandatory 
amalgamation or keeping things the way they were. One way to ensure that 
small municipalities would be able to provide all the required services at an 
                                                 
148 Exceptions under Section 9(3) of the Administrative Reform Act include islands as one 
municipality; if the residents’ criterion was fulfilled based on the data of 1 January 2016, but not of 1 
January 2017; if, after the amalgamation, the area of the municipality exceeds 900 km2 and has at least 
3,500 residents as of 1 January 2017; and if, after the amalgamation of at least four municipalities, the 
new municipality has at least 3,500 residents as of 1 January 2017. 
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adequate level would entail cooperation between municipalities, but this has 
not been facilitated by the state, however. While the state and local 
government partnership was discussed in the Riigikogu in 2010 as being a 
question of national relevance, the Minister of Regional Affairs was doubtful 
whether the provision of services via cooperation agreements between 
municipalities or/and associations would be feasible (Riigikogu Verbatim 
Record, 2010, September 23). The local government right to form unions and 
joint agencies with other local governments is stipulated in §159 of the 
Constitution. The OECD noted in its report (2011, p. 64) that ‘Culturally within 
the Estonian public administration there is currently a tendency towards 
competitiveness and “doing it alone” (i.e., not to depend on others in order to 
realise goals and pool means)’.  
Even under mandatory amalgamation, at least two options might have 
been possible: (1) to have a single criterion (e.g. municipality size), or (2) to 
have local government units demonstrate how they ensure the provision of an 
adequate level of services without amalgamation, if they do not opt for a 
merger. The latter might have been more time-consuming, considering that as 
a prerequisite there should have been at first the legal proposal on the revised 
tasks of local governments and financing.  
Critics of the Administrative Reform Act. During the legislative procedure 
on the Administrative Reform Act, the single criterion issue was touched upon 
by the National Audit Office, the Chancellor of Justice, and the Association of 
Municipalities of Estonia.149 The latter was the most critical. The Association 
stated that there was no clear connection between the size and administrative 
capacity of a municipality, and therefore the reform based on the single 
criterion might not result in improved quality and availability of services. 
Based on the analysis, and given that a municipality of 3,500 people is 
sometimes sufficient to provide services independently, both the Chancellor of 
Justice and the Association raised the question of why this number had not 
been used in the bill. In addition, the Association proposed using the criterion 
of 3,500 and amending the legislation to allow increased cooperation between 
the municipalities in order to achieve the aims of the reform less painfully, and 
with less of a negative impact on the local people than in the case of the 5,000 
criterion. The Association of Estonian Cities emphasised150 that proposals on 
strengthening the local government revenue basis should be a part of the bill. 
Despite all efforts, the veto players were not powerful enough to modify the 
conditions of the reform.  
                                                 
149 Respectively, the letter of 13.01.2016 No 6-2/16/36-2 from the National Audit Office to the 
Minister of Public Administration; the letter of 20.01.2016 No 18-2/160088/1600320 from the 
Chancellor of Justice to the Minister of Public Administration; and the letter of 13.01.2016 No 10-1/222-
1 from the Association of Municipalities of Estonia to the Minister of Public Administration. 
150 The letter of 14.01.2016 No 5-1/245-1 (Haldusreformi seaduse eelnõu kooskõlastamine) from the 
Association of Estonian Cities to the Minister of Public Administration. 
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More than twenty local councils petitioned the Supreme Court to declare 
either the Administrative Reform Act as a whole, or a part thereof, invalid.151 
Some of the arguments were that mandatory amalgamation violated the 
principle of democracy and legal clarity, the government had not given due 
consideration to alternatives (e.g. inter-municipal cooperation), the deadline 
set was too short, and merger support was not paid on equal grounds. The 
Court found that only the last point was not in line with the Constitution.152 
The administrative reform, led by the Minister of Public Administration, 
marked an attempt to break the path dependency related to administrative-
territorial division, just after many cities had celebrated their 90th anniversary 
in 2016.  
6.3.5 SOME REMARKS ON FINANCIAL AUTONOMY 
During the Soviet time, the village soviets had very limited financial powers. 
The local government’s independent budget and the local council’s exclusive 
competence in the adoption of the budget were stated in the LGFA of 1989. A 
week after the adoption of the latter, the Budget Act of the ESSR was also 
adopted, which included three chapters: general provisions, state budget, and 
local budgets. The Budget Act listed the local government revenues and 
expenditure. In December 1989 the Taxation Act was adopted, which 
stipulated, in addition to the state budget revenues, the local government 
budget revenues derived from taxes and levies. Section 5 of the Act foresaw 
that local government units could also levy taxes not listed in the Act, and the 
Government of the Republic could set the ceiling on tax rates. 
Based on the Taxation Act, in October 1991 the government adopted a 
regulation on establishing local taxes, specifying the procedures and terms and 
conditions for local taxation. The financial autonomy of local government is 
dealt with in Section 157 of the Constitution of 1992, which states: 
A local government shall have an independent budget for which the 
bases and procedure for drafting shall be provided by law. A local 
government has the right, on the basis of law, to levy and collect taxes, 
and to impose duties. 
 
The legislation in this respect was also replaced in 1993: in June the Rural 
Municipality and City Budget Act was adopted, followed in August by the Rural 
Municipality and City Budgets and State Budget Correlation Act. 
In the mid-1990s, the perceived financial autonomy of the municipalities 
was greater than in 2010, for example (personal interview, 21 September 
2010). This perception is also supported by data: in 1996, the municipalities 
were able to decide on about 30% of the budget revenues (local taxes, fees, 
                                                 
151 Cases 3-4-1-3-16, 3-4-1-5-16, 3-4-1-6-16, 3-4-1-7-16, 3-4-1-8-16, and 3-4-1-9-16.  
152 Judgement in case 3-4-1-3-16, 20 December 2016. 
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rental income, sale of property, etc.), while in 2008 this figure was 11%, 
indicating that state intervention and centralisation had increased (personal 
interview, 21 September 2010; Moll, 2011). Figure 6.2 illustrates local 
government and state expenditure as a percentage of GDP, showing that while 
these expenditures had increased/decreased at a similar pace during the 
interwar period (see Figure 4.1), since the beginning of the 2000s, expenditure 
at the state level has increased faster than that at the local government level. 
An interviewee emphasised that while the responsibility for a task has been 
given to a municipality, the amount and allocation of resources is decided by 
the state – ‘if local governments are allowed to decide very little, it means the 
adoption of the centralised local government model from Päts’ time’ (personal 
interview, 21 September 2010). 
 
 
Figure 6.2  Local government and state expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 1996–2016 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on the Ministry of Finance data (www.fin.ee). 
In 1993, the President refused to promulgate the Taxation Act that the 
Parliament had adopted in August 1993, and referred it to the Supreme Court. 
In its judgement,153 the Constitutional Review Chamber of the Court declared 
the Taxation Act to be unconstitutional. Several provisions were deemed 
unconstitutional, including the one which foresaw that the Ministry of Finance 
and the Minister of Finance could establish the nature of local taxes and 
approve them. The Court concluded that ‘the Ministry of Finance has been 
given the opportunity to directly interfere with the imposition and 
establishment of the procedure and conditions for collecting local taxes’ with 
the Taxation Act. 
The Court’s position was considered in the Local Taxes Act adopted in 1994. 
The Local Taxes Act listed nine different local taxes,154 inspired by the pre-
                                                 
153 Constitutional judgment III-4/A-4. 
154 Head tax, local income tax, sales tax, boat tax, advertisement tax, road and street closure tax, 
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1940 legislation (e.g. additional income tax, maintenance tax) (Riigikogu 
Verbatim Record, 1994, June 27). Local income tax was abolished in 2000, 
and head tax155 in 2002. In 2002, a parking charge was added as a local tax. 
During the period from 1996 to 2008, only 110 municipalities collected some 
local tax, the most used being advertisement tax (Moll, 2009, p. 117). Hence, 
the role of local taxes in local revenue is marginal.  
During the interwar period, local taxes constituted an important revenue 
source for local municipalities. Since the 1990s, however, they have 
diminished in both number and importance: while in 1994 the Local Taxes Act 
listed nine types of local taxes, in 2017 it listed just six. By January 2017, only 
30% of municipalities had established local tax(es). The sales tax was 
abolished as of 2012 in line with the amendment of 2010 because the capital 
city, Tallinn, had only started to collect sales tax from June 2010. The 
Government of the Republic justified the abolishment of sales tax with the 
need to protect the simplicity and clarity of the business environment, 
reasoning that the establishment of sales tax in Tallinn also had an impact on 
prices outside the capital (Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 2010, June 15). A 
parliamentary debate demonstrated the government’s attempt to influence 
Tallinn’s financial discipline. The introduction of local taxes by local 
municipalities has been hindered in part due to the high administrative costs 
of tax collection, which sometimes exceed the revenue derived from the taxes, 
making regulatory taxes the only ones worth collecting for the most part. Here 
the question remains whether the tradition of local taxes was broken due to 
the lack of financial autonomy of the local soviets, decisions made during the 
decentralisation process, or some other factors. This would need further 
investigation, which would be too detailed to fit within the scope of the current 
dissertation.  
6.4 LOCAL DEMOCRACY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
BODIES 
Similarly to the interwar period, the Local Government Council Election Act 
has been amended (or replaced) between every election, while the scope of the 
amendments has varied. Although the official local government bodies are the 
council and the government, the current section will focus, in addition to the 
                                                 
government tax listed instead of head tax (isikumaks). Parliament found that there were grounds for 
replacing the local government tax with head tax to avoid confusion related to the object of taxation. The 
maintenance tax was only in the bill and not in the adopted legislation (Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 1994, 
September 21).  
155 Head tax, which was widely debated during the interwar period, was levied after re-independence 
by just one municipality in 1995–1996. Nissi rural municipality had budgeted 30,000 kroons in terms of 
revenue, but managed to collect only 4,300 kroons (Moll, 2009). 
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council elections, on the mayor because of the important role played by this 
post during the 1990s. 
6.4.1 LOCAL ELECTIONS AND DEBATES ON DUAL MANDATE AND 
ELECTORAL ALLIANCES 
The Local Soviets Election Act of 1989 was established to cover the transitional 
elections, and hence a new act was drafted for the elections of 1993. One of the 
authors of the Constitution of 1992, Jüri Adams, noted in October 1991 that 
the election mechanism in the local government election acts of 1939 was 
‘exceptionally felicitous’ and the same acts could be put into force almost 
without changes (CCA, 1997, pp. 139–140). Notwithstanding this optimism, a 
totally new and different act was drafted and adopted. 
During the proceedings for the bill on the Local Government Council 
Election Act of 1993, in February that same year an expert committee also 
recommended considering a limited vote method as an option in addition to 
the proportional methods, as it had been used in the interwar period and 
deserved discussing in the light of the legislative continuity. The same expert 
group found that a majoritarian system could also be an option in small 
municipalities. The most debated issue in the Riigikogu again revolved around 
who should have the right to vote, namely should this be strictly limited to 
Estonian citizens or not. A summary of the main elements of the Local 
Government Council Election Act and its amendments is presented in 
Appendix C. 
The Local Government Council Election Act of 1993 was revised in 1996. 
The aim was to eliminate inaccuracies and contradictions in the text and to 
bring it in line with the respective act on the Parliament election.156 Under the 
1993 rules, in addition to political parties, non-profit associations and 
organisations could also nominate candidates as long as their statute included 
the right to nominate candidates for the local elections. Furthermore, 
individual candidates could form a list. In 1996, the term ‘electoral alliances’ 
(valimisliit) was stipulated. The electoral alliances issue was not debated in 
parliament, where attention was mainly focused on the technical aspects, 
namely ensuring that people who had the right to vote could also effectively 
put this right into practice (Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 1996, March 11). In 
the Act of 1996, a simple quota was explicitly stated, which is applied before 
applying the modified d’Hondt method. The simple quota method had already 
been experimented with during the parliamentary elections in 1992. In the 
local elections, the simple quota was a way of reducing the possibility that 
candidates with zero votes would be able to get onto a local council. In the 
corresponding debate in parliament, an MP opposed the simple quota because 
                                                 
156 The basic principles of the Parliament election act were decided in autumn 1991, and at that time 
the Legal Affairs Committee did not study the system of the interwar period, but instead focused on the 
practices of other European countries (Riigikogu, 2011, pp. 39-40). 
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it emphasised the election of individuals instead of political parties, and hence 
he felt that it signified a move away from Western Europe and towards 
autocracy (see Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 1996, April 17). The President 
refused to proclaim the Election Act because it stipulated that the candidates 
had to have completed basic, secondary, or higher education in Estonian, or 
passed a relevant language exam.157 Another MP stated that the time was ripe 
to end the consequences of the occupation at the language level because ‘if it 
is passed up at the moment, we not only lose years, but also call into question 
the work of preceding years’ (Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 1996, May 14). 
Parliament wanted to establish ex-ante control over language proficiency. The 
language requirement was, as several MPs claimed, a political issue, not a legal 
one. Instead, by way of a compromise, a reference to the Language Act was 
included. The language requirement was abolished in 2002, however, when a 
new Local Government Council Election Act was adopted. Although the bill 
stipulated that the candidate should have sufficient Estonian language 
proficiency to participate in the council work, in the parliament the Section 
with the language requirements was omitted from the adopted Act. 
The regime change also brought about changes in terms of the background 
of the people involved in local administration/government. During the Soviet 
era, the majority of the chairs of village soviets were female, whereas after the 
1989 elections males were most prevalent again (Russak, 2009, p. 33). While 
in 1948 every third candidate was female, in the local soviets in 1975 about half 
were women (Truuväli, 1986b, p. 170), which is considerably higher than in 
the independence years (e.g. in the post-communist period about 30–40% of 
candidates were female). A summary of the selected quantitative indicators is 
presented in Table 6.4. It shows a sharp decrease in the use of citizen electoral 
alliances (or independent lists) and an increase in the political parties’ lists at 
local elections since the 2002 elections. The change is mainly due to an 
attempt to ban the participation of independent lists at the local elections. 
When it comes to the amendments related to the local election legislation 
after 1993, there are at least two widely debated issues – whether a person 
could belong to the national parliament and a local council simultaneously (i.e. 
dual mandate or cumul des mandats), and whether only party lists would be 
allowed at local elections, or non-party lists as well. 
 
  
                                                 
157 Decision No 715 of the President of the Republic, 7 May 1996.  
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Table 6.4  Selected indicators of local elections 1993–2013 
 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2009 2013 
Voter turnout (%) 52.6 52.5 49.8 52.5 47.4 60.6 58.0 
Lists 844 773 768 874 912 912 923 
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Party lists and non-party lists 
In Central and East European countries, ‘local lists established themselves in 
the early 1990s as important actors on the local level, especially due to a lack 
of party organisation in the process of democratic consolidation’ (Reiser & 
Holtmann, 2008, p. 7). During the 2000s ‘local lists emerged also in countries 
which had been formerly fully party-politicised on the local level’, mainly due 
to ‘a general decline of trust in established parties and politicians’ (Reiser & 
Holtmann, 2008, p. 7). 
The 1990s marked the heyday of citizen electoral alliances (CEAs) or 
(independent) local lists158 in Estonia, but these have been ‘slowly pushed out 
by an increasingly cartelised party system’ (Pettai, Toomla, & Joakit, 2008, p. 
85). CEAs were first provided for in the Local Government Council Election 
Act of 1996, although individual candidates also had the right to form a 
common list in 1993. Table 6.5 indicates that there was a sharp decline in CEA 
candidates running in the 2002 and 2005 elections, which can be explained 
by the coalition parties’ attempts to ban CEAs in those years.  
                                                 
158 According to Holtmann (2008, p. 11), the independent local lists ‘are focussed on a local 
jurisdiction’ and limited to ‘one single local jurisdiction’. 
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Table 6.5   Local electoral candidates by political formation, % of total 
Political 
formation 
1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2009 2013 
Political 
party 
14.4 16.6 26.7 72.4 74.7 59.2 63.5 
Party alliance - 6.2 4.0 - - - - 
CEAs 76.6 73.5 68.1 26.8 24.9 39,7 35.8 
Individual 
candidates 
9.0 3.7 1.2 0.8 0.4 1 0.7 
Total N 8 971 11 127 12 801 15 203 14 656 15 322 14 784 
Source: Years 1993–2005: Pettai, Toomla, & Joakit, 2008, p. 89; years 2009 and 2013: vvk.ee. 
 
‘The strength of CEAs in the early 1990s was partly by default. As a newly 
democratised country, Estonia still had an incipient party system’, and the 
main parties were parliamentary parties (Pettai, Toomla, & Joakit, 2008, pp. 
90–91). Pettai et al. (2008, p. 91) note that the first sign that CEAs were a 
stopgap measure was that while they were allowed in the parliamentary 
elections in 1992, in the 1995 elections the civic associations were not 
permitted to run. At the local level the process was slower. In addition, in many 
municipalities in 1993 and 1996 political parties formed CEAs ‘to take 
advantage of their positive image’ (Pettai, Toomla, & Joakit, 2008, p. 92). In 
1998, the Riigikogu amended the Riigikogu Election Act by abandoning CEAs 
in the national elections. According to the explanatory memorandum on the 
bill, the aim of the amendment was to abolish the prerogative of CEAs 
compared to the political parties; it also emphasised that the political parties 
carry political accountability, but in the case of CEAs the accountability was 
blurred. The debates in the Riigikogu also touched upon questions of whether 
it harmed democracy, and whether it was in compliance with the Constitution.  
When it comes to the Political Parties Act of 1994, we can conclude that the 
Riigikogu wanted to avoid the situation whereby some small parties existed 
that were only active at the county level and which were not represented in the 
Riigikogu. Thus, although the Government of the Republic proposed a 
threshold in the bill for a political party registration with a minimum of 200 
members, in the Riigikogu this was increased to 1,000 members. While during 
the communist period it was common for politics to be de jure conducted in 
citizens’ associations as well, in 1993/94 the goal was to limit this right to 
political parties only. Introducing the nuance of local government in the Act 
was not an option for the Riigikogu’s constitutional law committee because 
this nuance would have confounded the logic of the Political Parties Act 
(Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 1994, February 16). 
Another event that caused some consternation among political parties 
occurred in 2001 when the Riigikogu failed to elect the President of the 
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Republic and the vote was put in the hands of the electoral college, which 
comprises MPs and representatives from all local governments. As the latter 
also included non-party members, the result of the vote was hard to predict, 
and the person elected as president did not have the support of many centre-
right parties. The ‘parties needed to get a better handle over the local 
government appointments’ to the electoral college (Pettai, Toomla, & Joakit, 
2008, p. 95).159 
In March 2002, the Riigikogu adopted a new Local Government Council 
Election Act, which permitted a candidate to run only if he or she was in a 
party’s list or was running as an independent candidate. In May 2002, the 
Chancellor of Justice submitted a petition to the Supreme Court to declare 
certain provisions of the Act unconstitutional.160 The Constitutional Review 
Chamber of the Supreme Court (CRC) was ‘of the opinion that the prohibition 
of citizens’ election coalitions in the present legal and social context is not 
constitutional, considering this to constitute a disproportional restriction of 
the right to vote and run as a candidate’, and that such restrictions ‘would 
prejudice the foundations of local government through the fact that the 
representative body will not be capable of becoming sufficiently 
representative’.161 At the time, the Political Parties Act required a party to have 
at least 1,000 members to be able to register as a party. This number exceeded 
the number of citizens in many municipalities and therefore it was not possible 
to register as a local party. The only option would have been to run in a national 
party’s list or as an independent.  
As a result of the judgement, in July 2002 the Riigikogu amended the Local 
Government Council Election Act and also allowed independent local lists at 
the local elections, albeit with the restriction that the CEAs’ right to present 
the lists of candidates would expire on 1 January 2005, namely ten months 
before the next elections. The Chancellor of Justice took this restriction to the 
Supreme Court once again. This time it was not the CRC, but the Supreme 
Court en banc that declared the provision abolishing the CEAs invalid as of 
January 2005. The Court also noted that: 
Pursuant to the Constitution, a local government is based on the idea 
of a community the duty of which is to resolve the problems of the 
community and manage the life thereof. If the possibilities to represent 
communal interests are made dependent on the decisions of political 
parties active on the national level, the representation of local interest 
may be jeopardised. This in turn may be in conflict with the principle 
of autonomy of local governments. In the case of a conflict of state and 
local interests a member of a local government council must have a 
possibility to resolve local issues independently and in the interests of 
                                                 
159 In 2016, the electoral college comprised 101 MPs and 234 local government representatives, 107 
of whom did not belong to any political party. 
160 For the official account of the ruling, see Constitutional Judgement 3-4-1-7-02 of 15 July 2002.  
161 Constitutional Judgement 3-4-1-7-02.  
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his or her community. That is why the electoral system of local 
elections should guarantee those groups of persons who come from the 
local community, and who have a common interest in resolving local 
issues, the possibilities to stand as candidates on an equal footing with 
those groups, such as political parties, who are also interested in 
exercising power on the national level.162 
In the same judgement were summarised the arguments of the Minister of 
Justice,163 which reflected the wish to better control the decision-making at the 
local level and align local interests with national interests.  
When it comes to the reasoning behind the amendment, the government’s 
main argument was that the non-party lists did not carry permanent political 
accountability and therefore only party lists and individual candidates should 
be allowed to participate in the local elections. The government did not see it 
as a problem that the parties did not have enough members in smaller 
municipalities because people who were not members could also run in party 
lists (Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 2002, February 27). The opposition, on the 
other hand, found that specific local problems exist at the local government 
level, which may be more significant than party programmes. The Pro Patria 
Union’s representative compared the requirement whereby a candidate had to 
be a member of a political party in order to run in local elections to the CPSU 
times, when ‘people’s possibility for a career and decision-making depended 
on the ownership of a party membership card’ (Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 
2004, November, 25).  
These two attempts to ban CEAs ‘enriched democratic discourse and 
prompted a deeper societal reflection over the kind of democracy Estonia 
wanted to create’ (Pettai, Toomla, & Joakit, 2008, p. 140). Reference to the 
interwar period in this discourse was marginal, if present at all. 
Dual mandate 
One element related to the central-local relations and local elections 
concerned whether the possibility to be a member of parliament and of a local 
council simultaneously should be allowed or not, and what impact this had on 
local democracy. Up until 2005, simultaneous membership of both was 
permitted. The ban on a dual mandate was adopted in 2002 and came into 
force in 2005, but was later abolished in 2016. 
                                                 
162 Judgement 3-4-1-1-05.  
163 ‘The Minister of Justice argues that it is necessary to give only the political parties the right to 
submit election lists also in order to ensure that there is a connection between a local government and 
the state power, and to avoid the conflict of local and national interests. The Minister of Justice is of the 
opinion that there can be only one actual centre of power in the state. The Supreme Court en banc does 
not agree with this opinion of the Minister of Justice, because the realisation of local interests on the 
local level, even in conflict with the interests of the central power, if necessary, is inherent in the principle 
of autonomy of local self-governments’. Judgement 3-4-1-1-05. 
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In 2002, the Local Government Council Election Act was adopted,164 
whereby two provisions were added to the Riigikogu Internal Rules Act. The 
first stated that when an MP was elected to the local council, his/her mandate 
as a member of the local council would be suspended, and the second that an 
MP should not become a member of a local council during his/her MP 
mandate. An addition to the LGOA stated that the mandate of a member of a 
local council would be suspended for the duration of his/her mandate as a MP 
until the termination of his/her mandate as a MP. These provisions were to 
come into force on 17 October 2005, a day after the next local elections. 
Runthal (2010, pp. 49, 51) draws attention to the fact that the incompatibility 
of the mandates was not in the initial draft, but was added during the 
proceedings and without legal analysis. It should be noted, however, that 
‘over-parliamentarisation’ was evident in Estonia at the beginning of the 1990s 
as well, for example in the adoption of the Government of the Republic Act 
(Sarapuu, 2017). 
In May 2005, the provisions concerning the incompatibility of mandates 
were annulled by parliament, by amending the Internal Rules of the 
Parliament and the LGOA. The President of the Republic only announced the 
amendment to the LGOA, and sent the amendment to the Internal Rules back 
to parliament. He concluded in his decision165 that the adopted act 
contradicted at least three provisions of the Constitution: 
• The principle of local autonomy (§ 154); 
• The principle of the separation and balance of powers (§ 4); 
• The incompatibility of the post of Member of Parliament with 
other state offices (§ 63). 
The Chancellor of Justice also sent a report to parliament even before the 
latter had adopted the Act, suggesting that the amendment should not be 
adopted for reasons similar to those subsequently provided by the president 
(Chancellor of Justice, 2006, p. 16). The Constitutional Committee of the 
Parliament presented counterarguments to the Presidential Decision in strict 
adherence to the letter of the Constitution, but not its spirit, stating that the 
local council is not a state office.166  
As parliament did not amend the text, in June 2005 the president asked the 
Supreme Court to declare the Riigikogu Internal Rules Act Amendment Act 
unconstitutional. The Court duly declared the Act unconstitutional with its 
judgement,167 but on different grounds, concluding that the ‘Act is in conflict 
                                                 
164 The act annulled the Local Government Election Act of 1996. 
165 Decision No. 848 of 30 May 2005. 
166 See Riigikogu Verbatim Record of 8 June 2005. In September 2016, a new Chancellor of Justice 
claimed that simultaneously being a Member of Parliament and a member of a local council is in line 
with the Constitution because the latter is not a state office (Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 2016, 
September 20). 
167 Judgement of the Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court, 3-4-1-11-05, 14 October 
2005.  
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with the requirements of democracy, arising from §10 of the Constitution’,168 
because the amendment was made three months before the local elections. 
Therefore, even though the provision on the incompatibility of the mandates in 
the LGOA was annulled, it remained valid in the Riigikogu Internal Rules Act. 
The Chamber of the Court claimed that ‘On the basis of the requirements 
of democracy, the Chamber cannot accept situations where the ruling political 
forces significantly amend in their own favour the electoral rules, which are 
known in advance for several years, and they do so immediately before the 
elections’.169 In her Master’s thesis, Runthal (2010, p. 51) also reached the 
conclusion, based on an analysis of parliamentary proceedings 
documentation, that party interests to succeed in the elections prevailed. 
If we refer to the parliamentary stenographs of February 2005 concerning 
the LGOA amendment (Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 2005, February 9), it is 
evident that discussions on the dual mandate gained the most attention while 
the banning of independent lists, included in the same amendment, received 
only marginal attention. The Constitutional Committee of the Parliament had 
not discussed the problematic situation whereby an MP cannot be a member 
of a local council, but can run as a candidate in the local elections. Supporters 
of the dual mandate cited Finland as an example.  
The bill allowing MPs to simultaneously belong to a local council was aired 
in parliament most recently in 2016. The Estonian Free Party (Vabaerakond), 
among others, opposed the bill, claiming that if MPs were to gain the right to 
belong to local councils as well, then in order to counterbalance that idea, non-
party lists should also be allowed in the parliamentary elections. Supporters of 
the bill, on the other hand, saw that it would enhance cooperation between the 
central and local levels (Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 2016, June 7). The 
initiative for the bill stemmed from the coalition agreement; hence, all 
coalition parties supported it and all opposition parties voted against it. 
In January 2016, the Free Party tabled a bill that would have prevented 
MPs from running in local elections as ‘duck decoys’ or ‘stalking horses’, by 
stating that as soon as an MP had gained a mandate in the local council, 
his/her mandate as an MP would have been annulled, and vice versa. 
According to the Estonian Free Party Fraction (2016), 93 MPs (out of 101) ran 
in the 2013 local government elections, and of the 60 that were elected, only 
one accepted a seat in the local council. In addition, 11 ministers were elected. 
Different Chancellors of Justice have held differing opinions on the dual 
mandate issue. It was not clearly stated in the Constitution of 1992 whether 
the mandates were incompatible or not, and nor has the Supreme Court taken 
a clear position on the matter. Some said that restricting the mandate would 
enable more people to participate in politics, particularly seeing as there was 
no lack of people interested in it in the 2000s, unlike the situation at the 
beginning of independence (Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 2005, May 3).  
                                                 
168 Ibid.  
169 Ibid.  
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6.4.2 THE INSTITUTION OF MAYOR170 
The LGFA of 1989 did not determine the functions of the mayor in detail. The 
Act referred to the rural municipality, county and city acts that would later be 
adopted to determine the powers of the local government bodies. The 
(provisional) status of the mayor was described in the Decree on the Status of 
Local Government Senior Officials (henceforth “Decree on Senior Officials”), 
which was adopted in January 1990. 
The mayors at the primary and secondary level of local government had 
different responsibilities and functions. The most significant distinction was 
that the posts of chairman of the council and mayor were unified at the 
primary level; at the secondary level, these were separate. At the primary level, 
the mayor had the opportunity to submit proposals and to take part in the 
decision-making process, but he also had to implement these decisions. The 
rationale for the unification of the posts of council chairman and mayor at the 
primary level was the need to concentrate all the powers locally, considering 
the need to build up the local government units (Kirs, 1989). According to 
Mäeltsemees, there was also a concern that there might be a lack of suitable 
candidates in the rural municipalities to fill the post of mayor and chairman of 
the council separately (Russak, 2009, p. 35). In addition, the chairman of the 
Council of Ministers of the Estonian SSR also referred in the speech that he 
gave in the Supreme Council at the first reading of the draft of the LGFA to the 
specificities of the transition period and the need to ‘effectively confront the 
economic pressure of some enterprise or agricultural holding’ (Lääne, 
Mäeltsemees, & Ludvig, 2012, p. 12). Since the interests of the local 
government and state intersected at the level of county and independent city, 
a decision was made to apply the principle that a county governor or the mayor 
of an independent city would not be the chairman or the deputy chairman of 
the council (Kirs, 1989). 
At the primary level, the mayor was elected by the respective council from 
among its members. It is worth noting that the wording of Section 6 of the 
LGFA implies that the council elects the chairman, who will also be the mayor, 
not the other way around. In 1989, when the LGFA was prepared, the direct 
election of the mayor was proposed, but it was not feasible. The Local Soviets 
of People’s Deputies Election Act was adopted as early as August 1989 and did 
not foresee the direct election of the mayor. The LGFA had to be consistent 
with the rules of the Election Act (Kirs, 1989). Therefore, the option of directly 
electing the mayor had already been ruled out in August 1989, a path that has 
been followed ever since. 
In an independent city the council appointed the mayor, but, contrary to 
the primary level, the mayor could not be a member of the council. The Decree 
on Senior Officials (point 12) specified that the mayor of an independent city 
                                                 
170 This section is partially based on a conference paper Historical Comparison of the Role and 
Powers of the City Mayor in Estonia Between 1918–1940 and Since 1989, presented in June 2012 at the 
22nd IPSA World Congress of Political Science, Madrid, Spain.    
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is the leader of the city government, but also a state representative in the city. 
According to the LGFA (Section 12(2)), the mayor had to be approved by the 
Supreme Council. The approval by the Supreme Council was added to the act 
due to the particular context. First, it was feared that the role of the local 
government associations would increase too much, and secondly, that there 
was a risk that local election would result in a mayor who was not supportive 
of the Estonian legal order (Lääne, Mäeltsemees, Vare & Kattai, 2017, pp. 97–
98). The LGFA (Section 12(1)) set out some of the tasks of the mayor of an 
independent city, mainly those which involved relations with the central 
government (e.g. organising the implementation of the national policy and 
participating in the work of the Government of the Republic with an advisory 
voting right). The mayor of an independent city was accountable to the city 
council, as well as to the Supreme Council of the Estonian SSR and the central 
government, as was the case during the communist period.  
The role of the mayor in the establishment of local self-government 
units  
The Decree on Senior Officials (point 25) explicitly stated that the chairman of 
the local soviet of a primary-level unit, while also heading the executive 
committee, had to ensure the implementation of certain provisions of the 
Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, from 6 December 1989, on 
the Creation of an Administrative System Based on Local Government in the 
territory of the respective administrative unit. One of the provisions concerned 
the local soviet’s obligation to develop a socio-economic development plan and 
a statute to gain self-governing status. The conformity of the submitted 
documents was assessed by an administrative reform expert committee, based 
on the requirements established by the Presidium of the Supreme Council. The 
latter granted self-governing status, based on the opinion of an expert 
committee. Sulev Mäeltsemees (2000, p. 242) has stated that one of the aims 
of the development plan was to make every local government official 
contemplate the situation at least in his own area, as well as the further 
quantitative and qualitative development, and discuss it with his colleagues.  
The importance of leadership in administrative reforms cannot be ignored 
(Toonen, 2007). It is argued that leadership is probably ‘of greater significance 
in unstable situations or where administrative behaviour has not yet become 
subject to routines compared to what might be defined as stable environments’ 
(Offerdal, Hanšpach, Kowalczyk, & Patočka, 1996, pp. 105–106). It can be 
claimed that the importance of administrative leadership at the local level in 
Estonia increased and changed at the beginning of the 1990s since the local 
governments had more discretionary power than under the Soviet regime. In 
addition, local government underwent a transformation since ‘it was clear 
what was being left behind, but it was not clear what lay ahead’ (Rose, 2009, 
p. 1), the institution was changing and developing, and a course also had to be 
charted at the individual municipality level (e.g. in socio-economic 
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development plans). This also called for leaders at the local level to contribute 
to the establishment of the new system, to create new routines, and to act in 
an unstable and changing environment – in other words, to be what Getimis 
and Hlepas (2006, p. 179) call a strategic or change-oriented mayor. 
There are several examples where mayors demonstrated innovative 
behaviour or ideas. For primary-level municipalities, a major issue involved 
getting their self-governing status recognised. It was often the mayors 
themselves who drafted the socio-economic development plan and the statute, 
and who subsequently presented it to the Supreme Council. There were also 
cases where researchers in Tallinn or Tartu were asked to draft the 
development plan (Mäeltsemees, 2000, p. 242), or parts thereof (e.g. 
historical background, demographical overview) (Lukas, 2007, p. 81). 
Not all local governments followed the procedure that was foreseen for 
gaining the self-governing status. For example, the Jõgeva village soviet 
became Jõgeva rural municipality by restoring the status of the rural 
municipality in accordance with the decision of the village council. The 
chairman of the village council started to investigate the legality of restoring 
the rural municipality according to the council’s decision because the rural 
municipality had been changed to a village soviet in an illegitimate way. The 
village soviet found no legal basis for denying the restoration of the rural 
municipality and, unofficially, the chairman of the Supreme Council simply 
said “Do it!” in response to the idea. The village council adopted the 
development plan and took the decision on the status of the rural municipality 
in September 1992. The documents were also approved the following year, in 
April 1993, by the Government of the Republic (Lukas, 2007, p. 27). 
Another example of local initiative involved amalgamations. As early as 
November 1990, the councils of people’s deputies in two municipal units in the 
county of Jõgeva approved the amalgamation of a city and a rural 
municipality, the main argument being an economic one (Põltsamaa linna 
rahvasaadikute nõukogu, 1990). The municipalities also contacted the 
Chairman of the Supreme Council, but an obstacle was posed by a lack of 
legislation that would regulate the amalgamation, and hence it was not 
implemented. These two municipalities did not sign the amalgamation 
agreement until the end of 2016. Around the same time, the city of Türi and 
the Türi village soviet also considered amalgamation (Sokk, 1999, p. 32), and 
this was implemented much earlier in 2005.  
Changes related to the LGOA of 1993 
An important change introduced by the LGOA was the separation of the posts 
of mayor and chair of the council. The LGOA simplified the legal framework 
with regard to the functions of the mayor since there was only one tier of local 
government and the Act did not differentiate between the mayors of different 
administrative units, as the previous legal acts had done. 
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Based on the LGOA, the election of the mayor, releasing him from office, 
and any expression of no confidence in the incumbent still fell within the 
exclusive competence of the council. One alternative that was considered was 
that the chair of the council would also be the mayor, and the executive body 
would be managed by a specialist, who would be hired by the council, but this 
proposal did not garner enough support in parliament, and neither did the 
direct election of the mayor (Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 1993, May 12). One 
of the rationales for having the council elect the mayor was that the prime 
minister is not elected directly. The act foresaw that the mandate of the council 
member would be suspended if he was appointed mayor. The same principle 
had been laid down in the LGFA of 1989 for the mayors of independent cities. 
The LGOA (Section 50) set out eight main functions or tasks of the mayor: 
• organising the work of the rural municipality or city government and 
preparing their respective sessions;  
• representing the local government and rural municipality or city 
government in accordance with the competence granted by law, the 
statutes of the rural municipality or city, and the council;  
• issuing directives for the organisation of the internal operations of 
the rural municipality or city government and its administrative 
agencies;  
• signing rural municipality or city regulations and orders, and other 
government documentation; 
• submitting the membership/staff of the rural municipality or city 
government to the council for confirmation;  
• submitting a proposal to the council for the confirmation of the 
appointment to office of the additional members of the rural 
municipality or city government, and the release from duties of a 
member of government;  
• presenting candidates for the heads of a municipal enterprise to the 
city or rural municipality government for confirmation of the 
appointment to office;  
• performing other functions assigned to him or her pursuant to the 
law and the statutes of the rural municipality or city. 
The LGOA was designed to set only a general legal framework for local 
government and to leave the details of the organisational arrangements 
(including functions and powers of the mayor) to the council to be determined 
in the statutes. The aim was to encourage local initiative and to consider the 
differences between cities and rural municipalities (see Kohaliku omavalitsuse 
korralduse seaduse töörühm, 1993, March 1). This also allowed the 
consideration of local conditions, as was the case under the LGFA. 
The LGOA stipulated the powers and role of the council in more detail than 
the LGFA. A total of 26 issues were listed under the exclusive competence of 
the council. More explicitly, the LGOA mentioned the exclusive competence in 
submitting requests or giving an opinion concerning the alteration of 
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municipality boundaries, the formation or liquidation of city or rural 
municipality districts, and setting the number of council members. 
While the councils of independent cities had a separate office servicing 
them under the legislation of 1989, in 1993 a decision was made to follow the 
principle that the city government would service the council in order to 
increase the cooperation between the two (see Kohaliku omavalitsuse 
korralduse seaduse töörühm, 1993, March 1). 
In the preliminary draft of the LGOA, it was foreseen that, in order to 
enable direct democracy, a general assembly of citizens with voting rights 
would be allowed to exist on small islands or in small municipalities in parallel 
with the council. This principle did not find its way into the final act. 
Different system, but the same people 
One element in Estonian local governments that often remained unchanged 
compared to the Soviet period was the people. It has been suggested that in 
Estonia ‘the local leaders from yesterday’ became the ‘political leaders’ of the 
1990s, especially in the small municipalities (Granqvist, 1993, p. 66). Based on 
the interviews and documents, it would appear that the people working on the 
executive committee of a local soviet usually continued working for the rural 
municipality or city government. For example, in more than half of the 
independent cities, the first mayor at the beginning of the 1990s had previous 
experience as the chair of the executive committee of a soviet, or experience in 
the communist party. In Jõgeva county, after the 1989 elections, the former 
chairs of the executive committee continued as the chair of the executive 
committee / mayor in 10 cities and rural municipalities (out of 13). Based on 
this, it is fair to say that local government reform at the local level at the 
beginning of the 1990s was often led by people with experience of the Soviet 
system. The high degree of continuity in personnel, and especially in the case 
of the first mayors, can also be found in other post-communist countries (see 
Szakolczai, 1993, pp. 14–15; Offerdal, Hanšpach, Kowalczyk, & Patočka, 1996, 
p. 115). 
In some independent cities, people outside the old system were also 
considered as mayoral candidates. In Tartu (independent city), for example, 
the Tartu City Council (Tartu Linnavolikogu, 1989a) decided to advertise the 
vacancy in a newspaper so that persons interested in the post could contact the 
members of the council, since the latter had the right to propose mayoral 
candidates. At the following council meeting three candidates were proposed, 
with the result that the person who had been the chair of the executive 
committee up to that point became the mayor (Tartu Linnavolikogu, 1989b). 
Mouritzen and Svara claim that ‘the longer the mayor remains in office, the 
more influential the mayor is likely to be’ (2002, p. 209). Therefore, it can be 
assumed that the first mayors had more influence due to their previous post 
as the chair of an executive committee. 
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The method of selecting the mayor has remained broadly the same since 
1989, in that it falls under the competence of the council. There are no signs in 
Estonia that the mayor would be directly elected in the near future. In 1993, 
an expert group proposed using the title ‘Local Self-Government Election Act’ 
instead of ‘Local Councils Election Act’ so as not to exclude the possibility of 
setting out the direct election of a mayor in the same act, if necessary. In 2002, 
when local councillors were asked whether they supported the direct election 
of the mayor, about 40% of respondents strongly opposed it while about 30% 
were in favour of such a move171 (Sootla & Toots, 2006, p. 240). Low support 
from councillors vis-à-vis the direct election of the mayor is expected, as Devas 
and Delay (2006) have indicated that a directly elected executive mayor 
reduces the powers of council members.  
The relations between the executive and the representative 
As already indicated, the council had the power to express ‘no confidence’ in 
the mayor, and in Tartu and Tallinn at least, this power was exercised. In 
Tallinn, the council made an attempt to express ‘no confidence’ in April 1991, 
which failed; the next attempt was made in February 1992, and the mayor 
himself resigned on the same day (Mäeltsemees, 2004, pp. 135, 137). In Tartu, 
based on the minutes of the council meeting of October 3, 1991 (Tartu 
Linnavolikogu, 1991), it is clear that the council considered exercising its ‘no 
confidence’ prerogative mainly as a tool to indicate to the city government that 
it was not satisfied with the work of the mayor and the city government, and 
that the relations between the council and the government needed to be 
specified. According to the council decision adopted at the meeting, the issue 
of the expression of ‘no confidence’ was put on the agenda for the meeting in 
November. As a result, the city government resigned in October, one of the 
reasons being that the mayor felt that the council did not trust the city 
government. 
The LGFA of 1989 did not determine the council-government relations 
(Ginter, 1991, p. 338). Ginter claims that during that period many councils 
predominantly held the view that the city government was subordinated to the 
council, and the composition of the government could easily be changed. 
Hence, mayors were often selected quickly and the government lacked the 
support of the council’s majority. The easiest and quickest way was to appoint 
a previous leader as a mayor (Ginter, 1991, p. 338). In the Decree on the Senior 
Officials of 1990, it was initially stated that the expression of ‘no confidence’ 
required an affirmative vote of three-quarters of the council’s elected 
members. In April 1991, this was amended and replaced with two-thirds. The 
amendment affected the balance of power between the council and the mayor 
                                                 
171 The survey included both rural municipalities and cities, but as opposition to direct election of 
the mayor was higher in the bigger municipalities, it can be assumed that opposition to direct election is 
stronger among city councillors than among rural municipality councillors. 
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by increasing the power of the council, as in the former case it would have been 
more difficult to initiate ‘no confidence’. Under the LGFA of 1993, the 
initiation of ‘no confidence’ required at least one-quarter of the council 
members’ support, and an affirmative vote required the majority of the votes 
of the council membership. 
At the secondary level, the mayor had dual subordination (a potential 
communist legacy) – to the council (limited) and to the central government. 
This ran the risk that a mayor would choose according to his own preference 
whether to follow the position of the council or that of the central government 
(Ginter, 1991, p. 338). It can be argued that at the primary level, the mayor had 
more influence over the council than at the secondary level. First, since the 
mayor was also the chair of the council, he was aware of all (or at least the 
majority) of the discussions at the council sessions and could take part in them. 
At the secondary level, the mayor did not attend all of the council sessions. 
Secondly, while at the primary level the mayor was still a part of the council, 
at the secondary level he was distanced from the council by the fact that he was 
also a representative of the central government. 
Both of the ex-mayors of small cities who were interviewed for this study 
claimed that unifying the posts of the chairman of the council and the mayor 
at that time was probably justified, or at least did not create problems. On the 
other hand, an ex-mayor of an independent city argued that unifying the post 
of the mayor and chair of the council would probably have worked there as 
well, as the mayor (and city government) had to implement the decisions of 
the council. The example of the expression of ‘no confidence’ in Tartu showed 
that as the situation was new for the council and the city government, and as 
both were undergoing change, there was a lack of coordination and trust 
between these two bodies, the risk of which at that time could have been 
decreased by having them connected through the mayor. Having one leader in 
a municipality who has an overview of the discussions and developments of 
the executive and representative body of the local government can mitigate the 
conflicts between government and council, but also increase the risk of the 
mayor exerting too much power. 
Above all, the LGOA of 1993 changed the statutory position of the mayor. 
It separated the posts of mayor and chair of the council, and since then the 
statutory position of the mayor has remained mainly unchanged. The local 
government system in Estonia has been described as a cabinet model172 
(Lõhmus & Tõnisson, 2006, p. 50; Sootla & Grau, 2005), whereby there is a 
‘strong balance between the roles of mayor and council’ (Sootla & Grau, 2005, 
p. 284). Based on a survey conducted in 2002/2003 among top officials of 
local governments and council members in Estonia, the impact of mayors on 
local government decisions was perceived to be stronger than other 
institutional actors (Sootla & Grau, 2005, p. 287). For example, since 1989 the 
                                                 
172 Sootla and Grau (2005) use the committee model, the mayoral model, and the cabinet model to 
describe the institutional balance in local government. 
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councils have appointed the mayors, but a council cannot appoint the 
members of the city government individually. The council either approves the 
latter as proposed by the mayor, or not as the case may be. 
Drawing parallels between the models proposed by Mouritzen and Svara 
(2002), in 1993 local government started to move towards the strong mayor 
form and the committee-leader form, with increasing probability that the 
elected mayor would have the support of the majority of the council, and be 
anchored through political parties or election coalitions. 
6.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter demonstrated that at least two critical junctures at the macro 
level can be identified in the 1990s: first, in 1989 when the first competitive 
local elections were held after half a century, and the Local Government 
Fundamentals Act was adopted; and second, in 1992/93 when the local 
government was set out in the Constitution and special laws. During the 
critical juncture in 1993, there was a move away from a temporary or 
transitional local government system towards a more permanent one. When 
analysing individual elements of local government, smaller-scale critical 
junctures can also be detected. 
The Local Government Fundamentals Act of 1989 contained several 
elements from the Soviet period, which were later abolished in the Local 
Government Organisation Act of 1993. Before the Fundamentals Act of 1989 
came into force, the executive committee members, including the chair of the 
executive committee (the equivalent of the mayor), were elected from among 
the members of the soviet. The executive committee was accountable to both 
the local soviet and the executive body at the higher level, namely to the district 
or council of ministers, thereby creating a situation of dual subordination. The 
former was partly implemented at the primary level from 1990–1993, and the 
latter in the independent cities (dual subordination of the mayor). 
The Estonian authorities chose to restore local government at the lowest 
level (i.e. cities and rural municipalities) in a gradual way. This decision had a 
crucial impact on the development of the county-level governance because 
right from the outset there was a tendency towards weak county government. 
The local election set for 10 December 1989 was a decisive incentive to adopt 
the Local Government Fundamentals Act. While continuing with the old 
legislation coupled with amendments was an option in the interwar period, in 
the 1990s it would not have been possible to restore local democracy without 
a total overhaul of the system. At the macro level, the abrupt change and 
discontinuity in 1989 was indicative of breakdown and replacement. 
It is not so much the legal framework that was transferred from the 
interwar period to the 1990s, but the idea of local government. The aim was to 
restore the local government as an institution, with its autonomy and 
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democracy. This chimes with what Carl Becker (1955, pp. 338–339) has 
observed: 
The kind of history that has most influence upon the life of the 
community and the course of events is the history that common men 
carry around in their heads. It won't do to say that history has no 
influence upon the course of events because people refuse to read 
history books. Whether the general run of people read history books or 
not, they inevitably picture the past in some fashion or other, and this 
picture, however little it corresponds to the real past, helps to 
determine their ideas about politics and society. This is especially true 
in times of excitement, in critical times, in time of war above all. It is 
precisely in such times that they form (with the efficient help of official 
propaganda!) an idealized picture of the past, born of their emotions 
and desires working on fragmentary scraps of knowledge gathered, 
or rather flowing in upon them, from every conceivable source, 
reliable or not matters nothing. 
 
This idealised picture of the past might have accelerated the process of the 
re-establishment of local government in the 1990s, and ostensibly be part of 
the usable democratic past. However, it has to be noted that during the 
interwar period in Estonia, there were mainly lawyers at the state level in 
politics,173 but at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s the leaders 
were mainly historians (Tamm, 2016). Tamm (2016, p. 165) has claimed that 
in transitional Estonia, history became a ‘science of legitimation’, ‘helping to 
gain, justify and preserve power in a new social situation’. This is true for the 
state as such and for the administrative-territorial organisation, but when it 
comes to details on the local government structure, the picture is somewhat 
blurred. 
In partially addressing the first research question about the institutions or 
institutional aspects demonstrating the strongest path dependence, within the 
post-communist period we can highlight at least the administrative-territorial 
system, county government and citizen electoral alliances. Local taxes and 
local finances have a clear potential to be examples of strong path dependence, 
but this would require a separate study.  
Based on Chapters 4 and 5, and on this chapter in particular, the most 
interesting institutions from both the theoretical and empirical point of view 
seem to be county government/administration, the election/appointment of a 
mayor, and election rules. The main reasons for this are as follows: 
 
• County government has been relatively important in local-central 
relations in terms of power during both the interwar and post-
                                                 
173 According to Leps (2009, p. 144), ‘it is no exaggeration to say that the prewar [i.e. interwar] 
Republic of Estonia was governed by lawyers, but the Soviet occupation in the years 1940–41 literally 
destroyed lawyer-statesmen’. 
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communist periods. Over time, it has lost relevance in both cases 
and been abolished. From a theoretical angle, it is an institution 
whose functions and stability strongly rely on changes in state 
institutions and primary-level local government institutions. 
• The mayor has probably been the most visible person in local 
government for the local people, and even during the communist 
period people often referred to the chair of the executive committee 
as the mayor. At the same time, Estonia has not followed the 
example of many other countries (e.g. Poland, Lithuania) in having 
a directly elected mayor.  
• Election rules are procedural institutions. The principal elements of 
these rules were amended prior to almost every election during the 
interwar years. In the post-communist period, the rules have been 
more stable. During the design phase (at the beginning of the 
1990s), the focus was on who should have the right to vote, but 
subsequently the most debated issues have been questions of dual 
mandate and citizen electoral alliances. This raises the question of 
the possible role of agency in historical institutionalism.174  
 
It is challenging to determine interwar legacies for local government in the 
post-communist period, especially institutional ones, with any degree of 
confidence. The legislation and institutions of the interwar period, and 
especially of the 1930s, were more a source of inspiration than legacies carried 
over to the post-communist period. An attempt to use the legacies explanation 
for selected institutions will be presented in the following chapter (Chapter 7). 
                                                 
174 Peters, Pierre, and King (2005) have provided critique on historical insitutionalism and argue 
that, as an approach, it cannot adequately explain change ‘without including some dynamic conception 
of agency, and including a greater role for political conflict’ (p. 1277). 
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7 HISTORY RHYMES 
In the year 1991, we decisively set out on a road leading into the past; 
from then on, everything happened under the label of restoration, of 
restitution. Parishes, schools, monuments, street names, property, 
money. The new was only allowed to be the old regained; the Republic 
of Estonia became a truly Proustian project: a journey into time 
regained.  
Õnnepalu (2011)175 
This chapter emphasises the comparative aspect of the study. It does so by 
discussing three selected institutions176 with a focus on path dependency and 
interwar legacies (research questions 1 and 2). Furthermore, it addresses 
research question 3 on central-local relations in different periods.   
When it comes to the structure of the chapter, it firstly explores the 
question of the constantly weakening position of county government (Section 
7.1). In the case of the mayor, it is interesting to note that the direct election of 
the mayor has not been practised in Estonia (Section 7.2), and in debates on 
local election rules the legacy of incomplete nation-building has been phased 
out, while attention has shifted to electoral alliances (Section 7.3). In addition, 
as the majority of formal changes to the local government system are decided 
at the state level, the analysis of selected institutions sheds light upon central-
local relations, which are examined in Section 7.4. 
Based on Chapters 4 to 6, it can tentatively be concluded that the 
development of local government and central-local relations in Estonia is 
more reflective of the idea that history rhymes rather than that it repeats itself. 
Similarly, Young (1997, p. 47) has refrained from the deterministic approach 
that history repeats itself in his PhD thesis on local government in Russia, 
advocating instead that ‘history may not repeat itself, but it certainly rhymes’.  
The focus on potential recurrence and legacies is justified by the fact that 
in the case of Estonia, we cannot ignore the importance of legal continuity at 
the beginning of the 1990s or, as Pettai (2004; 2007) has pointed out, of legal 
restorationism.177 The latter was used not only for re-independence, but was 
                                                 
175 Translation of the citation is based on Tamm (2016).  
176 The rationale for selecting these three institutions (county government, mayor, and election rules) 
was elaborated in Section 6.5. 
177 One of the proponents of legal restorationism, Tunne Kelam, stated in 1989: ‘The only rope, which 
we can hold onto as we go through this dangerous swamp is our historical continuity, the continuity of 
the legal, independent Estonian state. This rope must be secured to poles, which have been driven deep 
into a moral foundation. If we let go of this rope or if we forget about its existence, if we give in to 
weakness and sit down on a stump in the swamp in order to rest and taste the berries growing there, 
then we are lost…. All of this depends on us, our choices, our purity, our courage and determination, 
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extended to citizenship, property rights, borders and popular culture (Pettai, 
2007). The principle of legal continuity was anchored in the Constitution of 
1992. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the local government 
legislation of the interwar period was largely considered to be inappropriate 
for the 1990s. While the main critical juncture occurred in 1989–1990, the 
critical juncture period for the legal framework lasted at least until 1993 
because an essentially unlimited number of solutions were discussed in 
parliament, including whether the mayor and council chairman posts would 
be unified or not, or whether the post of mayor would be filled by a specialist 
or an elected person (Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 1993, May 12). Moreover, 
the potential enduring legacies (without which we cannot talk about a critical 
juncture) were, in many cases, only produced in 1993. Politicians and leaders 
were not personal bearers of the interwar legacies because the first decade of 
Soviet rule eliminated that possibility. Instead, the political actors functioned 
as enablers of the interwar legacy (Sarapuu, 2017). Hence their understanding 
of the interwar local government may also have been influenced by their own 
‘present needs and purposes. The past is a kind of screen upon which we 
project our vision of the future’178 (Becker, 1955, p. 337). 
Before concluding on specific institutions, there are at least three aspects 
relevant to this context that need highlighting. First, at the beginning of the 
interwar period, social transformation was crucial, while in the post-
communist period, the people in power during the Soviet period continued for 
the most part. Until 1917, those in power in the cities were mainly Baltic 
Germans because they also owned the majority of real estate and companies. 
In their list at the elections, some Estonians also gained a seat on the local 
council (Vihalem, 1963, pp. 11–12), and so Estonians were not entirely 
excluded, although they were often in the minority.179 Parming (1975) does not 
hesitate to claim that an Estonian Social Revolution took place at the 
beginning of the interwar independence, in that the Constituent Assembly 
promulgated the land reform in 1919. The reform transformed society because 
the manorial land holdings were nationalised. ‘Since the estates had been the 
backbone of Baltic German power in Estonia, the Land Reform was 
instrumental in transferring political, economic, social and cultural power to 
                                                 
because the correct choice will guarantee purity and moral force. And moral force will guarantee courage. 
And the courage of a proper conviction will guarantee a continuity of struggle and the achievement of 
one’s goals’ (cited in Pettai, 2007). 
178 According to Becker (1955, p. 336) ‘our imagined picture of the actual [historical] event is always 
determined by two things: (1) by the actual event itself insofar as we can know something about it; and 
(2) by our own present purposes, desires, prepossessions, and prejudices, all of which enter into the 
process of knowing it’. 
179 Vihalem (1963) puts forward an example that while in 1878 in Tartu there were about 30,000 
inhabitants, only 1,081 persons had the right to vote. In rural municipalities the situation was different 
and the possibility of participating was better. Konstantin Päts, who had a crucial role in the interwar 
period, started his political career in Tallinn city council in 1904. 
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the natives’ and ‘led to the formation of a sizeable ethnic Estonian propertied 
rural class’ (Parming, 1975, p. 25). In the 1990s, the land and ownership 
reform had the purpose of remedying the injustice caused by the Soviet 
occupation in 1940, when all land was nationalised. The Land Reform also 
had, in addition to its economic aspect (e.g. privatisation created a land market 
as a component of the market economy), a political one – the weakening of 
political opposition. Even the Land Reform can to a certain extent be seen as 
an attempt to continue from where the Republic ended in 1940. 
Second, while in the interwar period Estonians inherited functioning 
structures from 1917 and earlier, the land reform of 1919 was crucial in 
removing Baltic Germans from the decision-making position. In addition, as a 
result of the Communists’ armed coup attempt in December 1924, ‘the 
Communist Party of Estonia was destroyed as an effective political entity’ 
(Parming, 1975, p. 13). Furthermore, the coup attempt resulted in ‘temporary 
political stability’ with which ‘Estonia was able to resolve many domestic 
economic difficulties’, and also contributed to an ‘increasing rightward shift of 
Estonian domestic politics’ (Parming, 1975, p. 13). People started to realise the 
value of nationhood and independence.  
In the 1990s, on the other hand, it was not so much the people in the 
administration that had to be replaced180 but, rather, there was a need to create 
appropriate structures for a democratic state. Those from the 1920s could not 
be re-installed in their initial form because the temporal context and 
antecedent conditions in the 1990s were different. At the same time, the 
institutional framework for local government at the end of the 1930s was 
enacted under an authoritarian regime, but it contained several aspects 
already proposed or discussed in the 1920s, and therefore the framework 
cannot be automatically labelled entirely unsuitable under democracy.  
The third point to highlight is that during the second decade of 
independence both periods witnessed a global economic depression or crisis. 
In the interwar period the first ‘occurred during the first half of the 1920s 
[1923–1924] and culminated in the attempted Communist coup, and the 
second, a decade later, during the great depression, which culminated in the 
collapse of the democratic order’ (Parming, 1975, p. 17).  
Due to the economic depression at the beginning of the 1930s and at the 
end of the 2000s, the state had to cut expenditure, which also affected local 
government. On account of different central-local relations, the consequences 
for local government were different during these two periods. In the interwar 
period, the revenues of the local authorities depended more on local taxes than 
during the post-communist period, and hence the state was able to exert less 
of a direct influence. On the other hand, during the post-communist period, 
the share of local taxes was marginal at best, and hence the state could 
                                                 
180 In terms of people, a common problem during the transition in Central and Eastern Europe ‘was 
the shortage of well-qualified, motivated civil servants’ in the public administration (Randma-Liiv & 
Drechsler, 2017).  
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intervene more, which it did by decreasing the income tax share transferred to 
local governments and by making their loan-taking subject to permission from 
the Ministry of Finance, thereby restricting their fiscal autonomy (Savi & 
Randma-Liiv, 2015). What was similar for both periods was the state’s 
reluctance to reinstall the pre-crisis situation. In the 1930s, the state had 
increased taxes due to the crisis, but in the post-crisis period the state tax rates 
were not decreased substantially (Valge, 2000). During the post-communist 
period, the local government revenue base had still not been restored to the 
pre-crisis level by 2017.  
7.1 COUNTY ADMINISTRATION 
County administration and the question of the one-tier vs. two-tier local 
government system are strongly interrelated. If we consider both the interwar 
period and the time since re-independence, county government enjoyed the 
most capacity and legitimacy during the first years of independence, ‘when 
counties were subsidiary to the weak central and municipal government and 
ensured an extensive set of public services’ (Sootla & Laanes, 2015, p. 212). At 
other times, the county government was more of an extended arm of central 
government than a representative of local or regional interests and a balancing 
power. An analysis of different patterns of county-level governance, based on 
the dual versus fused pattern, has already been presented elsewhere (see 
Sootla & Laanes, 2015). That particular analysis identified four governing 
patterns during the interwar period and three patterns since 1989. As can be 
seen from Table 7.1, while the fused pattern dominated during the interwar 
period, since the 1990s the dual pattern has been most prevalent, influenced 
by the example of the Nordic countries. In 1989–1993, the county level was 
characterised temporarily by a fused pattern, although formally it was more of 
a dual one. At the county level there was a local government with an elected 
council, but its main task at that time was to hand over its municipal tasks to 
the cities and rural municipalities.  
Table 7.1 Summary of patterns of county governance in Estonia  
Unit/ 
dimension 






























































Fused Fused Fused  Fused Dual 
[Tempora-





























No No  
 
Source: Sootla & Laanes, 2015, p. 213. 
7.1.1 THE ROLE OF LEGACIES DURING CRITICAL JUNCTURES IN 
THE 1990S 
The relevance of legacies, or lack thereof, is somewhat reflected in the 
institutional choices made in the transitional decisions of 1989/90,181 in the 
Constitution, in the County Administration Act of 1993, and in the 
Government of the Republic Act of 1995. These pieces of legislation were the 
main ones regulating county governance at the beginning of the 1990s.  
As already indicated in Chapter 6, the power concentration at the raion 
level, as well the soviet politico-administrative system in general (Sarapuu, 
2017), which had been effected during the Soviet period, was a negative 
experience, and something that decision-makers attempted to leave behind in 
the 1990s. 182 ‘Moreover, because the county government was a stronghold of 
communist soft-liners, but the new political elite regarded the municipal level 
as a basis for its political power resource, a strong political cleavage’ between 
tiers, besides the structural tensions, shaped the context for the evolution of 
county governance (Sootla & Laanes, 2015, p. 207).  
Both the communist and interwar legacies played a role in the decisions of 
1989–90. The communist legacies acted as constraints – especially the power 
of the old elites at the raion level and the remnants of old institutions in the 
new environment. The initial two-tier local government can be seen as a 
conversion, where the raion soviet was converted into a second-tier local 
                                                 
181 The decisions of 1989/90 refer here to the Local Soviets Election Act of 1989, to the Decision on 
Implementation of Administrative Reform of 1989, to the LGFA of 1989, etc. 
182 At the meeting of the Constitutional Assembly in October 1991, H. Runnel had this to say about 
the issue of tiers: ‘People have a real fear that the current raion centres are full of corrupt people and that 
keeping these centres viable might be dangerous. Therefore people say that all the power should be 
concentrated in the rural municipality. But is it like that? It might be a temporary state of mind, because 
if we implement the other option, namely appoint alien leaders [kroonu juhtkond] from the capital to 
the counties, then we will create a terrible phenomenon – an alien state [kroonuriik]; and I am of the 
opinion that as a citizen it is even a bit better to deal with local corrupt people than with the authority’s 
executors sent from the distant capital, and with whom we share no common language. This is a 
dilemma.’ (CCA, 1997, p. 343). 
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government via competitive elections and a new legal framework in an attempt 
to temporarily revive the interwar legacies of strong municipalities.  
The directly elected raion/county council in 1989 was a transitional 
phenomenon because during the Soviet period the raion soviet was ‘elected’ 
and the competitive election aspect was added in 1989 as a natural part of 
democratisation. Therefore there is no clear strong basis to connect the elected 
county council with the 1920s. In addition, the main debate in Parliament 
during the adoption of the election act was the question of who had the right 
to participate in the elections; this is a communist legacy – a ‘legacy of 
incomplete nation building’ (Crawford & Lijphart, 1995, p. 187). 
When it comes to the Constitution, in September 1991, the county 
governors and chairs of the county councils opted for the local government 
part in the Constitution to follow the 1938 Constitution model (Eesti Vabariigi 
Põhiseadusliku Assamblee VII toimkond, 1991, October 5, p. 9). While the 
county governors wanted the county council to be composed of deputies 
delegated by the councils of cities and rural municipalities, the council chairs 
preferred a directly elected county council instead (Eesti Vabariigi 
Põhiseadusliku Assamblee VII toimkond, 1991, October 5). Both versions 
existed at different times during the interwar period. The council chairmen’s 
preference for direct election can also be explained as an attempt by actors to 
increase the power of the representative. The main argument for the 1938 
system was that it represented ‘a balancing synthesis of state power and self-
government’ (Eesti Vabariigi Põhiseadusliku Assamblee VII toimkond, 1991, 
October 5, p. 10), and therefore the system inscribed in the County Act of 1938 
was still a positive example to consider, although it was not fully implemented. 
In the end, no decision about the county was inscribed in the Constitution. 
Nonetheless, as described in Section 6.2, for some, stipulating the county as 
second-tier local government in the Constitution could have kept the old elite 
at the raion level, and implied maintaining power at the county level as an 
element of the Soviet system. 
At the first reading of the County Administration Act of 1993 in the 
parliament (Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 1993, June 9), the representative of 
the relevant parliamentary committee admitted that the thinking behind the 
bill was similar to that of the County Act of 1938, although it followed the 
principle of decentralism, contrary to the Act of 1938. The County 
Administration Act was a temporary Act and a very short one, in contrast to 
the County Act of 1938. The local government interim system established in 
1989 was reorganized in 1993 ‘into a split hierarchy [...], where two 
autonomous realms of public authority do not have direct institutional contact 
at the county level’ (Sootla & Kattai, 2010, p. 583). In essence then, the 
counties became a part of the central government apparatus, again making it 




The adoption of the Government of the Republic Act in 1995 only 
anchored the county government as a governmental authority.183 The 
discussions were limited to the continuation of the path chosen in 1993. For 
example, it was discussed whether the term ‘county government’ should be 
replaced by the term ‘office of the county governor’ or not (see 
Justiitsministeerium, 1995, October). The county governors objected to the 
proposed change because, according to them, a reform of that scale would 
have needed a longer preparation time (see Justiitsministeerium, 1995, 
October). Although the term ‘county government’ was incorrect, as county 
government is not a collegial body, the term was retained because people 
were accustomed to it (Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 1995, November 16). This 
signifies (weak) path dependence with the interwar period; if a different term 
had been used for the county government in the interwar period, it would 
have been easier to change the terminology in 1995. The fact that the 
appropriate term would be ‘office of the county governor’ was also 
highlighted in the reform plan of 1998 (see Aru, 1998). 
The impacts of joining the European Union and of Europeanisation at the 
county level are very limited. In contrast to many other Central and Eastern 
European countries, ‘Estonia has matched its institutions to the requirements 
of the EU regional policy by making only minimal changes to its system of local 
and regional governance’ (Kungla, 2010, p. 182). Coupled with the fact that, 
for the county level, the interwar period was referred to as a source of ideas 
more than other countries were, it can be stated that the impact of external 
support on the county administration was limited and weak, compared to the 
legacies of the past and institutional choices. 
7.1.2 INITIAL WEAKENING OF COUNTY GOVERNMENT SETS PATH 
FOR DECADES 
Administration or local government at the meso level has existed for more 
than a century. The lack of territorial reform (i.e. the context) kept the 
remnants of county government functioning and relevant, during both the 
interwar and re-independence periods. The large number of rural 
municipalities was a constraint that kept the institution on the path. Removing 
the constitutional protection of county government has not resulted in the 
abolishment of county government, although it has made it easier to increase 
the state influence at the county level and to make it a state authority.  
The interwar system was inherited from the days of the Russian Empire, 
and the need for reform was voiced throughout the 1920s. The main obstacle 
to abolishing the county governments stemmed from the fact that the state 
level could not cope with the supervision of about 375 rural municipalities. The 
                                                 
183 As county governors were the Government’s representatives in the counties and county 
governments were government authorities, the county government was regulated in the Government of 
the Republic Act (Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 1995, November 16). 
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Constitution of 1934 included the mandate to abolish the county governments, 
although in practice the latter were replaced by temporary county 
governments as both an administrative body and the extended arm of central 
government. The few years of temporary county government demonstrated 
that there has to be something between the state level and the level of cities 
and rural municipalities – it was not feasible to carry out all the tasks 
performed at the county level at other levels. The path set before the 
independence of the state was difficult to alter.  
The county government’s very own institutional design was only created 
with the County Act of 1938, integrating at the county level both the state level 
(the county governor was a state representative, appointed by the President) 
and the local level (members of the county council were elected from among 
the rural municipality mayors and city elders by the plenary of the mayors and 
city elders). Therefore, the Estonians’ own system was created and put into 
place only under the authoritarian regime. This altered the path set at the time 
of the Russian Empire. 
A path-dependent explanation of the development of county government is 
presented in Figure 7.1. I refrain from calling the 1934 attempt to abolish 
county self-government a critical juncture because it does not wholly meet the 
critical juncture definition.184 The path dependence from the Russian times 
was too strong to alter. Whether or not to term the result of the County Act of 
1938 a critical juncture poses another question, for two reasons in particular. 
First, the change was made under the authoritarian regime, and second, 
although the County Act of 1938 was in force for a short period, it created a 
legacy that is still referred to. 
 
Figure 7.1  Path-dependent explanation of the development of county government in the 
interwar and post-communist periods 
When it comes to the post-communist period, the purpose of the reform 
initiated in 1989 was to restore strong municipal self-government and to 
transfer the tasks from the raion/county to this level. The option of county self-
                                                 
184 As defined in Section 3.1.1, a critical juncture is a ‘major episode of institutional innovation that 



















































government was still on the table until 1993.185 The decision of May 1993 on 
establishing a single-tier local government ‘was a victory by the new political 
elites’ (Sootla & Laanes, 2015, p. 208) who saw the county level as a competitor 
to the local level. This decision put county government on the path that was 
followed until 2017: gradually increasing dependence on the Cabinet and 
losing functions to the government agencies, which eventually resulted in the 
abolishment of county governments in 2018.  
The decision of May 1993, which established single-tier local government, 
contains only three short points. The Parliament adopted it mainly because 
the Constitutional Assembly and the designers of the LGOA of 1993 were not 
able to take a clear position on the number of tiers. The inexperienced political 
elite might have also started to understand the non-political problems related 
to the second-level local government (Sootla & Lääne, 2012, p. 302). Since May 
1993, the two-tier local government has no longer been an option, or at least 
one where there is a county government as such at the second level. Therefore 
the critical juncture lasted from 1989 until 1993. In May 2016, the Ministry of 
Finance proposed five different options for the development of county 
government in its analysis (Rahandusministeerium, 2016a, p. 237), but none 
of these foresaw the county-level local government. The same analysis 
proposed abolishing county governments as of March 2018 by transferring 
their tasks to the agencies under the ministries, or to local governments (or the 
associations of the latter), and establishing regional agencies for some 
functions. 
When it comes to the strength of county government as a political 
institution, the analysis leads to the assumption that the negative legacy of the 
raion was stronger than the positive memory of the interwar republic, because 
within the space of almost three decades there was no serious attempt to 
strengthen county government, and county-level local self-government was 
not even considered. The path set in 1989 – of relinquishing tasks and 
resources at the county level – has been followed, but in addition to passing 
these tasks downwards to municipalities, the tasks have also been transferred 
to the state. 
During the whole post-communist period, several alternatives have been 
possible, including giving the county-level tasks to the local government 
associations, transforming county government into state authorities with 
more extensive responsibilities and tasks, and so forth. For some reason, the 
political parties have not dared to strengthen the county governments, despite 
the fact that the county governors have become political appointees and 
therefore more controlled by the state. The option of giving county-level tasks 
to the county or municipal association would have required changing the 
status of the association in the legislation (Sootla & Laanes, 2015, p. 209).  
                                                 
185 Ginter (1991, p. 338) already noted in 1991 that as the tensions between local councils and local 
governments were pronounced enough, drafts abolishing county councils were under preparation. 
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Path dependence during the interwar and post-communist period is 
evident, but path dependence between those two periods is questionable. 
There is no visible impact of the decisions made during the interwar period on 
the post-communist period when it comes to the county government.  
After abolishing the county government in 2018, only time will tell whether 
Estonia will face any of the challenges that it faced in 1934–1937 with the 
temporary county government. 
7.2 THE APPOINTED MAYOR 
Traditionally in Estonia the municipal government has been led by a mayor 
(i.e. the plural executive model). The mayor has been an inseparable part of 
local government in Estonia and some even used the term ‘mayor’ to describe 
the chair of the executive committee. Hence, the institutional legacy of the 
interwar republic mayor remained in people’s minds throughout the Soviet 
period.  
Arguments in Europe in favour of directly electing the mayor include 
increased accountability and transparency, but ‘the outcome of these debates 
about the rights and wrongs of direct mayoral elections are influenced and 
shaped by the distinct political culture and history of the country concerned’ 
(Kukovic, Copus, Hacek, & Blair, 2015, p. 694). In the case of the Baltic 
countries, the mayor has been directly elected only in Lithuania as of 2015, 
after more than a decade of debate. In Estonia and Latvia the mayor is elected 
by the local council. In Slovenia, where direct election was introduced in 1994 
and trust in political parties is low, independent candidates and lists are 
becoming increasingly successful election after election, also in large cities 
(Kukovic, Copus, Hacek, & Blair, 2015). 
7.2.1 WIDELY USED PRACTICE OBSCURES LEGACY  
In Estonia, the election of the mayor has almost always been within the remit 
of the council, and the mayor has never been elected directly by the people. 
The only exception was the so-called ‘Era of Silence’: with the Decree of 19 
March 1934186 the Government of the Republic was empowered to appoint the 
mayors of four cities, where the mandates of more than 30% of the councilmen 
had been annulled (Postimees, 1934b). In addition, under the City Act of 1938, 
the mayor of the capital city was appointed by the President of the Republic. 
In the first-level cities, the Government of the Republic appointed the mayor 
based on a nomination by the Minister of Internal Affairs. In the second- and 
third-level cities, the mayor was appointed by the council, but was subject to 
the approval of the Minister of Internal Affairs. The appointment of the mayor 
by the state level can be regarded as a deviation attributable to 
                                                 
186 Decree amending the City Act (Linnaseaduse muutmise dekreet). 
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authoritarianism. In addition, the length of the mayoral mandate has always 
been dependent on the mandate of the council. The end of the 1930s again 
proved to be an exception, although separating the duration of the mandates 
had been discussed already before 1934. 
It is difficult to say anything about the impact of legacies in the case of the 
mayoral appointment for several reasons. First, in the parliamentary 
procedure, references to the interwar or communist legacies are not evident 
when it comes to the appointment/election of the mayor. Secondly, the 
procedure whereby the council appoints the mayor was, and is, widely used in 
Europe. Thirdly, the council appointed the mayor in the interwar period and 
the same principle was used for the equivalent post (i.e. chair of the executive 
committee) during the communist period. 187 
7.2.2 PATH ENFORCED BY CONTEXT OR LEGAL PATH 
DEPENDENCE 
The direct election of the mayor has never been seriously and openly 
considered in recent decades in Estonia. However, the principles of the Local 
Soviets of People’s Deputies Election bill, published in 1988 (Rahva Hääl, 
1988), stated that in addition to the deputies the chairman of local soviets 
would also be directly elected (the equivalent in the current system is the 
chairman of the council). Among the feedback submitted on the principles in 
1988/89 we can find proposals for the direct election of the mayor or chair of 
the executive committee (Eesti Vabariigi Ülemnõukogu Esimehe Kantselei, 
1988/1989). Some proposed introducing the direct election of the mayor in the 
LGFA of 1989, but the Local Soviets of People’s Deputies Election Act had 
already been adopted in August that year and it did not foresee the direct 
election of the mayor. Hence, the Election Act eliminated the option of direct 
election; in other words, the path was selected with the Election Act. 
A possibility for a juncture emerged in 1993 with the LGOA bill, which 
stated that the council would elect the mayor. During the reading of the bill in 
parliament, a motion to amend was presented, according to which the 
municipality government would be led by a specialist (chair of the city or rural 
municipality government) and the mayor would lead the council. This 
proposal was rejected.188 The status quo, namely an appointed mayor, was 
maintained with reference to other posts in the governing system. A similar 
proposal and various alternatives were also proposed in the reform plan of 
1998 (see Aru, 1998). Every now and then some politicians have brought up 
the idea of direct election, but it has not engendered a public debate. 
In the absence of a solid debate on how the mayor should be elected or 
appointed, I am disinclined to say whether the antecedent conditions 
                                                 
187 Under § 7 of the Act on the Parish Administration in Baltic Provinces of 1866, the mayor of a rural 
municipality was elected by the plenary of the rural municipality, which can be seen as a direct election. 
188 20 were in favour, 31 against, and 6 abstained (Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 1993, May 12).  
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(including interwar legacies) have or have not had an impact on that decision. 
The legacies explanation in the case of the appointed mayor is questionable. 
However, a strong executive can relate to Päts’ authoritarianism, which in turn 
could have fostered reluctance to consider the direct election of the mayor. 
To add context to the analysis of the election of the mayor, the changing 
power of the mayor vis-à-vis the council is summarised in Table 7.2.189  
Table 7.2  Selected indicators of horizontal power relations  
Whether ... City Act of 1892 
(version of 1927) 
City Act of 1938 Fundamentals 
Act of 1989 
Organisation Act 
of 1993 




No (appointed by 
the council) 
No (either (i) 
appointed by the 
President, or (ii) by 
the Government of 
the Republic, or 
(iii) elected by the 
council and appro-
ved by the Minister 
of the Interior)  
No (appointed by 
the council) 
No (appointed by 
the council) 
... mayor’s 
term in office 
is equal to the 
council’s 
Yes No Yes Yes 
... mayor can 
be recalled by 
the council 
Not regulated Respectively the 
President or 
Minister of the 
Interior can 






No Yes Yes (in the 
primary-level 









Yes Yes At the primary level 
– yes; at the 
secondary level – 
no. 
The possibility is 
limited 
... the mayor 
appoints the 
city secretary 
Yes Mayor makes a 
proposal and the 
Minister of the 
Interior appoints 
Yes Yes 
Source: Laanes, 2012  
 
The Table shows that the mayor presided over the council meetings mainly 
when the central government was aiming for centralisation or when there was 
a need to implement a major reform. The gradual establishment of 
municipalities provided a good opportunity to demonstrate the importance of 
the mayor, and as the posts of mayor and chair of the council were unified at 
                                                 
189 The table is based on the main indicators (with some modifications) that were used in an 
international survey reported by Heinelt and Hlepas (2006). The survey covered 17 European countries 
and focused on mayors.  
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the primary level, this was thanks to the context – namely the need to 
concentrate powers in order to implement the reform, and the potential lack 
of suitable candidates in small municipalities. Hence, the context and Soviet 
legacies temporarily suppressed the interwar legacies when it came to unifying 
the posts of mayor and council chairman.  
Many aspects in Table 7.2 can be explained by the separation of powers 
between representative and executive. For example, the initial bill of the LGOA 
of 1993 provided the possibility for the city or rural municipality government 
(i.e. the executive body) to initiate an expression of no confidence in the 
council chair, which the experts (Ekspertgrupp, 1993, April 14) highlighted as 
being against common logic. The same experts also drew attention to the 
lessons and examples of the interwar Republic.  
In summary, the alternative in the form of a directly elected mayor has been 
available but, on the one hand, previous decisions have been used to justify the 
appointment of the mayor and, on the other hand, it may be a case of legal path 
dependence,190 where the alternative has not really been considered, because 
discussions on the direct election of the mayor are rare in parliamentary 
debates after 1993. 
7.3 ELECTION RULES IN POLITICAL WINDS 
For some institutions, path dependence is not very evident. In the case of 
electoral rules, there is a low degree of interrelation or complementarity with 
other institutions, and path dependence between the two periods of 
independence is marginal at best.  
During the interwar period, the principles of election rules were generally 
changed before every election. In the case of voting rights and eligibility for 
nominations, the changes were often linked to the changes in the legislation 
concerning parliamentary elections and the changes in the Constitution. A 
proportional system was used for most of the period, which was also anchored 
in the Constitution until 1938.  
7.3.1 LEGACY OF INCOMPLETE NATION-BUILDING COMMANDEERS 
THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE IN THE 1990S 
A proportional system was introduced in Estonia in 1918. In 1933, the shift to 
voting for individuals instead of lists was mainly due to the context – economic 
recession, failed attempts to amend the Constitution, and a surge in the 
veterans movement (Adams, 2009). Adams claims that people could have 
enshrined the election of individuals, which occurred during the Tsarist times, 
in their memories; it was nostalgic and therefore easier to revert to it in the 
                                                 
190 ‘Legal path dependence occurs when an initial path effectively blinds lawmakers to alternative 
paths’ (Schwarcz & Sharon, 2014, p. 1722). 
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1930s. In addition, the new system of 1933 borrowed some elements from 
Finland (Klesment, 1933, p. 211) and hence it was not a reapplication of the 
old self-tested system. 
When it came to the local election rules of the post-communist period, the 
interwar practice was ignored, although some thought the election rules of 
1939 could be used in the 1990s with certain amendments (CCA, 1997, pp. 139-
140), or at least that some elements of the interwar period (e.g. limited vote 
method) could be used. Instead, in 1989 and 1993, the focus in the parliament 
was on who should have the right to vote. This is what Crawford and Lijphart 
(1995) have called the (communist) legacy of incomplete nation-building. 
Another communist legacy, or antecedent condition, was in action in 1996 
when the parliament unsuccessfully sought to introduce an ex ante control 
mechanism,191 ensuring that all candidates would have a good enough 
command of Estonian to effectively participate in council work. In the Soviet 
era, it was not necessary for ethnic Russians living in Estonia to learn 
Estonian, and so individuals could have been elected to the council who were 
unable to participate fully in the council work due to language shortcomings. 
Utility maximisation is an argument for the two main debates related to the 
local elections in the later post-communist period – dual mandate and 
electoral alliances. These debates have not been influenced by interwar 
legacies, and as the interwar election system was in constant flux, no solid 
legacy was formed. As personal connections and informal networks are 
considered a Leninist legacy (LaPorte & Lussier, 2011), Soós (2010, p. 124) 
considers it probable that as ‘[p]ersonal connections served as a major 
resource under the previous regime’ in Hungary, the cumul des mandats ‘was 
prohibited in the first years after the system change’. In Estonia, it was 
prohibited only from 2002 and the ban came into effect in 2005. As of 2017, it 
is again allowed to combine the mandates of Member of the Parliament and of 
the local council. As a result, this legacy did not have the same effect in Estonia 
during the first years of re-independence. 
When it comes to the citizen electoral alliances, the fact that these were 
established could have been a remnant of the transitional rules, which have 
been difficult to alter subsequently. Some see the attempt to ban the citizen 
electoral alliances as a form of mandatory party membership 
(sundparteistamine). The latter is a communist legacy, which worked in 
favour of the electoral alliances. While the Political Parties Act of 1994 aimed 
to speed up the formation of political parties and broaden their membership, 
the term ‘party’ carried a negative connotation, and hence the process of letting 
                                                 
191 A similar provision on language was used in Latvia. Therefore several members of the Estonian 
Parliament interpreted the President’s decision in May 1996 not to proclaim the Local Government 




only political parties present candidates at the local elections had to be gradual 
(Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 1996, April 17).192  
7.3.2 LIMITED PATH DEPENDENCE 
The electoral rules have not changed fundamentally since 1993. As 
demonstrated, the rules for the local elections of 1989 were transitional ones, 
where a balance had to be struck between the new system and the old higher-
level rules that were still in force. The fact that there have been no major 
changes does not automatically imply the impact of path dependence, 
however. In order to claim that there is path dependency, other alternatives 
must also be available, as well as ‘positive feedback effects that generate 
continuity’ (e.g. who benefits from the institution) (Sorensen, 2015, p. 22). 
Alexander (2001, p. 259) suggests electoral laws as an example of easily 
amendable or ‘non-sticky’ institutions, because these ‘can be changed by a 
simple legislative majority’. When we take a look at the elements set in the 
Constitution (see Table 7.3), we can see that there were more elements in the 
Constitutions during the interwar period than there were during the post-
communist period. All four Constitutions have left legislators with 
considerable room for manoeuvre. 
Table 7.3  Local election principles in the Constitution 
Constitution Elements in the Constitution 
1920 Direct elections, proportionality principle 
1934 Direct elections, proportionality principle, voters have opportunity to vote for 
individuals 
1938 Direct elections, voters have permanent residence or employment in the 
municipality they vote in 
1992 Direct elections, voters have permanent residence in the municipality and are 
at least 18 years old 
(In 2015, the age requirement was reduced from 18 to 16) 
 
Basic rules for the parliamentary elections had already been established 
before the local election system was redesigned in 1993. It is noteworthy that 
the parliamentary election rules were not taken as a model or basis for 
designing the local election system, however. As the Constitution of 1992 
stipulated the proportionality principle only for the parliamentary elections, 
such pre-determination did not exist for the local council elections, which 
meant that the legislators were free to design the electoral rules as they saw fit.  
                                                 
192 In Lithuania there were only party lists in the local elections of 1995. 
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Setting the requirement for a political party to have at least 1,000 members 
in 1994, stipulating state subsidies for the parties in parliament, and banning 
electoral alliances in the parliamentary elections since 1998 have all 
contributed to the cartelisation of party politics (Pettai, 2009). The minimum 
threshold for party members has been put forward as an argument for why 
electoral alliances at the local level cannot be abolished. When the threshold 
for party registration was set at 1,000 members in 1994, it was acknowledged, 
during the debate on the Political Parties Act in 1994, that parliament serves 
as the primary functioning level for parties, while at the local level there are 
many non-party lists (Riigikogu Verbatim Record, 1994, May 11).193 The small 
size of the municipalities has therefore been a constraint and enforced the set 
path (i.e. the existence of electoral alliances). It has been in the interests of 
many political parties to abolish electoral alliances, not only because of the 
power at the local level, but also because local council members without party 
affiliation increase unpredictability when electing the President. 
Hence, we can claim that in the case of election rules, path dependence is 
weak at best over the two periods of independence. In this sense, rational-
choice institutionalism could possibly provide a better explanation because 
changes have largely been introduced when actors have wanted to use election 
rules to maximise their utility.  
Despite the lack of path dependence vis-à-vis the interwar Republic, the 
electoral alliances phenomenon is possibly path dependent within the post-
communist period. The negative connotation of the ‘party’ and the existence 
of small municipalities have resulted in no ban being placed on electoral 
alliances. Figure 7.2 deserves some explanation. The critical juncture for 
electoral alliances depends on judgement and interpretation. There are at least 
two different perspectives from which one can approach the issue. First, we 
could treat as a critical juncture the decision to allow citizen electoral alliances 
at the elections in addition to political parties and individuals. Second, the 
policy choice whereby political parties are national-level players was made 
with the Political Parties Act of 1994. This choice can be treated as a critical 
juncture because it created a system in which the political-party playground 
occurs at the national level, and renders infeasible the existence of political 
parties whose activity would be restricted to just one or a limited number of 
municipalities. At the same time, this choice can be seen as a strong variable 
that reproduces the structural pattern. 
                                                 
193 In the Riigikogu in 1994, during the discussion over the Political Parties Act, some MPs stressed 
that during the interwar period, or pre-1934 to be precise, three members would suffice to form a political 
party (Riigikogu, 1994, May 4). The bill for the Political Parties Act of 1994 was drafted mainly following 




Figure 7.2  Path-dependent explanation of citizen electoral alliances 
7.4 DEVELOPMENT OF CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS 
FROM THE STANDPOINT OF CONTINUITY 
The development of local government institutions, analysed above, also sheds 
light on central-local relations. As already indicated, the fused system was 
predominant during the interwar period, while the dual system was formally 
in use in the post-communist period. In both cases, the respective system was 
a result of external impact. In the interwar period, the system was a legacy of 
the Russian empire, but its format was strongly influenced by the ideas of 
Prussian reform architect and statesman vom Stein, and reflected continental 
European principles. It is interesting to note that while in the post-communist 
period the state-level institutional setting followed the continental European 
state tradition, the Scandinavian tradition predominated at the local level.194 
That inevitably created additional tensions. The main reason for the 
establishment of the dual system in the 1990s was the connections of the 
Estonian elite with the Nordic countries and the direct assistance of their local 
government associations, which can be seen as a contingency. The external 
influence on institutional design can be interpreted as a source of disruption 
of continuity. The fact that foreign expertise and policy transfer were supply-
based in Estonian public administration at the beginning of the 1990s, due to 
urgency, but demand-based from the late 1990s, has also been highlighted by 
Randma-Liiv (2005).  
When it comes to drawing comparisons between the two periods of 
independence, mention should be made of the fact that at the beginning of 
interwar independence, the municipalities and also the county level were more 
developed than the national level in terms of (democratic) political institutions 
than in the wake of the post-communist period. The strong local government 
was a legacy of the Russian empire. At the beginning of the 1990s, the primary 
level had to be restored and the county level was impacted by negative legacies 
from the Soviet period. Therefore, due to the negative experiences of strong 
raions under Soviet rule and the positive legacy of strong municipalities in the 
1920s, coupled with the general democratisation and decentralisation trends, 
                                                 
194 For additional details on four state traditions (Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, French, and 
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it was only to be expected that the counties would lose at least some of the 
power, while the cities and rural municipalities would gain power and 
functions. However, centralisation trends were in evidence even in the mid-
1990s and the 2000s. Hence, the antecedent conditions of the two periods 
were different. 
7.4.1 TENDENCY TOWARDS A NORTHERN EUROPEAN SYSTEM  
With its Protestant past and present, Estonia should belong, according to Page 
and Goldsmith’s typology, to the Northern tradition. The latter is 
characterised by a wide set of functions, a high level of discretion, and a low 
level of connections between local government actors and those at the state 
level. If we take a look at these typological elements, then the tendency in both 
periods is more towards the Nordic/Protestant type than towards the 
Southern orientation (see Table 7.4), especially when we take into account the 
fact that local politicians are not influential at the central level. 
Decentralisation in the 1990s was mainly political and somewhat 
administrative with limited fiscal decentralisation, which, according to Falleti 
(2010, p. 37), ‘indicates that the national government has the upper hand’.  
 Table 7.4  Estonian local government in the North-South typology 
 Interwar democracy (1918–1934) Post-communist period 
Functions Low Medium 
Discretion High (with a tendency towards 
medium) 




access to the 
central state 
Low to medium 
Cities had direct access to the 
central government as they were 
subordinated to the national and not 
to the county level, while for rural 
municipalities, the county served as 
an intermediary. Access also 
through associations. 
Low (initially medium) 
Access mainly through 
associations. Based on the example 
of budget negotiations, the access 
is low. In addition, the political 
parties’ representatives (especially 
after the dual mandate) can obtain 
better access than the election 
coalitions. 
 
Functions. When calculating local government expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP, which is a way to assess decentralisation and also an ‘indicator of 
functional importance of local governments’ (Soós, 2010, p. 117), it is apparent 
that during the interwar period its development progressed in pace with that 
of the state. In the current period, the graph looks somewhat different (see 
Figures 4.1 and 6.2 above). One interpretation, which would require further 
study, is that while during the interwar period the pace of two levels was more 
or less the same, in the post-communist period the local government functions 
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decreased compared to those of the central government.195 Another 
observation based on those two figures is that the local government 
expenditure during the post-communist period has stayed between 5 and 10% 
of GDP, while during the interwar period it was constantly below 5% of GDP. 
Discretion. In order to comment on the discretion of local governments, we 
need to understand the legal framework and financial regime in which they 
operate (Goldsmith & Page, 2010, pp. 5–6). Despite the constitutional 
guarantee, the state can and does restrict local discretion in several ways. 
Firstly, by means of earmarked grants, and secondly, if the revenues do not 
cover the expenditure related to performance of the mandatory functions. The 
latter has also been acknowledged in Constitutional Judgement No. 3-4-1-8-
09 by the Supreme Court, which in March 2010 declared  
unconstitutional the failure to adopt such legislation of general 
application, which: 1) would stipulate what obligations imposed on 
local authorities by law are of a local character and what are of a 
national character; 2) would distinguish between the funds allocated 
to local authorities for deciding on and organising local issues from 
the funds allocated for performance of national obligations, and 
provide for funding of the national obligations imposed on local 
authorities by law out of the state budget. 
 
In 2015, local taxes only constituted about 1% of all local government 
revenues, and the municipalities could decide on about 17% of the revenues 
(Riigikontroll, 2017, p. 9). This is an indication of path dependence within the 
post-communist period because legislation on local taxes was adopted in 1993, 
and the authority to replace or principally change it was subsequently 
lacking.196 According to the National Audit Office (Riigikontroll, 2017, p. 30), 
about one-third of municipalities are interested in introducing new local taxes, 
chiefly a property tax, a heavy goods vehicle tax, and a tourism tax. According 
to the same survey, the local government associations are interested in local 
income tax. This also reflects the municipalities’ wish for increased discretion.  
Swianiewicz and Steyvers (2017) have concluded that in the post-
communist period (in 1990, 2004, and 2014) political discretion in Estonia 
has been high and financial autonomy low. Furthermore, Ladner et al. (2016) 
measure effective political discretion in Estonia on a four-point scale as 2.83 
                                                 
195 One domain which the state has started to take over from local government, or to compete with, 
is upper secondary education (see Laanes, 2016). Formally, the municipalities have had to give little 
away, e.g. primary healthcare; in this sense, the process has been stealthy. 
196 Setting the local government tasks during the drafting of the LGOA of 1993 was completed 
separately from setting the revenue base, and tax legislation was also adopted later, without considering 
the LGOA (Sootla & Kattai, 2010, p. 584). 
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in 1990 and 2.5 in 2014. Hence, discretion is marked in Table 7.4 as ‘medium 
with a tendency towards high’. 
Access. While the arrangements for rural municipalities and cities were 
different during the interwar period, and cities had better access to the central 
government, in the post-communist period this differentiation in legal status 
has been eliminated. The only differences are that ‘local elections in Tallinn 
are held by city districts’ and since 2003 the residents of small islands have 
been obliged to hold a mandatory meeting at least once a year (Mäeltsemees, 
2016, p. 87). During both periods, local government associations have been 
the main tool for local government to provide input into policy-making and 
the legislative process at the state level. This can be seen as an aspect of 
continuity.197 While during both periods the associations wanted to be 
consulted more, the local politicians’ access to state-level politicians can be 
considered low. As individual local governments’ interests are represented via 
municipal associations, their access is limited (Goldsmith & Page, 2010, p. 7). 
On the other hand, the dual mandate or cumul des mandats can increase 
access through party networks (Goldsmith & Page, 2010, p. 7). 
7.4.2 THE ROLE OF (CULTURAL) VALUES 
When it comes to central-local relations, the path dependence with the 
interwar period, based on purely formal institutions, is unclear. Formally, the 
dual system was established based on external support from the Nordic 
countries as well as on the temporary political activism of local populations, 
which had already declined along with the crisis by 1993. An alternative fused 
system would have still been possible, but its likelihood was decreased by the 
geographical location (the proximity of the Nordic countries) and the fact that 
local government legislation of the interwar period stemmed from the 
authoritarian period. On the other hand, if we take a look at the essence of the 
central-local relations, one possibility is that the Soviet system was not able to 
modify the basic values of the people, and it was those self-same values that 
carried the democratic continuity and hampered the success of the dual system 
in the post-communist period.  
The Soviet-style top-down system was gradually replaced by local activism 
in some municipalities even before 1989. For example, Ruutsoo (2000) has 
cited a former chair of the executive committee of the Kanepi village soviet 
who was proud that their village soviet supported national initiatives, even 
when these conflicted with those of Moscow. Therefore, they had to be double-
faced and also follow the orders of the higher authorities at the same time, 
including those of Moscow. How much the local level knew about the interwar 
local government is unknown. The legislation of the 1990s assumingly reflects 
                                                 
197 As the local government associations were re-established based on legal continuity, this has also 
restricted them. There is rivalry between the association of municipalities and the association of cities, 
which in turn is weakening the local government balancing power. 
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the (political and cultural) values of the MPs of the time (see Meyer-Sahling & 
Yesilkagit, 2011). Steinmo (2016, p. 108) emphasised that198  
at the core of historical institutionalism is the insight that history 
matters not just because it provides different contexts in which 
rational actors made choices, but because history affects actors’ 
beliefs, values, and preferences. History matters for our 
understanding of politics because history provides experience and 
experience can change the beliefs and preferences of citizens and their 
elites. But, if we are honest with ourselves, we typically do not have the 
tools to test these propositions. 
Realo (2013, p. 48), by applying the value theory of Ronald Inglehart and 
colleagues, emphasises that individual and group beliefs and actions are 
shaped by cultural values and these values are reflected in ‘[e]veryday 
practices and institutional functioning’. The development of cultural values is, 
according to Inglehart and Baker (2000, p. 49), path dependent: ‘Economic 
development tends to bring pervasive cultural changes, but the fact that a 
society was historically shaped by Protestantism or Confucianism or Islam 
leaves a cultural heritage with enduring effects that influence subsequent 
development’. Based on that, Realo concludes that ‘although the value systems 
of various countries are moving in the same direction under the influence of 
modernisation, the development of the values of these societies is influenced, 
to a significant degree, by their cultural, historical and religious legacies’ 
(2013, p. 50), and hence by both Protestantism and communism in the case of 
Estonia.  
Päts tried to institutionalise the corporatist regime and, according to Pinto 
(2014), the second half of the 1930s in Estonia is characterised by strong social 
corporatism and moderate political corporatism. Indications of corporatism 
have also been apparent in Estonia in the 2000s. In his doctoral dissertation, 
Olle (2002, p. 21) has pointed to indications of corporatism in Estonian 
politics in the 1990s and 2000s, as the changes in the power structure in the 
city of Tallinn had an impact on the relations between the coalition partners 
of the national government. 
Sootla and Lääne (2012) claim that one explanation for centralisation, and 
consequently for the diminishing local autonomy from the mid-1990s 
onwards, is the gradual decrease in the balance of power and cooperativeness, 
and the deepening trend of protective autonomy. Indeed, the latter started to 
hamper the evolution of democratic local government. Similarly, the OECD 
(2011, p. 64) has observed a ‘doing it alone’ approach in the Estonian public 
administration. Such an approach weakens the position of the local 
government in its dealings with the state level.  
                                                 
198 In the same text, Steinmo proposes combining historical institutionalism with experimental 
methods to test some propositions. 
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7.4.3 ADDITIONAL ASPECTS 
History influences the current relationship between the centre and locality, as 
different conflicts have been resolved in different countries in different ways 
(Goldsmith, 2002, p. 94). Sootla and Lääne (2012, pp. 294–295) highlight that 
the ideology and principles on which the central government was developed 
differs from those of local government and that local government reforms have 
faced political confrontation between central and local government in Estonia 
since 1993.  
While during the interwar period the county government performed a 
balancing function in central-local relations and connected the state and local 
government level at the end of the 1930s, in the post-communist period ‘the 
county government has not been considered as a core balancing institution in 
central-local relations. Rather, this role was expected to be played by the 
associations of local authorities’ (Sootla & Kattai, 2010, p. 584). The latter are 
involved through the local government associations’ cooperation council in the 
annual negotiation with the Government Commission on redefining local 
government financial resources. Municipalities have been dissatisfied with the 
negotiations because these are a formality and the state makes decisions based 
on its power position (Riigikontroll, 2017, p. 4). 199 
In short, the legacies of both the interwar (or even the Russian empire) and 
the Soviet periods have impacted the development of central-local relations in 
Estonia, especially at the beginning of the 1990s, while external influences 
have also played a part. Despite the different initial conditions, the problems 
during both periods were the same: the central government’s preference for 
deconcentrated units instead of allocating tasks to municipalities or to their 
associations, coupled with limited opportunities for municipalities to 
influence state-level decision-making. The abolishment of the counties in 2018 
can create a totally new system in Estonia and disrupt any continuity that can 
be identified now. This change of course would open up new perspectives for 
research on Estonian local government.  
7.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
In Estonia at the beginning of the 1990s, attempts were made to avoid taking 
certain decisions that would put local government on a specific path. One 
reason for this is that the persons involved in drafting the legislation were 
often experts, not politicians, and they wanted to leave some of the principal 
decisions to the politicians (e.g. choosing between a single or two-tier local 
government system), or just to leave some options open (e.g. the direct election 
of the mayor). Policy development up to 2017 regarding local government has 
                                                 
199 Local government representatives have not signed the final protocol of the negotiations for 




largely followed the path set in 1993. The most noticeable changes during the 
last few years include state-run upper secondary schools and territorial 
reform. The latter was implemented without providing information on what 
the functions of local governments would be, and how their revenue base 
would be determined. 
The central-local relations set in the legal framework in the interwar period 
contained elements which decision-makers tried to avoid in the 1990s, (i.e. 
negative legacy), especially when it came to the strong executive. But that 
period has also produced many positive legacies. The legislation of 1937/38 
has also been referred to in the explanatory memoranda of bills in the 
2000s200 and parliamentary debates as a positive legacy, despite the fact that 
democracy was already interrupted in 1934. As history is awash with 
contingent events, we cannot know whether the current local government 
would have been different if the legislation of 1937/38 had been adopted in the 
1920s, or if the ELGA had become law in 1920. 
As the focus of this study has been on formal institutions, the main factors 
impacting the development of local government institutions in Estonia in the 
1990s were context, legal path dependence, and legacies (see Table 7.5 below). 
The post-communist developments of local-central relations have been 
influenced more by behavioural and attitudinal legacies, when using the 
categorisation of LaPorte and Lussier (2011), than by the institutional legacies 
of the pre-communist and communist period. The main institutional legacy is 
the organisation of territorial administration. 
 
Table 7.5  Summary of selected institutions 
 
 Historical legacies and antecedent 
conditions (including legacies of 
previous periods) impacting 
institutional choices 




- Power concentration at the raion 
level 
- Municipal level as a potential power 
base of the new political elite, while 
old elites in power at the raion level;  
- County Act of 1938 – considered in 
drafting the County Administration 
Act, but no significant impact. 
In the initial phase, it was important 
to weaken the raion and the old 
elite; the path chosen in 1993 was 
maintained, and no attempts were 
made to strengthen the county 
government. The gradual decline 
of the county level culminated in 
the decision to abolish the county 
government (as a state authority) 
as of 2018. 
Appointed mayor Difficult to identify Possible legal path dependence as 
the mayor was usually appointed 
by the council during the interwar 
and post-communist period.  
Election rules - Incomplete nation building; 
- Negative connotation of political 
party. 
For electoral alliances, the path set 
in the transition was enforced by 
the presence of small 
municipalities and the negative 
connotation of political party. 
                                                 




When it comes to path dependency, this has been strongest in the case of 
county government, followed by the appointment of mayor. Both institutions 
are interrelated with other institutions and this has duly reinforced path 
dependence. As election rules are less connected to other institutions of the 
governance system and are procedural institutions, path dependence is not so 
visible there. In addition, in the development of county government we can 
also see the interaction between interwar and communist legacies, which are 
virtually absent in the case of election rules. 
 
Research question 1: Which aspects of local government institutions in 
Estonia have exhibited the strongest path dependence and in which 
institutions has this been weak or missing and why? 
According to Alexander (2001), not all institutions are path dependent, and 
he proposed that election rules may be one of the non-path-dependent ones. 
The Estonian case largely confirmed this proposition. During the interwar 
period, the municipal election system was changed basically before every 
election. Whether this was due to a fragmented government coalition at the 
national level, parties’ wishes to achieve certain political outcomes, or simply 
a search for the best system, calls for further research. In the post-communist 
period, the election system has been more stable, but I propose that on the 
whole it is not path dependent.201 A visible exception is the element of electoral 
alliances, for which the path was locked in 1993/94 and subsequently enforced 
by the negative connotation of the political party (communist legacy), and by 
the existence of many small municipalities (context). 
The strongest path dependence is exhibited by county administration, 
whose development has been crucially influenced by the decisions of 1917 or 
even earlier. In 1920 it was found that making principal changes would be too 
time- and resource-consuming (large set-up costs), and therefore the system 
that existed during the Russian times was maintained and only gradual 
changes were introduced (layering). A potentially stable structure was created 
in the County Act of 1938, but turned out to be a temporary phenomenon. In 
the post-communist period, an approach towards a weak county (to weaken 
the communist legacy) or a county as a state representative was taken at the 
very beginning, and was retained until the abolishment of county government 
in 2018. An alternative of giving the majority of the county tasks to the local 
                                                 
201 The transitional election rules of 1989 were path dependent because the changes had to fit into 
the general framework set by the Soviet rules. The choice of a single transferrable voting method could 
have been influenced by the fact that there were as yet no political parties in the elections of 1989. The 
legislators had a free hand when it came to the rules of 1993, by which the proportional method was 
chosen for example, but at the same time other alternatives were also available (e.g. majoritarian). The 
political parties have not expressed explicit interest in changing the fundamental aspects of the system 
established in 1993. This may also imply that the proportional system has thus far served the interests 
of all political parties in Estonia compared to its alternatives. 
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government associations was suggested, but was not implemented. In Estonia, 
the county-level administration has always been the loser or ‘underdog’ in 
power struggles. At the same time, we have to keep in mind that the county 
level is already an inherently contested area, both territorially and functionally 
(Keating, 1997, p. 17). 
One important difference compared to the election rules is that county 
administration is an interdependent institution (Pierson, 2004), which 
constrains changes after the institution is established because major changes 
in the county administration could also imply changes at the state or municipal 
level, as well as in the power dynamics. 
 
Research question 2: What was the role of interwar legacies in the critical 
junctures and institutional choices of the post-communist period? 
As ‘Estonia and Latvia had the most substantial prior experience of 
democratic politics of any of the Soviet republics’ (Linz & Stepan, 1996, pp. 
402–403), it was practically impermissible to talk about path dependence 
without paying attention to legacies. This study has provided preliminary 
evidence that interwar institutional legacies were generally not the main 
variables impacting the institutional choices during 1989–1993, but were still 
important enough to make a difference to some institutional aspects. The 
interwar period’s own legislation on local government was adopted only in 
1937/38 (i.e. under the authoritarian regime), and hence when designing local 
government institutions in the 1990s, it was the 1937/38 legislation that was 
referred to and very rarely that of the 1920s. Local government associations of 
the interwar period were re-established in the 1990s based on legal continuity, 
and the interwar terminology was taken into use even if in some cases it did 
not wholly reflect the essence of a specific issue. While the European Charter 
of Local Self-Government provided the frame for institutional design in the 
1990s, the input for details had to come from somewhere else – the interwar 
republic, local government associations in Finland and Sweden, and so forth. 
Historical legacies have probably made certain institutional choices more 
likely and have determined the available alternatives, as Ekiert (2003, p. 93) 
suggested, and have also facilitated the rebuilding of local self-government. In 
the 1990s, the idea of local self-government was essentially derived from the 
interwar period and choices that would have retained the institutional 
elements introduced during the Soviet period were consciously avoided, if 
possible. In addition to interwar and communist institutional and attitudinal 
legacies, aspects such as context, agents’ interest and external support also 
influenced the institutional choices.  
 
Research question 3: What are the similarities and differences between 
the development of central-local relations in the two periods of 
independence? 
While the interwar system was mainly an inherited one, in the 1990s the 
central-local relations of the Soviet period were drastically changed as a result 
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of decentralisation and democratisation. Furthermore, the state traditions 
followed in the two different periods are different. While in the interwar period 
both the local and state level followed the continental tradition, in the 1990s 
the local government system was based on the Scandinavian tradition202 and 
the national level on continental one (more specifically on the German one). 
These engendered a different developmental logic as well as inherent conflicts 
in the central-local relations in the post-communist period. 
                                                 




8 CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is debatable whether the current institutions in Estonia have their roots in 
the interwar period or whether wholly new structures have sprung up in 
Estonian soil. One thing is clear, however: what took place at the end of the 
1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s was a revival of local democracy. 
When it comes to the specific institutions, it can be concluded that the impact 
of the interwar experience on the post-communist institutions varies. 
This thesis aimed to analyse the role of legacies and the applicability of a 
path dependence rationale as far as the development of post-communist local 
government in Estonia is concerned. As the study dealt with both history and 
institutions, historical institutionalism appeared to be an appropriate 
theoretical approach. Since starting to work on the topic there has been a 
notable advancement in the field, including through debates on central 
concepts such as legacies, path dependence, and critical junctures, but there is 
still a long way to go before the majority of scholars reach a consensus on what 
the term legacy actually means, for instance, and before they speak the same 
language. When it comes to empirical studies, the possible impact of the 
interwar experience on post-communist democratisation and institutional 
development is still a relatively grey area. 
The thesis makes an original contribution to this field of study by providing 
a synopsis of selected aspects of Estonian local government over a time frame 
of almost one century and by analysing certain developments using the 
historical institutionalist approach, coupled with practices from the post-
communist approach. 
Conclusions and their implications 
The main conclusions of the thesis are as follows: 
First, it can be claimed that path dependence has been stronger for 
institutions as organisations and for interconnected institutions (e.g. county 
government) than for purely procedural ones (e.g. electoral rules). The direct 
election of mayors is also a procedural institution, but changes in this respect 
would influence the power balance between the council and the mayor and 
hence it has been more path dependent than rules concerning council 
elections. Whereas the choice between an open or a closed list, or the method 
by which mandates are allocated after elections does not impact the functions 
of the council, the direct election of a mayor would give the mayor a direct 
mandate instead of a mandate from the council. A mayor with a direct 
mandate would be less dependent on the council. This is in line with Pierson’s 
(2004) elaboration of positive feedback and path dependence. 
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Second, despite the fact that historical institutionalism is limited in 
providing an explanation for the development of election rules in Estonia, it 
does not imply that, taken together, various new institutionalisms could not 
provide a more exhaustive explanation for the development of electoral rules 
or local-central relations. The complementarity of various strands of 
institutionalism has already been advocated for some time (e.g. Katznelson & 
Weingast, 2005; Peters, 1999; Raudla et al., 2017; Thelen, 1999). 
Third, although one reason for the uniqueness of the Estonian case was its 
relatively long years of interwar democracy compared to many other post-
communist countries, it used the institutions from the authoritarian period 
(i.e. the end of the 1930s) instead as a source of ideas for rebuilding local 
government in the 1990s. Hence, the current study has demonstrated that 
Estonian post-communist institutional choices related to local government 
were more influenced by the interwar authoritarian period and less by its 
democratic period. For this reason, in the case of Estonia, Wittenberg’s (2013) 
proposed alternative periodisation, whereby the ‘authoritarian period’ label 
would cover both the Era of Silence as well as communism, would not be 
useful.  
Metaphorically speaking, it could be claimed that while the democratic 
interwar period provided a vision as to what the rebuilt house should look like 
when complete, the builders had some construction materials from the 
interwar authoritarian period at their disposal, albeit only after they had 
customised them somewhat to fit the new structure. Even if it sounds 
paradoxical that decision-makers turned to the legislation enacted under 
interwar authoritarianism to cull ideas for democratic local government, this 
can be reasoned from readily available texts, as can the fact that they also 
resorted to legal restorationism and aimed to continue in the 1990s from 
where the Republic of Estonia was interrupted in 1940. Furthermore, local 
government in the 1920s was a result of the critical juncture of 1917 and thus 
not self-designed by the Estonian elite, while the changes at the end of the 
1930s were brought about by ethnic Estonians. Another reason why we find 
very few references to the 1920s might be that the legislation on local 
government at the time was fragmented. The Estonian case broadly confirmed 
what many scholars have claimed – the majority of ideas and institutions at 
the beginning of the 1990s in Eastern and Central Europe were either 
anchored in interwar life or followed the example of Western democracies 
(Baldersheim & Illner, 1996; Nunberg, 1999) as there was a lack of innovative 
ideas (Habermas, 1990). Nonetheless, some innovative ideas on local 
government institutions were proposed in the process, but these were not 
implemented as a rule. In addition, due to time pressure and lack of 
experience, it is justified to re-establish institutions based on one’s own 
experience or that of others. The current thesis demonstrated that legacies 
were carried over from the interwar period to the post-communist period 
mainly through the legal texts and written sources of the interwar republic, 
while political leaders were enablers in the process. The leaders had to decide 
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on the extent to which they would revert to history and to locally tried and 
tested solutions, and the extent to which they would look towards the rest of 
Europe. 
Fourth, for Estonian local government, the Soviet period was more than 
just a temporary divergence or diversion from the path set in the pre-
communist period. In terms of the institutional choices made at the critical 
juncture (1989–1993), and given the context, the desire to discontinue 
communist legacies was greater than the desire to revive the interwar legacies, 
and hence the communist legacies sometimes either weakened or eliminated 
the possibility of reviving the interwar legacies.  
Fifth, this comparative historical analysis seems to be broadly in line with 
the conclusion drawn by Pop-Eleches (2007) in his statistical analysis, namely 
that interwar statehood had a lesser impact on the first years of transition and 
a greater impact in the 2000s. This is due to the fact that during the initial re-
independence years in Estonia it was important to sever the communist 
legacies. The latter eliminated some of the institutional alternatives for local 
government in the 1990s. The geographical location was also of paramount 
importance, however, as relations with Finland and, to a lesser extent, with 
Sweden meant that these countries provided Estonia with potential examples 
and lessons to learn from. 
Sixth, the analysis of selected local government institutions in Estonia 
demonstrated that the legacies explanation can have a place in the historical 
institutionalist approach. The legacies concept helps to connect the two 
periods of independence because, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, the local 
government elite of the interwar republic was eliminated in the 1940s, and the 
system created under the Soviet period primarily adopted a Union-wide 
approach. Historical legacies exerted an impact on the choice of path at the 
critical junctures and in some cases also contributed towards adhering to the 
chosen path well after a critical juncture had closed. 
The final point is related to the definition of legacy. If I had rigorously 
applied the definition suggested by Collier and Munck (2017, p. 6) in 
comparative historical analysis, according to which ‘legacy is an enduring, self-
perpetuating institutional heritance of the critical juncture that persists and is 
stable for a substantial period’, we would not be able to talk about the legacies 
of the local government system established in 1937/38 because it was not used 
for a substantial period. If there is no legacy, there is no critical juncture 
(Collier & Munck, 2017, p. 6), and hence we would not be able to talk about a 
critical juncture for local government in the 1930s either. The critical juncture 
and legacies for local government in the interwar period would stem only from 
1917. For that reason, I am of the opinion that a looser definition of legacy is 
justified in post-communist studies. Although ‘one of the core puzzles of post-
communist transformation literature still relevant today’ is ‘the role of legacies 
in shaping the institutional choices’ (Sarapuu, 2017), in this study it is relevant 
not only from the empirical point of view, but also from the methodological 
perspective. Post-communist studies would benefit a great deal from the 
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convergence of the legacy explanation with the one used in historical 
institutionalism, especially when it comes to theory-building based on a large 
number of case studies. 
Limitations of the current study and new avenues for further research 
This thesis blended historical institutionalism and comparative historical 
analysis with the approaches used in post-communist studies. In one sense, 
this can be seen as a major weakness, particularly as the concept of legacy has 
different meanings in different traditions. On the other hand, while 
considerable research on the post-communist period has focused only on 
communist legacies, in the case of Estonia I sought to delve further back to 
study the impact of the often-idealised interwar period on the post-communist 
period.  
One limitation of this study was its scope due to the need to strike a balance 
between depth and breadth. If I were to undertake the research again, I would 
narrow down the focus. However, an advantage of the current approach is that 
it analysed several aspects and attempted to reduce the risk of overlooking 
important connections between elements of local government and possible 
contingencies. In this way, the current study could also ease the work of other 
scholars studying the same topic, as a general overview of different aspects and 
periods has been provided, albeit with some lacunae. 
I concur with Lussier and LaPorte (2017), who claim that competing 
conceptions of critical junctures and ‘methodological debates pose real 
obstacles to theoretical advancement’ (p. 3). The same applies to the legacy 
concept. Moreover, the significance of the current thesis is reduced due to the 
fact that various historical institutionalism and post-communist scholars use 
competing definitions of legacies, making generalisation based on different 
case studies challenging. For example, when following a critical junctures 
approach, if we identify a critical juncture in the interwar period that produces 
an enduring legacy, should we regard its appearance in the post-communist 
period as a revival of a legacy or an antecedent condition instead, despite the 
fact that the phenomenon was not present during the communist period? 
As institutions are usually interrelated, the current thesis served the 
purpose of mapping those aspects of Estonian local government that could 
benefit from further analysis, possibly by delving even further back into 
history than the current study in order to find even deeper roots for some 
institutions. 
The attempt to address the initial research questions may have raised more 
questions for further research than it has provided answers. These questions 
could not be answered within the scope of the current study. Among them, for 
example, is the question of why the county-level functions have not been 
transferred to the municipal associations in Estonia. Can this be explained by 
the path dependence approach? In addition, what explains the limited 
financial autonomy of local government? Is it mainly due to the Soviet past, 
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attitudinal legacies, or something else? Clark (2002, p. 44) has indicated that 
the debate on ‘whether values and attitudes facilitate the emergence of 
democracy or democracy causes a change in political culture’ is a part of post-
communist studies. The attitudinal legacies and political culture are outside 
the scope of the current study, but it would be both interesting and challenging 
to study their role in the context of the interwar and post-communist periods, 
particularly because in the former period, the power had been mainly held by 
Baltic Germans, while in the latter the people who had interwar local 
government experience had largely been eliminated and the people working 
for the local soviets often continued working for the post-communist local 
authorities. The cultural variables are more a question of sociological 
institutionalism than historical institutionalism. 
Furthermore, it is sometimes difficult to identify a legacy and the kind of 
impact it has had. Therefore, from the methodological point of view, Frye 
(2014), for example, has demonstrated the value of comparison in the case of 
communist legacies. Using his approach could provide a more solid basis for 
reaching a conclusion on the impact of institutional legacies on outcomes. This 
could be conducted at the level of one or two elements due to challenges 
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The Figure not only demonstrates the splitting and merging of counties and 
raions, but also how their names have changed or remained unchanged. For 
the purposes of clarity, the Figure does not reflect the changes which concern 
only one or two village soviets. The numbers at the base of the Figure indicate 





APPENDIX B: FINANCIAL INDICATORS 
 
Figure B1 The share of head tax within the rural municipalities’ total revenue during selected 
years of the interwar period 
Note. Based on data from Riigi Statistika Keskbüroo (1937) and Feldman (1939). 
 
 
Figure B2 Cities – revenue structure (ordinary revenue), 1922–1935/36 
Note. Based on data from Neuhaus (1927a, 1929), Riigi Statistika Keskbüroo 
(1937), and Feldman (1938c). 
As the nomenclature was changed starting in the financial year 1936/37, the years 

























1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927/28 1928/29 1929/30 1930/31 1931/32 1932/33 1933/34 1934/35 1935/36
Taxes on ownership 24.9% 33.6% 35.6% 32.4% 30.2% 26.5% 31.2% 31.2% 30.2% 35.9% 36.5% 36.0% 33.2% 34.9%
Tax on commercial and industrial enterprises 25.9% 21.9% 19.7% 19.1% 16.7% 16.8% 13.5% 13.1% 12.9% 14.3% 14.1% 12.8% 12.7% 11.8%
Tax on using right 3.1% 3.4% 3.6% 3.6% 3.5% 3.1% 3.4% 3.5% 1.9% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.2% 1.9%
Other taxes 7.1% 7.5% 5.4% 4.1% 4.3% 4.0% 3.5% 3.5% 3.9% 4.2% 2.3% 1.6% 1.7% 1.5%
Net profit from the use of cities' assets 7.0% 7.0% 8.0% 9.2% 7.7% 9.2% 8.2% 7.8% 7.9% 8.5% 8.3% 8.4% 8.1% 7.5%
Net profit from cities' enterprises 13.8% 7.1% 4.9% 6.3% 9.6% 8.8% 7.8% 8.4% 7.9% 8.3% 9.6% 11.6% 11.8% 13.1%
Miscellaneous receipts from special tasks 18.2% 19.4% 22.7% 25.3% 28.0% 31.6% 19.7% 22.2% 21.9% 23.3% 23.6% 24.2% 26.7% 25.4%
Financial operations 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 12.4% 9.9% 13.1% 3.1% 3.1% 2.6% 3.3% 3.5%
















 1928/29 1929/30 1930/31 1931/32 1932/33 
Tax on real estate 10.28% 8.58% 8.56% 8.74% 13.38% 
Income tax 5.01% 5.71% 5.03% 5.73% 5.53% 
Local taxes (incl. head tax) 53.42% 56.58% 58.00% 57.14% 52.81% 
Special taxes on documents 1.47% 0.50% 0.25% 0.24% 0.29% 
Other taxes 4.72% 5.21% 6.03% 6.06% 2.62% 
Rural municipality’s funds 0.72% 1.59% 2.05% 2.70% 2.43% 
Rural municipality’s assets 2.33% 2.84% 3.41% 2.89% 3.03% 
Rural municipality’s enterprises 0.48% 0.34% 0.36% 0.39% 0.40% 
Subsidies 2.19% 1.06% 0.92% 0.69% 0.68% 
Reimbursable expenditure 1.05% 1.28% 1.82% 1.99% 2.22% 
Planned loans 9.88% 9.47% 7.06% 6.75% 8.79% 
Various revenues 8.45% 6.85% 6.51% 6.69% 7.82% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Figure B3 Rural municipalities – revenue structure (ordinary revenue), 1928/29–1932/33 
Note. Based on data from Riigi Statistika Keskbüroo (1937). 
In the case of rural municipalities, the Statistical Office started to collect detailed 
data only in 1927 and the nomenclature changed starting in the financial year 
1934/35. 

































































































































































Figure B4 Local government expenditure as share of general government expenditure and 
GDP, 1996–2017 
Note. Based on data from the Ministry of Finance. 
 
Table B1 Local government revenue structure, 1997–2002 
Indicator 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Local budget income 
      
..individual income tax 48.12% 49.07% 47.83% 46.54% 36.16% 34.87% 
..other taxes 5.29% 5.02% 4.91% 5.64% 4.33% 4.01% 
..state fees 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.02% 
..miscellaneous income 1.01% 0.37% 0.46% 0.50% 0.71% 0.81% 
..revenue from property 5.83% 5.48% 5.59% 10.01% 14.85% 10.65% 
..financial income 0.40% 0.48% 0.25% 0.10% 0.31% 0.12% 
..income from economy 3.42% 3.71% 3.62% 3.85% 2.97% 5.64% 
Residue to cover the 
expenses 
4.32% 2.35% 2.45% 2.03% 1.63% 3.09% 
Settlements of accounts and 
transfers (incl. subsidies from 
state budget) 
23.66% 25.63% 26.07% 23.37% 32.25% 33.11% 
Loans 7.93% 7.87% 8.51% 7.92% 6.77% 7.62% 
Total  100% 100% 99% 99% 99% 99% 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   






   
   
   
   
   




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   






   
   
 
   
   
   
   





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX D: LIST OF PRIME MINISTERS 
AND MINISTERS OF THE INTERIOR 
List of Prime Ministers and Ministers of the Interior 1918 – 1940 
 Dates Prime Minister / 
State Elder 
Minister of Interiora 
1 24/02/1918 – 12/11/1918 Konstantin Päts Konstantin Päts 
2 12/11/1918 – 27/11/1918 Konstantin Päts Konstantin Päts 
3 27/11/1918 – 09/05/1919 Konstantin Päts August Peet 
4 09/05/1919 – 18/11/1919 Otto Strandman Aleksander Oinas (until 18 July); 
Aleksander Hellat (from 25 July) 
5 18/11/1919 – 28/07/1920 Jaan Tõnisson Aleksander Hellat 
6 28/07/1920 – 30/07/1920 Ado Birk Karl Einbund (Kaarel Eenpalu) 
7 30/07/1920 – 26/10/1920 Jaan Tõnisson Karl Einbund (Kaarel Eenpalu) 
8 26/10/1920 – 25/01/1921 Ants Piip Lui Olesk 
9 25/01/1921 – 21/11/1922 Konstantin Päts Karl Einbund (Kaarel Eenpalu) 
10 21/11/1922 – 02/08/1923 Juhan Kukk Karl Einbund (Kaarel Eenpalu) (from 
07/04/1923) 
11 02/08/1923 – 26/03/1924 Konstantin Päts Karl Einbund (Kaarel Eenpalu) 
12 26/03/1924 – 16/12/1924 Friedrich Karl Akel Theodor Rõuk 
13 16/12/1924 – 15/12/1925 Jüri Jaakson Karl Einbund (Kaarel Eenpalu) 
14 15/12/1925 – 23/07/1926 Jaan Teemant Karl Einbund (Kaarel Eenpalu) 
15 23/07/1926 – 04/03/1927 Jaan Teemant Heinrich Laretei (until 12/11/1926) 
Jaan Soots (acting, from 
13/11/1926) 
16 04/03/1927 – 09/12/1927 Jaan Teemant Jaan Hünerson 
17 09/12/1927 – 04/12/1928 Jaan Tõnisson Jaan Hünerson 
18 04/12/1928 – 09/07/1929 August Rei Tõnis Kalbus 
19 09/07/1929 – 12/02/1931 Otto Strandman Tõnis Kalbus (until 12/04/1930) 
Ado Anderkopp (from 12/04/1930) 
20 12/02/1931 – 19/02/1932 Konstantin Päts Jaan Hünerson (until 20/11/1931) 
Johan Reinhold (Raid) (from 
20/11/1931) 
21 19/02/1932 – 19/07/1932 Jaan Teemant Ado Anderkopp 
22 19/07/1932 – 01/11/1932 Karl Eenpalu (Kaarel 
Einbund) 
Ado Anderkopp 
23 01/11/1932 – 18/05/1933 Konstantin Päts Ado Anderkopp 
24 18/05/1933 – 21/10/1933 Jaan Tõnisson Vladimir Rooberg (Roopere) (until 
03/10/1933) 
Ernst Heinrich Ein (from 04/10/1933) 
25 21/10/1933 – 24/04/1938 Konstantin Päts Johan Müller (until 25/08/1934) 
Kaarel Eenpalu (Karl Einbund) 
(25/08/1934 – 09/05/1938) 
26 09/05/1938 – 12/10/1939 Karl Eenpalu (Kaarel 
Einbund) 
Richard Veerma (Veerman) 
27 12/10/1939 – 21/06/1940 Jüri Uluots August Jürima (Jüriman(n)) 
a In July 1929 the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of the Court were merged, and in April 
1934 the two Ministries were separated. Therefore, for five years, there was a Minister of the Court 
and the Interior instead of a Minister of the Interior. 
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List of Prime Ministers and Ministers of the Interior or of Regional Affairs 
1990–2017 
 Dates Prime Minister Minister responsible for local 
government or regional 
development 
1* 03/04/1990–30/01/1992 Edgar Savisaar Olev Laanjärv 
2* 30/01/1992–21/10/1992 Tiit Vähi Robert Närska 
3 21/10/1992–08/11/1994 Mart Laar Lagle Parek (until 27/11/1993) 
Heiki Arike (from 14/12/1993) 
4 08/11/1994–17/04/1995 Andres Tarand Kaido Kama 
5 17/04/1995–06/11/1995 Tiit Vähi Edgar Savisaar (until 10/10/1995) 
Tiit Vähi (from 11/10/1995) 
6 06/11/1995–17/03/1997 Tiit Vähi Märt Rask (until 01/12/1996) 
Riivo Sinijärv (from 01/12/1996 
7 17/03/1997–25/03/1999 Mart Siimann Peep Aru 
8 25/03/1999–28/01/2002 Mart Laar Toivo Asmer 
9 28/01/2002–10/04/2003 Siim Kallas Toivo Asmer 
10 10/04/2003–13/04/2005 Juhan Parts Jaan Õunapuu (from 13/04/2004) 
11 13/04/2005–05/04/2007 Andrus Ansip Jaan Õunapuu 
12 05/04/2007–06/04/2011 Andrus Ansip Vallo Reimaa (until 22/01/2008) 
Siim-Valmar Kiisler (from 23/01/2008) 
13 06/04/2011–26/03/2014 Andrus Ansip Siim-Valmar Kiisler 
14 26/03/2014–09/04/2015 Taavi Rõivas Hanno Pevkur (until 02/07/2014) 
15 09/04/2015–23/11/2016 Taavi Rõivas Arto Aas 
16 23/11/2016–.... Jüri Ratas Mihhail Korb (until 11/06/2017) 
Jaak Aab (since 12/06/2017) 






APPENDIX E: INFORMATION ON THE 
INTERVIEWS 
Interviewees 
Date of the 
interview 
Background of the interviewee 
21 September 2010 The last chairman of the executive committee (1988–
1991) and the first mayor of a small city (1991–1992) 
23 September 2010 The last chairman of the executive committee (1990) 
and the first mayor (1991–1993) of a small city 
16 December 2010 The first mayor of a republic city 
7 February 2011 Deputy chairman of a raion executive committee, who 
continued working in the county government 
8 February 2011 Head of raion financial department 
Interview themes 
• The background of the interviewee; 
• The efforts and history of gaining the status of local municipality; 
• Relationships either between the local soviet and raion in various policy 
fields (finance, education, etc.) or between raion and the central 
government; 
• The mayor being also the chair of the council 
• The changes in personnel and in tasks; and  
• The development of legislation (in case the interviewee was involved in 
the process). 

